Bigger’ after all? The Effect of Structural Policy Coordination Authorities on the Multidimensionality of Policy Output
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6282014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kristina Ophey (0000-0002-8445-2025, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics University of Cologne Cologne), Jan Schwalbach (0000-0002-6990-8098, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics University of Cologne Cologne, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1592-1610 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.13334 |
| OpenAlex | W4226157213 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 30 |
To be ‘bigger on big things’, Jean‐Claude Juncker reformed the European Commission's organizational set‐up by adding another hierarchical layer to its political sphere. Vice‐Presidents shall foster coordination between departmental Commissioners when drafting policies so that these are more multidimensional in kind. Taking an actor‐centred organization theoretical perspective, complemented by principal–agent reasoning, we conceptualize these as structural policy coordination authorities. We hypothesize that this organizational manipulation to a core executive's typical multidivisional set‐up incentivizes silo‐focused actors to coordinate more across policy sectors. Hence, the coordination dilemma that typically confronts core executives might be counteracted, resulting in more multidimensional policy output. Constituting a ‘case in time’, we assess whether Commission policy output has changed systematically after the Juncker reform. Using newly developed indicators for policy multidimensionality, we evaluate all legislative proposals developed under the Juncker and Barroso II Commissions. We find that proposals under Juncker are indeed ‘bigger’ than before
Business · Commission · Core (optical fiber · Corporate governance · Dilemma · Economic policy · Economic system · Economics · European commission · European union · Industrial organization · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · European Union Policy and Governance · Finance · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration
International organizations, the EU and peace among member states
Connecting internal and external dynamics in European intersectoral policy coordination – the case of education and employment
External pressure, bureaucratic politics and policy insiders
The rift between executive contraction and executive detraction
The Normalization of the European Commission
The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis
Making and Breaking Governments
Which Policy for Europe?
The European Commission of the Twenty-First Century
How Bureaucratic Structure Matters
Organization theory
The Management of Change in Public Organizations
What’s New? A First Appraisal of the Juncker Commission
Linking Agenda Setting to Coordination Structures
An Economic Theory of Democracy
T urf wars in government administration
Core Executive Studies in Britain
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Managing the house
Executive politics as usual
Intra‐ and Inter‐Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President
Procedural models of European Union politics
One agenda-setter or many? The varying success of policy initiatives by individual Directorates-General of the European Commission 1994–2016
Collegiality and the Politics of European Competition Policy
Legislative Politics in the European Union
Reputation and Organizational Politics
Crises as driver of policy accumulation
Games Real Actors Could Play
Coordination inside government administrations
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |