Capture the Fort

Explaining the Timing of Rebel Assaults on Cities During Wartime

Bibliographic Data

ID6284591
AuthorsGary Uzonyi (0000-0001-6006-993X, University of Tennessee at Knoxville), Bryce W Reeder (0000-0002-1782-6605, University of Missouri)
Year2024
Volume68
Issue4
Pages591-615
Publication date2024-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027231176232
OpenAlexW4378652184
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited49

Rebels that fight near or capture cities gain more concessions from the government than those that remain in the periphery. Yet, not all groups challenge urban centers. Previous scholarship expects rebel strength to explain this strategic decision. However, weak rebel groups challenge cities, too. Our approach focuses on the conflict process more broadly. We argue that as the network of rebels challenging the government increases, opposition groups become more likely to attack cities as either they become emboldened, given the government’s disadvantage in multi-front wars, or they are propelled to strategic and resource centers in competition with the other groups. Statistical analysis of all African conflicts from 1989-2009 strongly supports this logic, while an exploration of most typical cases highlights each of these mechanisms in practice. This project thus links literature on civil war tactics and conflict contagion

Civil Conflict · Competition (biology · Development economics · Disadvantage · Economics · Government (linguistics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Scholarship · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence