An Application of a Richardson Process Model
Soviet-Amer.Can Interactions in the Test Ban Negotiations 1962-1963
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284805 |
|---|---|
| Authors | P Terrence Hopmann (0000-0002-5612-7102, Department of Political Science and Quigley Center of International Studies University of Minnesota), Theresa C Smith (Department of Political Science and Quigley Center of International Studies University of Minnesota) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 701-726 |
| Publication date | 1977-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277702100409 |
| OpenAlex | W2140592755 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 24 |
Richardson models have often been used to describe reactive processes in arms races. This paper argues that, following the work of Otomar Bartos, negotiations may also be analyzed as a reactive process rather than as a process of discrete position changes. Four variants of the basic Richardson model were employed to determine whether the Partial Test Ban negotiations exhibited such an interactive pattern. In all four equations for the behavior of both the United States and the USSR the stimulus variable provided the greatest explanatory power, supporting the notion that these negotiations were reactive. Several important differences emerged, however, between the Test Ban negotiations and most arms races. On balance, the data gave strong support for the basic assumption of Richardson models, namely that negotiations may be treated as a highly reactive process
Biology · Econometrics · Epistemology · Explanatory power · Mathematical economics · Negotiation · Political science · Test (biology · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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| Unique citing works | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,49 |
| Citation span | 1977 - 2023 (47) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 24 |