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When Is an Arms Rivalry a Prisoner's Dilemma

Richardson's Models and 2 × 2 Games

Bibliographic Data

ID6285280
AuthorsMark Lichbach (0000-0002-2461-5013, University of Illinois Chicago, corresponding author), Mark Irving Lichbach (University of Illinois Chicago)
Year1990
Volume34
Issue1
Pages29-56
Publication date1990-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002790034001002
OpenAlexW1970325359
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited27

This article uses the utility functions from Richardson arms rivalry (R-AR) models to help determine the equilibrium outcomes of 2 × 2 game-theory arms rivalry (GT-AR) models. Three different formulations of a R-AR, one general and two specific, are employed. Four different formulations of a GT-AR, a PD arms rivalry (PD-AR), a Chicken arms rivalry (Chicken-AR), a Deadlock arms rivalry (Deadlock-AR), and a Stag Hunt arms rivalry (Stag Hunt-AR), are also used. I first establish the most general possible restrictions on Richardson-type utility functions that determine the four common 2 × 2 arms rivalry games. I then establish two counterintuitive results: One of the specific formulations of a R-AR may help imply the equilibrium outcomes of a PD- or Deadlock-AR but is inconsistent with the equilibrium outcomes of a Chicken- or Stag Hunt-AR; it is impossible for either specific formulation of a R-AR to ever yield the equilibrium outcome of a Stag Hunt-AR

Counterintuitive · Deadlock · Developmental psychology · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Prisoner's dilemma · Rivalry · Sibling rivalry (animals · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Philosophy · Psychology

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  • Fights, Games, and Debates

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  • A Selected Bibliography of Arms Race Models and Related Subjects

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    Open Access•Joanne Gowa•International Organization•1986

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Unique citing works6
Citations per year0,17
Citation span1991 - 1998 (8)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 6
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