Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285852 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steven J Bram (0000-0003-3650-0392, New York University, corresponding author), Steven J Brams (New York University) |
| Year | 1975 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 596-612 |
| Publication date | 1975-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277501900402 |
| OpenAlex | W2138152596 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 18 |
The relationship between Newcomb's problem, which involves an apparent paradox of prediction, and Prisoners' Dilemma is explicated. After describing a resolution to Newcomb's problem, due to John A. Ferejohn, that renders the two contradictory principles of choice in Newcomb's problem (dominance and expected utility) consistent, I show Prisoners' Dilemma to be a “symmetricized” version of Newcomb's problem in its payoff structure. The assumption about predictability of choice made for one player in Newcomb's problem, when applied to both players in Prisoners' Dilemma–one considered as a leader and the other as a follower–offers a resolution to this dilemma that, while consistent with the resolution offered by metagame theory, rationalizes the existence of a metagame solution within a probabilistic, rational-choice framework. The relevance of the mutual-predictability assumption to the solution of arms races, and tragedy-of-commons situations generally, is discussed
Commons · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Expected utility hypothesis · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Political science · Predictability · Prisoner's dilemma · Stochastic game · Superrationality · Tragedy of the commons · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy
The Absurd Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion
Why We Should Reject S
The Mere Addition Paradox
What We Believe Ourselves to Be
Personal Identity and Morality
The Non‐Identity Problem
Different Attitudes to Time
How We Are not What We Believe
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
A World Without Deception
Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics
What Does Matter
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Theories That Are Indirectly Self‐Defeating
Personal Identity and Rationality
Concluding Chapter
Practical Dilemmas
Conclusions
Why Our Identity Is not What Matters
The Appeal to Full Relativity
Thinking through uncertainty
Tickles, iteration, and habits
Newcomb's Problem and Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemmas
Reasons and Persons
From social projection to social behaviour
Newcomb’s problem isn’t a choice dilemma
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
A Game‐Theoretic View of Voting
The Influence of Moral Considerations on the Perceived Consequences of an Action
Teaching & Learning Guide for Speech Variation, Utility, and Game Theory
Speech Variation, Utility, and Game Theory
The Geometry of the Arms Race
Institutions and the Free Rider
Multiple Aim Point Basing
Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities
Symmetry and the Illusion of Control as Bases for Cooperative Behavior
Rational Choice and Congressional Norms
Prisoner's Dilemma
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice
Prisoner's Dilemma
N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma
The Unpredictability of Free Choices
Newcomb's Paradox Revisited
Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma
The Tragedy of the Commons
| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,8 |
| Citation span | 1977 - 2026 (50) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 39 |