Information and financial crisis policy-making
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6290609 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Gandrud (0000-0003-4723-7585, Department of International Politics, City University London, UK; European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, corresponding author), Mícheál O''Keeffe, Mícheál O’keeffe (European Central Bank), Mícheál O'Keeffe (Department of International Politics, City University London, UK; European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 386-405 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13501763.2016.1149205 |
| OpenAlex | W2201657049 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 24 |
The degree to which governments intervene to contain financial crises varies considerably. We aim to understand why policy-makers choose the level of intervention they do to contain financial shocks. In particular, we want to understand why policy-makers may choose policies that create outcomes they do not want. We focus on a defining feature of financial crisis policy-making that has been largely unaddressed in the literature on policy responses to crises: policy-makers lack good information about the health of their banking systems. So they rely on their bureaucrats and other actors for necessary information. However, information providers may have different policy preferences. To understand the interactions between these actors and the implications for policy choice, we advance a signalling game of financial crisis containment. We use a case study of the recent Irish crisis to demonstrate how information asymmetries can have a significant impact on bailout choices
Bailout · Business · Economic policy · Economics · Financial crisis · Information asymmetry · Intervention (counseling · Macroeconomics · Public economics · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Finance
The Power of Inaction
Delegating Powers
Strategic Information Transmission
Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses
When all is said and done
Governing Finance
The diffusion of financial supervisory governance ideas
Advocates
Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises
Why Do Governments and the imf Enter into Agreements? Statistically Selected Cases
Does Banking Union Worsen theEU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency
Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis
Saving the Banks
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
Varieties of helping capitalism
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2021 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |