Legislatures
Rational Systems or Rational Myths
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6295052 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nancy Shulock (California State University System, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 299-324 |
| Publication date | 1998-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024386 |
| OpenAlex | W2312660230 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 22 |
This article addresses a gap in the literature on legislatures as organizations. Organization theory has focused on private firms. Theories of public organization have focused on bureaucracies. Political scientists use formal, rational choice models to study legislative institutions but are primarily interested in explaining individual, not organizational behavior. I suggest that organization theory, applied to legislatures, can provide some useful insights beyond the rational choice approaches predominant in political science. I apply an organization theory perspective, which I call interpretive theory, to engage the current debate among rational choice theorists over whether legislative organization is driven by member interest in policy outcomes or in political positioning—an argument most elaborately presented by Keith Krehbiel's information theory. I present an empirical analysis of information use by congressional committees from 1985 to 1994 to challenge Krehbiel's view and to suggest the utility of the organization theory perspective
Argument (complex analysis · Bureaucracy · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Microeconomics · Organizational theory · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Positive political theory · Public choice · Rational choice theory (criminology · Sociology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Organizations
The giant jigsaw puzzle
Information and Legislative Organization
Institutions and Social Conflict
Organizations
Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics
Between knowledge and power
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
One Bill, Many Committees
Parties and Committees in the House
Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences
A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System
Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics
The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
Information Transmission in Debate
The Analysis of Committee Power
Why are Congressional Committees Powerful
The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,26 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2024 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |