Wrongful Observation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6325684 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Helen Frowe (0000-0003-4754-6847), J Parry (0000-0002-2649-9220) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 104-137 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/papa.12142 |
| OpenAlex | W4255802127 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 2 |
According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they are rendered liable to bear costs to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer.Various possible grounds of this connection have been proposed, such as causally contributing to another's wrongdoing 1 , sharing particular kinds of intentions with the primary wrongdoer 2 , and shared membership in certain types of group or collective 3 .As we employ it, to say that a person is morally liable to bear a cost is to say that she has, through her actions, forfeited her usual rights against bearing that cost.In virtue of her liability, she is not wronged by the imposition of that cost. 4 In this paper, we argue that, under certain conditions, observation can establish the relevant connection to another's wrongdoing.We address, specifically, observation in the context of what we call degrading wrongs.Examples of degrading wrongs include sexual assault and harassment, bullying, slavery, and racially-motivated harms (we elaborate on the notion of degrading wrongs in Section Two).We defend the following thesis
Art history · Library science · PARRY · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Classics · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · History · Law · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |