Political Attention and Public Spending in the United States

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6328474
AutoresPeter Bjerre Mortensen (0000-0001-5809-3260, autor de correspondencia)
Año2009
Volumen37
Número3
Páginas435-455
Fecha de publicación2009-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolicy Studies Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1541-0072.2009.00322.x
OpenAlexW2069001028
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas26
Referencias citadas28

According to Jones and Baumgartner's disproportionate information processing model, it is crucial to study fluctuations in congressional attention over time and across policy issues to understand congressional policy decisions including decisions on the federal budget. Drawing on classical ideas about reelection‐oriented behavior, on the one hand, and the blocking power of federal agencies, on the other, this paper extends and specifies the attention‐spending predictions of the disproportionate information processing model. Specifically, spending effects of congressional attention shifts are argued to be crucially dependent on both the spending preferences expressed by the U.S. public and on pressure from spending advocates. An empirical evaluation of the association between changes in congressional attention measures and federal budget appropriations across 12 spending domains and 33 years (1970–2003) supports this conditional hypothesis derived from the extended disproportionate information processing model

Association (psychology · Cognitive psychology · Economics · Federal budget · Information processing · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Public spending · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Psychology · Public Administration