The Obligation to Contribute to Discretionary Public Goods

Bibliographic Data

ID6345926
AuthorsGeorge Klosko (0000-0002-7792-7344, University of Virginia, corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume38
Issue2
Pages196-214
Publication date1990-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.1990.tb01488.x
OpenAlexW2042251026
LanguageEN
Citations received9

The principle of fairness, first introduced by H. L. A. Hart in 1955, is able to support a workable theory of political obligation upon liberal premises. In a previous paper, ‘Presumptive benefit, fairness, and political obligation’, I argued that the principle can establish general obligations to cooperate in the provision of ‘presumptive public goods' (that is, public goods that are indispensable to the typical member of society). Because a wider range of governmental services is necessary for the provision of presumptive goods, the principle also supports obligations to support ‘discretionary public goods' (goods that are desirable but not indispensable). The ‘indirect argument’ developed in this paper counters the criticisms of my previous paper presented by A. John Simmons in ‘The anarchist position: a reply to Klosko and Senor

Argument (complex analysis · Business · Economics · Goods and services · Law and economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Obligation · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Public economics · Public good · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification