Who Recovers First

Banking Crises Resolution in Developing Countries

Bibliographic Data

ID7728017
AuthorsGabriella R Montinola (0000-0003-3297-7484, University of California, Davis, corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume36
Issue5
Pages541-574
Publication date2003-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0010414003036005003
OpenAlexW2131490401
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited51

This article evaluates conditions that facilitate banking crises resolution using data from 67 developing countries from 1980 to 1995. In particular, the author examines explanatory variables under three categories: external macroeconomic constraints, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and domestic political conditions. The principal results of the analyses are twofold. First, IMF credits decrease the probability of resolving banking crises. This result holds controlling for potentially confounding variables and in a test for endogeneity. Second, the decisiveness of a political regime significantly influences the probability of emerging from systemic distress. Specifically, in cases of moderate banking distress, decisiveness facilitates resolution of crisis, but during periods of severe crises, less decisive governments (i.e., governments constrained by accountability groups) are likely to recover more quickly than are those with less constrained executives

Accountability · Distress · Econometrics · Economics · Emerging markets · Endogeneity · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · Principal (computer security · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · International Development and Aid