Timing is everything
A quantitative study of presidentialist regime dynamics in Eurasia, 1992–2016
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7981464 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Henry E Hale (0000-0002-2956-8033, George Washington University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 267-281 |
| Publication date | 2018-09-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Post-Soviet Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1060-586X • E-ISSN: 1938-2855 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1060586x.2018.1500094 |
| OpenAlex | W2889985986 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 47 |
Why do some countries with presidentialist constitutions feature more political closure than others at a given time? A quantitative study of post-Soviet countries since independence finds that much of the observed variation in political closure reflects timing, or the particular point at which a country happens to be within a regime cycle, rather than structural or other factors usually cited to explain regime change. Specifically, how much time a president has had to coordinate rivalrous networks around his or her authority is at least as strong a predictor of the level of regime closure as are economic development, economic growth, resource rents, proximity to Europe, and key cultural factors, even when controlling for the level of closure in the preceding year. This pattern is not found among countries with divided-executive constitutions, indicating it is related to the constitution rather than a general phenomenon
Closure (psychology · Constitution · Democracy · Development economics · Economic geography · Economic rent · Economics · Independence (probability theory · Market economy · Phenomenon · Physics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Regime change · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance · Russia and Soviet political economy
Democracy and Elections in Africa
Voting for Autocracy
Authoritarian Russia
Pluralism by Default
Democracy
Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States
Virtual politics
Patronal Politics
Informal Institutions and Democracy
The Rise and Decline of Nations
The Crisis of Russian Democracy
Democratization by Elections
The Dynamics of Democratization
Democracy Derailed in Russia
The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation
Competitive Authoritarianism
Post-Communist Party Systems
Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa
A Tale of Two Kazakhstans
Political and social networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin
Regime Cycles
Dictators without borders
Preference for Presidentialism
Islam and Authoritarianism
Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World
Endogenous Democratization
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions
The End of the Transition Paradigm
Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies
Delegative Democracy
Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes
Authoritarian and Democratic Diffusion in Post-Communist Regions
A Politics of Institutional Choice
Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities
Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover
Modernization
Elections Under Authoritarianism
Deer in Headlights
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |