Chance, Possibility, and Explanation

Bibliographic Data

ID8397096
AuthorsNina Emery (0000-0001-8726-4292, Brown University, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume66
Issue1
Pages95-120
Publication date2015-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axt041
OpenAlexW2160819503
LanguageEN
Citations received20
References cited33

I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. I suggest an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies. 1 Introduction 2 A Paradigm Case 3 The Incompatibilist’s Criterion 4 Against the Incompatibilist’s Criterion 5 The Explanatory Criterion 6 Conclusion

Economics · Epistemology · Explanatory power · Metaphysics · Position (finance) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science