Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science

Bibliographic Data

ID8397479
AuthorsUwe Peters (0000-0002-7103-3921, University College London, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume72
Issue4
Pages1061-1081
Publication date2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axy079
OpenAlexW2906010609
LanguageEN
Citations received17
References cited38

The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level, even when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that this proposal assumes a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine the project of ensuring reliable belief-formation in science.

Affect (linguistics) · Cognition · Cognitive bias · Confirmation bias · Epistemology · Individualism · Philosophy of science · Political science · Reliability (semiconductor) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology