What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397495 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marc Lange (0000-0002-0704-7376, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 485-511 |
| Publication date | 2013-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axs012 |
| OpenAlex | W2126595017 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 95 |
| References cited | 23 |
Certain scientific explanations of physical facts have recently been characterized as distinctively mathematical–that is, as mathematical in a different way from ordinary explanations that employ mathematics. This article identifies what it is that makes some scientific explanations distinctively mathematical and how such explanations work. These explanations are non-causal, but this does not mean that they fail to cite the explanandum’s causes, that they abstract away from detailed causal histories, or that they cite no natural laws. Rather, in these explanations, the facts doing the explaining are modally stronger than ordinary causal laws (since they concern the framework of any possible causal relation) or are understood in the why question’s context to be constitutive of the physical arrangement at issue. A distinctively mathematical explanation works by showing the explanandum to be more necessary (given the physical arrangement in question) than ordinary causal laws could render it. Distinctively mathematical explanations thus supply a kind of understanding that causal explanations cannot. 1 Introduction 2 Some Distinctively Mathematical Scientific Explanations 3 Are Distinctively Mathematical Explanations Set Apart by their Failure to Cite Causes? 4 Distinctively Mathematical Explanations do not Exploit Causal Powers 5 How these Distinctively Mathematical Explanations Work 6 Conclusion
Causality (physics) · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Mathematical practice · Mathematical structure · Mathematics education · Natural (archaeology) · Physical law · Physics · Set (abstract data type) · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies
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Constraints and Selection
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A reply to Craver and Povich on the directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations
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Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation
Drift beyond Wright–Fisher
Explanatory unification and conceptualization
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Manipulation is key
Structural explanations
Optimal representations and the Enhanced Indispensability Argument
The directionality of topological explanations
Mathematical problem-solving in scientific practice
Explanatory schema and the process of model building
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Renormalization group methods
Idealization, representation, and explanation in the sciences
The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations
Explaining individual differences
Distinctively mathematical explanation and the problem of directionality
Bringing thought experiments back into the philosophy of science
What could mathematics be for it to function in distinctively mathematical scientific explanations
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Hamilton's rule
Realizability and the varieties of explanation
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The Metarepresentational Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanations
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Explaining Mechanism–Task Fit in Neuroscience
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The Narrow Ontic Counterfactual Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience
Distinctively Mathematical Explanations of Game Outcomes
On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
Complements, Not Competitors
Explanatory Distance
Explanatory Abstractions
Minimal Models and the Generalized Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation
Explaining Mathematical Explanation
Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation
Causal Explanation
Making Things Happen
Depth
Science, Truth, and Democracy
In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism
Aspects of Scientific Explanation
Are there Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena
The Nature of Selection
Program explanation
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Conservation Laws in Scientific Explanations
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On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science
| Unique citing works | 95 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7,31 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 91 |