Respect-Worthiness and Dignity

Bibliographic Data

ID9690339
AuthorsCarol Hay (University of Massachusetts Lowell, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume51
Issue4
Pages587-612
Publication date2013-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217313000073
OpenAlexW2151010083
LanguageEN
References cited15

I argue that failing to fulfill the Kantian obligation to protect one’s rational nature might actually vitiate future instances of this obligation. To avoid this conclusion, I argue that, contrary to the received view among Kant scholars, the feature in virtue of which someone has unconditional and incomparable value is not the same feature in virtue of which she is owed the respect that constrains how she may be treated. Even though someone who fails to attempt to protect her rational nature fails to respect herself, and even though this moral failing does make her lose a certain kind of value, her obligations to respect herself remain

Dignity · Epistemology · Feature (linguistics) · Law and economics · Moral obligation · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Virtue · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification