Games Parents and Adolescents Play

Risky Behaviour, Parental Reputation and Strategic Transfers

Bibliographic Data

ID9720231
AuthorsLing-Xin Hao (0000-0002-4694-0917), Lingxin Hao (John Hopkins University), Joseph Hotz (0000-0002-6958-3318, Duke University), V Joseph Hotz (Duke University and NBER), Ginger Zhe Jin (0000-0001-7912-3780)
Year2008
Volume118
Issue528
Pages515-555
Publication date2008-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02132.x
PMID21660221
PMCIDPMC3109916
OpenAlexW2003715290
LanguageEN
Citations received19
References cited43

This paper examines parental reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. In a repeated two-stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalize older children for their adolescent risk-taking behaviours in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviours when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model

Demographic economics · Developmental psychology · Drop out · Economics · Game theory · Incentive · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political science · Repeated game · Reputation · Family Dynamics and Relationships · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Intergenerational and Educational Inequality Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology