Signalling, Inequality and the Social Structure

Bibliographic Data

ID9727504
AuthorsA Ferrer (0000-0002-7385-2381, University of Calgary, corresponding author), Ana M Ferrer
Year2005
Volume72
Issue287
Pages515-529
Publication date2005-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.00428.x
OpenAlexW2122819518
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited13

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous transmission of social status through signalling in the labour market. A signalling game is analysed, in which education, acting as a signalling good, determines one's position in society. The economy's degree of inequality is shown to be a determinant of whether a society is ‘aristocratic’, where high income is the source of social standing, or ‘meritocratic’, bestowing status on high ability. Each social structure shows a different balance between production efficiency and social factors such as equality or mobility

Balance (ability) · Economic growth · Economics · Inequality · Labour economics · Market economy · Meritocracy · Microeconomics · Position (finance) · Signalling · Social change · Social mobility · Social position · Social science · Social status · Sociology · Economic theories and models · Finance · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Psychology