Damned if you, damned if you don’t
The politics of pandemic preparation as a grand challenge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9963162 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Catherine Moury (0000-0001-5405-1493, Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Olivier Jacques (0000-0002-3864-1773, Université de Montréal, corresponding author), Emna Ben Jelili (École de santé publique, Université de Montréal, Canada) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Review of Administrative Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8523 • E-ISSN: 1461-7226 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00208523251342676 |
| OpenAlex | W4411616570 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
In this article, we shed light on the politics of preparation for a pandemic. We show why the existing literature fails to explain the puzzling case of France, which became one the best prepared countries in the world, only to discontinue its efforts to find itself unprepared when COVID hit. To investigate what happened, we conduct a qualitative process-tracing analysis of pandemic preparation efforts for two decades. From this, we induce the causal mechanisms at work during this period and we develop new insights on adverse events preparation and mitigation. Our main contribution is to conceptualize pandemic preparation as an insurance which would reduce future costs only in certain conditions. Given this particularity, we contend that governments take significant electoral risks when they engage in such an endeavour. If preparation is successful, it is likely to remain largely invisible and bring no electoral credit. If in contrast, the feared event does not happen or if its effects have been overestimated, a mechanism of blame generation for having wasted public money will be at play. Finally, if governments discontinue preparation and the dreaded event occurs, they will be blamed (again) for this discontinuation. Hence, governments risk being blamed twice when engaging in pandemic preparation, which explains why governments rarely prepare enough
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19 · Pandemic · Political science · Politics · Evaluation and Performance Assessment · Law · Medicine · Policy Transfer and Learning · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research
Unorthodox Lawmaking
World Trade Report 2006
Causal Case Study Methods
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
The Blame Game
Handling the Covid‐19 crisis in France
Explaining through causal mechanisms
Varieties of Crises
Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy
Mobilizing Policy (In)Capacity to Fight Covid-19
Rethinking barriers to adaptation
Why are policy innovations rare and so often negative? Blame avoidance and problem denial in climate change policy-making
Can we represent future generations in myopic democracies? – Analyzing the design, feasibility and viability of institutional guardians of future generations
Public Leadership in Times of Crisis
After Fukushima
Futures studies and uncertainty in public policy
In Search of Co‐variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies
Who Do You Trust? Institutions That Constrain Leaders Help People Prevent Disaster
Reconciling Perspectives on Blame Avoidance Behaviour
Towards a Concept of Political Robustness
Ready When the Big One Comes? Natural Disasters and Mass Support for Preparedness Investment
Electoral competition and the party politics of public investments
The lessons of failure
Policy overreaction
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Austerity and the path of least resistance
Blame games and democratic responsiveness
Policy Making for the Long Term in Advanced Democracies
Preventing Prevention
Why Do Citizens Discount the Future? Public Opinion and the Timing of Policy Consequences
Dislocation
Understanding Process Tracing
The politics of public health investments
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
Politicians' Theories of Voting Behavior
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |