Saltar al contenido principal

ETHNOS_APP

Inicio • Búsqueda • Revistas • Lista 0

Carl G Hempel

Datos Biográficos

ID1003519
NOMBRECarl G Hempel
NOMBRESCarl G
APELLIDOHempel
FIRMAHEMPEL C G
AFILIACIONESPrinceton University
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS26
TOTAL DE CITAS522
TOTAL COMO AUTOR26
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1936
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN1988
ÍNDICE H7
  • On the Cognitive Status and the Rationale of Scientific Methodology

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Poetics Today•1988

  • Turns in the evolution of the problem of induction

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Citada por: 8

  • Philosophy of Natural Science.

    David L Hull, Carl G Hempel et al.•ARTICLE•Systematic Zoology•1975

  • The old and the new ?Erkenntnis

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•1975

  • Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1973

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays

    Carl G Hempel•BOOK•Aspects of Scientific Explanation…•1970•Citada por: 173

  • Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1968•Citada por: 28•Referencias: 2

    The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity ( RMS ) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding “ambiguity” in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical gen…

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science

    Edward J Nell, Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•History and Theory•1968•Citada por: 2

  • The White Shoe

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1967•Citada por: 8

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation

    Michael D Resnik, Carl G Hempel•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1966•Citada por: 1

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science

    Haskell Fain, Carl G Hempel•REVIEW•American Sociological Review•1966

  • Frontiers of Science and Philosophy

    Carl G Hempel, Wilfrid Sellars et al.•BOOK•Frontiers of Science and Philosophy•1963

  • Inductive inconsistencies

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1960•Citada por: 22

  • Foundations of the Unity of Science. Volume II, no. 7

    J J C Smart, Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1953

  • Reflections on Nelson Goodman's

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1953•Citada por: 2

  • A Note on Semantic Realism

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1950•Citada por: 1

    Professor Feigl's admirably lucid and concise appraisal of the major considerations which are still significant in the controversy between realism and phenomenalism includes the important reminder that the problem at hand should be viewed as concerning, not the truth or falsity of two conflicting hypotheses, but rather the comparative adequacy of two alternative proposals for the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge. Feigl advocates th…

  • Reply to David L. Miller's Comments

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1948

    Like a number of other authors, Miller uses the term “emergent” interchangeably with “unpredictable” and employs it as a property term , i.e., in contexts of the form “Event E is emergent.” As we showed in our article, however, predictability and unpredictability as well as emergence are relations ; they can be predicated of an event only relatively to some body of information. Thus, a lunar eclipse is predictable by means of information includin…

  • Studies in the Logic of Explanation

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1948•Citada por: 266•Referencias: 28

    To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, th…

  • A Note on the Paradoxes of Confirmation

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Mind•1946

    Journal Article A NOTE ON THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION Get access CARL G. HEMPEL CARL G. HEMPEL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LV, Issue 219, July 1946, Pages 79–82, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LV.219.79 Published: 01 July 1946

  • I.—studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I.)

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Mind•1945

    Journal Article I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.) Get access CARL G. HEMPEL CARL G. HEMPEL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LIV, Issue 213, January 1945, Pages 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIV.213.1 Published: 01 January 1945

  • I.—studies in the Logic of Confirmation (Ii.)

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Mind•1945

    I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (II.) Get access CARL G. HEMPEL CARL G. HEMPEL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LIV, Issue 214, April 1945, Pages 97–121, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIV.214.97 Published: 01 April 1945

  • A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation”

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1945•Citada por: 8

    1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question…

  • The Function of General Laws in History

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1942

    1. It is a rather widely held opinion that history, in contradistinction to the so-called physical sciences, is concerned with the description of particular events of the past rather than with the search for general laws which might govern those events. As a characterization of the type of problem in which some historians are mainly interested, this view probably can not be denied; as a statement of the theoretical function of general laws in sci…

  • Vagueness and Logic

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1939•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 2

    As is rather generally admitted today, the terms of our language in scientific as well as in everyday use, are not completely precise, but exhibit a more or less high degree of vagueness. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the consequences of this circumstance for a series of questions which belong to the field of logic. First of all, the meaning and the logical status of the concept of vagueness will be analyzed; then we will try to find…

  • Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik

    Louis Osgood Kattsoff, Carl G Hempel et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1938

Siguiente
  • Studies in the Logic of Explanation

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1948•Citada por: 266•Referencias: 28

    To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, th…

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays

    Carl G Hempel•BOOK•Aspects of Scientific Explanation…•1970•Citada por: 173

  • Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1968•Citada por: 28•Referencias: 2

    The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity ( RMS ) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding “ambiguity” in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical gen…

  • Inductive inconsistencies

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1960•Citada por: 22

  • Turns in the evolution of the problem of induction

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Citada por: 8

  • The White Shoe

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1967•Citada por: 8

  • A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation”

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1945•Citada por: 8

    1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question…

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science

    Edward J Nell, Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•History and Theory•1968•Citada por: 2

  • Reflections on Nelson Goodman's

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1953•Citada por: 2

  • Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der Neuen Logik. Wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchungen zur Konstitutionsforschung und Psychologie

    Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1936•Citada por: 2

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation

    Michael D Resnik, Carl G Hempel•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1966•Citada por: 1

  • A Note on Semantic Realism

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1950•Citada por: 1

    Professor Feigl's admirably lucid and concise appraisal of the major considerations which are still significant in the controversy between realism and phenomenalism includes the important reminder that the problem at hand should be viewed as concerning, not the truth or falsity of two conflicting hypotheses, but rather the comparative adequacy of two alternative proposals for the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge. Feigl advocates th…

  • Vagueness and Logic

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1939•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 2

    As is rather generally admitted today, the terms of our language in scientific as well as in everyday use, are not completely precise, but exhibit a more or less high degree of vagueness. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the consequences of this circumstance for a series of questions which belong to the field of logic. First of all, the meaning and the logical status of the concept of vagueness will be analyzed; then we will try to find…

  • Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der Neuen Logik. Wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchungen zur Konstitutionsforschung und Psychologie

    Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1936•Citada por: 2

  • Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik

    Louis Osgood Kattsoff, Carl G Hempel et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1938

  • Vagueness and Logic

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1939•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 2

    As is rather generally admitted today, the terms of our language in scientific as well as in everyday use, are not completely precise, but exhibit a more or less high degree of vagueness. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the consequences of this circumstance for a series of questions which belong to the field of logic. First of all, the meaning and the logical status of the concept of vagueness will be analyzed; then we will try to find…

  • The Function of General Laws in History

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1942

    1. It is a rather widely held opinion that history, in contradistinction to the so-called physical sciences, is concerned with the description of particular events of the past rather than with the search for general laws which might govern those events. As a characterization of the type of problem in which some historians are mainly interested, this view probably can not be denied; as a statement of the theoretical function of general laws in sci…

  • I.—studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I.)

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Mind•1945

    Journal Article I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.) Get access CARL G. HEMPEL CARL G. HEMPEL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LIV, Issue 213, January 1945, Pages 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIV.213.1 Published: 01 January 1945

  • I.—studies in the Logic of Confirmation (Ii.)

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Mind•1945

    I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (II.) Get access CARL G. HEMPEL CARL G. HEMPEL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LIV, Issue 214, April 1945, Pages 97–121, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIV.214.97 Published: 01 April 1945

  • A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation”

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1945•Citada por: 8

    1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question…

  • A Note on the Paradoxes of Confirmation

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Mind•1946

    Journal Article A NOTE ON THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION Get access CARL G. HEMPEL CARL G. HEMPEL Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LV, Issue 219, July 1946, Pages 79–82, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LV.219.79 Published: 01 July 1946

  • Reply to David L. Miller's Comments

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1948

    Like a number of other authors, Miller uses the term “emergent” interchangeably with “unpredictable” and employs it as a property term , i.e., in contexts of the form “Event E is emergent.” As we showed in our article, however, predictability and unpredictability as well as emergence are relations ; they can be predicated of an event only relatively to some body of information. Thus, a lunar eclipse is predictable by means of information includin…

  • Studies in the Logic of Explanation

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel, Paul Oppenheim•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1948•Citada por: 266•Referencias: 28

    To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, th…

  • A Note on Semantic Realism

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1950•Citada por: 1

    Professor Feigl's admirably lucid and concise appraisal of the major considerations which are still significant in the controversy between realism and phenomenalism includes the important reminder that the problem at hand should be viewed as concerning, not the truth or falsity of two conflicting hypotheses, but rather the comparative adequacy of two alternative proposals for the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge. Feigl advocates th…

  • Foundations of the Unity of Science. Volume II, no. 7

    J J C Smart, Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1953

  • Reflections on Nelson Goodman's

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1953•Citada por: 2

  • Inductive inconsistencies

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1960•Citada por: 22

  • Frontiers of Science and Philosophy

    Carl G Hempel, Wilfrid Sellars et al.•BOOK•Frontiers of Science and Philosophy•1963

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation

    Michael D Resnik, Carl G Hempel•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1966•Citada por: 1

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science

    Haskell Fain, Carl G Hempel•REVIEW•American Sociological Review•1966

  • The White Shoe

    Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1967•Citada por: 8

  • Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1968•Citada por: 28•Referencias: 2

    The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity ( RMS ) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding “ambiguity” in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical gen…

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science

    Edward J Nell, Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•History and Theory•1968•Citada por: 2

  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays

    Carl G Hempel•BOOK•Aspects of Scientific Explanation…•1970•Citada por: 173

  • Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1973

  • Philosophy of Natural Science.

    David L Hull, Carl G Hempel et al.•ARTICLE•Systematic Zoology•1975

  • The old and the new ?Erkenntnis

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•1975

  • Turns in the evolution of the problem of induction

    Open Access•Carl G Hempel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1981•Citada por: 8

Philosophy (24 obras) · Epistemology (22 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (10 obras) · Philosophy of science (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras)

Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae