John Turri
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1006624 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | John Turri |
| NOMBRES | John |
| APELLIDO | Turri |
| FIRMA | TURRI J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Waterloo |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7611-2824 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 33 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 112 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 32 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2009 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Toxic intentions
Pure voluntarism is the claim that we have the same voluntary control over intentions as we do decisions. The Toxin Puzzle is often taken to challenge pure voluntarism by supporting a reasons constraint on intentions. According to this constraint, one cannot voluntarily intend to do something that one lacks a practical reason to do. We present the results of three experiments stemming from this puzzle demonstrating that the concept does not suppo…
Probability and intentional action
Knowledge and belief in Korean
Recent research has found that in the folk epistemology of American anglophones, knowledge does not entail belief. This runs contrary to a standard view in contemporary anglophone epistemology, according to which it is a conceptual truth that knowledge entails belief. In this paper, we investigate whether the conceptual dissociation between knowledge and belief is cross-culturally robust. Toward that end, we studied the judgments of Koreans. We f…
Pathways from inability to blamelessness in moral judgment
This paper evaluates opposing theories of the relationship between inability and blamelessness in commonsense morality. One theory (the prevention account) is inspired by the “ought implies can” principle in philosophy. On this account, whenever an agent is unable to perform an action, she is blameless for not performing it because she is not obligated to perform it. In other words, blamelessness is explained by the absence of obligation, which i…
A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency
Objective falsity is essential to lying
Truth, fallibility, and justification
Lying, fast and slow
Evaluating objections to a factive norm of belief
Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth
Compatibilism can be natural
Experimental work on the norms of assertion
Communication is essential to human society, and assertion is central to communication. This article reviews evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy relevant to understanding how our social practice of assertion is structured and sustained. The principal conclusion supported by this body of evidence is that knowledge is a central norm of assertion-that is, according to the rules of the practice, assertions should express kno…
Vision, knowledge, and assertion
Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision
Knowledge and the norm of assertion
Selfless assertions
The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology
Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizin…
Assertion and Assurance
I report three experiments relevant to evaluating Krista Lawlor's theory of assurance, respond to her criticism of the knowledge account of assertion, and propose an alternative theory of assurance
Ad Infinitum
This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs-an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
Iffy predictions and proper expectations
Non-psychological weakness of will
That's Outrageous
I show how non‐presentists ought to respond to a popular objection originally due to A rthur P rior and lately updated by D ean Z immerman. P rior and Z immerman say that non‐presentism cannot account for the fittingness of certain emotional responses to things past. But presentism gains no advantage here, because it is equally incapable of accounting for the fittingness of certain other emotional responses to things past, in particular moral out…
Unreliable Knowledge
There is a virtual consensus in contemporary epistemology that knowledge must be reliably produced. Everyone, it seems, is a reliabilist about knowledge in that sense. I present and defend two arguments that unreliable knowledge is possible. My first argument proceeds from an observation about the nature of achievements, namely, that achievements can proceed from unreliable abilities. My second argument proceeds from an observation about the epis…
Is knowledge justified true belief
A Puzzle about withholding
This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the common assumptions. Section 2 presents the puzzle case. Se…
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain…
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge …
A Puzzle about withholding
This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the common assumptions. Section 2 presents the puzzle case. Se…
Selfless assertions
Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision
Unreliable Knowledge
There is a virtual consensus in contemporary epistemology that knowledge must be reliably produced. Everyone, it seems, is a reliabilist about knowledge in that sense. I present and defend two arguments that unreliable knowledge is possible. My first argument proceeds from an observation about the nature of achievements, namely, that achievements can proceed from unreliable abilities. My second argument proceeds from an observation about the epis…
Contingent A Priori Knowledge
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
On the regress argument for infinitism
Mythology of the Factive
Knowledge and the norm of assertion
The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology
Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizin…
Assertion and Assurance
I report three experiments relevant to evaluating Krista Lawlor's theory of assurance, respond to her criticism of the knowledge account of assertion, and propose an alternative theory of assurance
Non-psychological weakness of will
Lying, fast and slow
Experimental work on the norms of assertion
Communication is essential to human society, and assertion is central to communication. This article reviews evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy relevant to understanding how our social practice of assertion is structured and sustained. The principal conclusion supported by this body of evidence is that knowledge is a central norm of assertion-that is, according to the rules of the practice, assertions should express kno…
Iffy predictions and proper expectations
Is knowledge justified true belief
On the regress argument for infinitism
On the general argument against internalism
Does Perceiving Entail Knowing
This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain…
Contingent A Priori Knowledge
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge …
Critical Notice of Robert C Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues
Mythology of the Factive
Is knowledge justified true belief
A Puzzle about withholding
This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the common assumptions. Section 2 presents the puzzle case. Se…
That's Outrageous
I show how non‐presentists ought to respond to a popular objection originally due to A rthur P rior and lately updated by D ean Z immerman. P rior and Z immerman say that non‐presentism cannot account for the fittingness of certain emotional responses to things past. But presentism gains no advantage here, because it is equally incapable of accounting for the fittingness of certain other emotional responses to things past, in particular moral out…
Unreliable Knowledge
There is a virtual consensus in contemporary epistemology that knowledge must be reliably produced. Everyone, it seems, is a reliabilist about knowledge in that sense. I present and defend two arguments that unreliable knowledge is possible. My first argument proceeds from an observation about the nature of achievements, namely, that achievements can proceed from unreliable abilities. My second argument proceeds from an observation about the epis…
Ad Infinitum
This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs-an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
Iffy predictions and proper expectations
Non-psychological weakness of will
Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision
Knowledge and the norm of assertion
Selfless assertions
The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology
Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizin…
Assertion and Assurance
I report three experiments relevant to evaluating Krista Lawlor's theory of assurance, respond to her criticism of the knowledge account of assertion, and propose an alternative theory of assurance
Vision, knowledge, and assertion
Compatibilism can be natural
Experimental work on the norms of assertion
Communication is essential to human society, and assertion is central to communication. This article reviews evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy relevant to understanding how our social practice of assertion is structured and sustained. The principal conclusion supported by this body of evidence is that knowledge is a central norm of assertion-that is, according to the rules of the practice, assertions should express kno…
Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth
Objective falsity is essential to lying
Epistemology (32 obras) · Philosophy (31 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (26 obras) · Psychology (19 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (17 obras) · Computer Science (15 obras) · Metaphysics (14 obras) · Social Psychology (13 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (11 obras) · Philosophy of language (11 obras)