Toni Rønnow‐rasmussen
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1010699 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Toni Rønnow‐rasmussen |
| NOMBRES | Toni |
| APELLIDO | Rønnow‐rasmussen |
| FIRMA | RASMUSSEN T R |
| AFILIACIONES | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8599-4814 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 18 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 40 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1999 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Explaining value
Orsi and Garcia (Philos Stud, 2020, 10.1007/s11098-020-01471-6 ) argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis, for short) is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admi…
Exploring Practical Philosophy
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that wh…
For Kevin’s Sake
Motivation and Motivating Reason
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to appear at the outset as incomprehensible. The next step is then to add some further details about the agent — typically some information about his or her beliefs and desires — providing some sort of explanation of the agent’s p…
Types of Value
This chapter introduces some contrasting notions of value, in particular final intrinsic and final extrinsic value. G. E. Moore's views on value, as well as his so‐called isolation test, are discussed. It is explained why this test might have done more bad than good to value theory. The chapter also examines the common claim that values are supervenient features. Supervenience is one of the key elements which this work employs in order to underst…
Personal Value
RÃ ̧nnow-Rasmussen examines the notion of 'good-for', and provides a new analysis of personal value that justifies its inclusion within our classical value taxonomy
On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes
Love, Value and Supervenience
People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking …
Analysing Personal Value
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of t…
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value
A Distinction in Value
The Strike of the Demon
Tropic of Value
The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in …
Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers
A Distinction in Value
The paper argues that the final value of an object—i.e., its value for its own sake—need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved…
Particularism and principles
Jonathan Dancy argues in his book Moral Reasons that neither general nor specific moral principles are of any important use in moral decision making. I examine his reasons for denying any important role to such principles. With regard to general moral principles, I suggest that there are such principles that appear useful ‐ an idea that Dancy in some passages actually seems to endorse. When it comes to highly specific principles, Dancy's advice i…
Personal Value
RÃ ̧nnow-Rasmussen examines the notion of 'good-for', and provides a new analysis of personal value that justifies its inclusion within our classical value taxonomy
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of t…
Analysing Personal Value
Tropic of Value
The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in …
On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes
Love, Value and Supervenience
People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking …
Particularism and principles
Jonathan Dancy argues in his book Moral Reasons that neither general nor specific moral principles are of any important use in moral decision making. I examine his reasons for denying any important role to such principles. With regard to general moral principles, I suggest that there are such principles that appear useful ‐ an idea that Dancy in some passages actually seems to endorse. When it comes to highly specific principles, Dancy's advice i…
A Distinction in Value
The paper argues that the final value of an object—i.e., its value for its own sake—need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved…
Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers
Tropic of Value
The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in …
The Strike of the Demon
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value
A Distinction in Value
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of t…
Analysing Personal Value
Love, Value and Supervenience
People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking …
On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes
Types of Value
This chapter introduces some contrasting notions of value, in particular final intrinsic and final extrinsic value. G. E. Moore's views on value, as well as his so‐called isolation test, are discussed. It is explained why this test might have done more bad than good to value theory. The chapter also examines the common claim that values are supervenient features. Supervenience is one of the key elements which this work employs in order to underst…
Personal Value
RÃ ̧nnow-Rasmussen examines the notion of 'good-for', and provides a new analysis of personal value that justifies its inclusion within our classical value taxonomy
Motivation and Motivating Reason
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to appear at the outset as incomprehensible. The next step is then to add some further details about the agent — typically some information about his or her beliefs and desires — providing some sort of explanation of the agent’s p…
For Kevin’s Sake
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that wh…
Exploring Practical Philosophy
Explaining value
Orsi and Garcia (Philos Stud, 2020, 10.1007/s11098-020-01471-6 ) argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis, for short) is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admi…
Epistemology (17 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (14 obras) · Philosophy (13 obras) · Mathematics (11 obras) · Psychology (9 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Statistics (7 obras) · Value (mathematics (7 obras) · Free Will and Agency (6 obras)