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Alvin I Goldman

Datos Biográficos

ID1090458
NOMBREAlvin I Goldman
NOMBRESAlvin I
APELLIDOGoldman
FIRMAGOLDMAN A I
AFILIACIONESUniversity of Arizona
ORCID0000-0003-0793-4589
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS48
TOTAL DE CITAS100
TOTAL COMO AUTOR46
TOTAL COMO EDITOR2
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1967
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2021
ÍNDICE H6
  • How Can You Spot the Experts? An Essay in Social Epistemology

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Royal Institute of Philosophy…•2021

    In the history of western philosophy, people were often encouraged to seek knowledge by starting from their own minds and proceeding in a highly individualistic spirit. In recent contemporary philosophy, by contrast, there is a movement toward Social Epistemology, which urges people to seek knowledge from what others know. However, in selected fields some people are experts while others are laypersons. It is natural for self-acknowledged layperso…

  • A Different Solution to the Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism

    Alvin I Goldman, Alvin Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•2021

    According to process reliabilism, a person's belief is justified just in case it is generated by a reliable belief-forming process. If somebody merely wishes that P is true, and proceeds to believe it for that reason only, the belief is not justified. Some critics of reliabilism, however, point out that each token process that causes a particular belief is of numerous different types, which can vary in reliability. So, which type must be sufficie…

  • Expertise

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Topoi•2018

  • What Is Democracy (and What Is Its Raison D’Etre)?

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Journal of the American…•2015

    This article aims to say what democracy is or what the predicate ‘democratic’ means, as opposed to saying what is good, right, or desirable about it. The basic idea—by no means a novel one—is that a democratic system is one that features substantial equality of political power. More distinctively it is argued that ‘democratic’ is a relative gradable adjective, the use of which permits different, contextually determined thresholds of democraticnes…

  • Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification

    Alvin I Goldman, Inc Journal of Philosophy•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2009

  • Recursive Tracking versus Process Reliabilism

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Citada por: 1

  • Hurley on Simulation

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008•Referencias: 1

    It is a tragedy that Susan Hurley was taken from us (by cancer) at the height of her powers. She was a philosopher of impressive insight and knowledge. Even if one didn’t accept her distinctive philosophico-scientific views, one had to admire her scholarship, vigor, and inventiveness. Despite her illness, she made a long trip to the 2007 Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association to participate in an author-meets-critics s…

  • Imagination and Simulation in Audience Responses to Fiction

    Alvin I Goldman, Alvin Goldman•CHAPTER•The Architecture of the Imagination•2006

    This chapter considers how imagination generates emotion. ‘Supposition-imagination’ (S-imagination) is distinguished from ‘enactment-imagination’ (E-imagination). The former kind of imagination involves entertaining or supposing various hypothetical scenarios; with the latter kind of imagination, one tries to create a kind of facsimile of a mental state. Thus, one might try to create a perception-like state as in visual imagination or motoric ima…

  • Simulating Minds

    Alvin I Goldman•BOOK•Simulating Minds•2006

    How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds t…

  • Simulating Minds

    Alvin I Goldman•BOOK•Simulating Minds•2006

  • Kornblith's Naturalistic Epistemology

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman, Alvin Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005•Citada por: 1

  • The Need for Social Epistemology

    Alvin I Goldman, Alvin Goldman•CHAPTER•The future for philosophy•2004

    Epistemology is one of the oldest fields of philosophy. Plato, for example, devoted several dialogues, or portions thereof, to epistemology, including Meno, Phaedo, Republic, and Theaetetus. Epistemology is as lively a subject today as in many periods, though its intricacies are not widely known outside academic philosophy. Much of today’s epistemology, like the epistemology of yesteryear, is focused on skepticism. But there is also a novel devel…

  • The Mentalizing Folk

    Alvin I Goldman, ProtoSociology Project•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2002

  • Reply to Commentators

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002•Citada por: 3

  • Précis of Knowledge in a Social World

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

  • The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues

    Alvin I Goldman•CHAPTER•Virtue epistemology•2001

    One of the central questions about the moral virtues that preoccupied Socrates concerned the unity of the virtues. Are the several virtues aspects of a single virtue or are they entirely distinct and independent? Socrates himself apparently accepted the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. In this essay I shall explore the tenability of an analogous doctrine for the intellectual, or epistemic, virtues, namely, that the various epistemic virtues …

  • Experts

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001•Citada por: 23

  • The Mentalizing Folk

    Alvin I Goldman•CHAPTER•Metarepresentations•2000

    Ordinary people are mentalizers. The folk not only have mental states, but they represent themselves — both self and others — as having mental states. Many of these mental states (e.g., beliefs and desires) represent how the world is or ought to be. By representing themselves as having such first-order representational states, the folk engage in second-order representation, or metarepresentation. The class of representations is not exhausted, of …

  • Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts

    Alvin I Goldman, ProtoSociology Project•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2000

    There are several different questions associated with the study of folk psychology: (1) what is the nature of our commonsense concepts of mental states?, (2) how do we attribute mental states, to ourselves and to other people?, and (3) how do we acquire our concepts and skills at mental-state attribution? Three general approaches to these questions are examined and assessed: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. A preliminary …

  • Why Citizens Should Vote

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•CHAPTER•Responsibility•1999

    Why should a citizen vote? There are two ways to interpret this question: in a prudential sense, and in a moral (or quasi-moral) sense. Under the first interpretation, the question asks why–or under what circumstances–it is in a citizen's self-interest to vote. Under the second interpretation, it asks what moral (or quasi-moral) reasons citizens have for voting. I shall mainly try to answer the moral version of the question, but my answer may als…

  • Why Citizens Should Vote

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Social Philosophy and Policy•1999

    Why should a citizen vote? There are two ways to interpret this question: in a prudential sense, and in a moral (or quasi-moral ) sense. Under the first interpretation, the question asks why—or under what circumstances—it is in a citizen's self-interest to vote. Under the second interpretation, it asks what moral (or quasi-moral) reasons citizens have for voting. I shall mainly try to answer the moral version of the question, but my answer may al…

  • Social Epistemology

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Critica•1999

    Social Epistemology

  • Knowledge in a Social World

    Alvin I Goldman•BOOK•Knowledge in a Social World•1999

    A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but replaces its customary emphasis on solitary knowers with a focus on social institutions and interpersonal practices. Postmodernism, science studies, and pragmatism pose worries about the meaning and attainability of objective truth and knowledge. After layi…

  • Knowledge in a Social World

    Alvin I Goldman•BOOK•Knowledge in a social world•1999

    "Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows…

  • Science, Publicity, and Consciousness

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1997•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 13

    A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific …

Siguiente
  • Experts

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001•Citada por: 23

  • Strong and Weak Justification

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1988•Citada por: 22

  • Values and Morals

    Open Access•Jaegwon Jaegwon Kim, Alvin I Goldman et al.•BOOK•Values and Morals•1978•Citada por: 13

  • Foundations of social epistemics

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1987•Citada por: 9•Referencias: 14

  • Ethics and Cognitive Science

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Ethics•1993•Citada por: 7

  • The Compatibility of Mechanism and Purpose

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1969•Citada por: 6

  • Reply to Commentators

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002•Citada por: 3

  • Science, Publicity, and Consciousness

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1997•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 13

    A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific …

  • Perceptual objects

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 14

  • A Theory of Human Action

    Les Holborow, Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1973•Citada por: 3

    Book Reviews Get access A Theory of Human Action. By Alvin I. Goldman. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. Pp. x + 230. Price not given.) Les Holborow Les Holborow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 91, April 1973, Pages 180–182, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217499 Published: 01 April 1973

  • Epistemology and the theory of problem solving

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1983•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 13

  • Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

    Alvin I Goldman, Richard Rorty•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1981•Citada por: 2

  • Recursive Tracking versus Process Reliabilism

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009•Citada por: 1

  • Kornblith's Naturalistic Epistemology

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman, Alvin Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005•Citada por: 1

  • The relation between epistemology and psychology

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1985•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 19

  • Philosophical Explanations

    Alvin I Goldman, Robert Nozick•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1983•Citada por: 1

  • A Causal Theory of Knowing

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1967

  • The Compatibility of Mechanism and Purpose

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1969•Citada por: 6

  • A Theory of Human Action

    Les Holborow, Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1973•Citada por: 3

    Book Reviews Get access A Theory of Human Action. By Alvin I. Goldman. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. Pp. x + 230. Price not given.) Les Holborow Les Holborow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 91, April 1973, Pages 180–182, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217499 Published: 01 April 1973

  • Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•1976

  • The Volitional Theory Revisited

    Alvin I Goldman•CHAPTER•Action Theory•1976

  • Perceptual objects

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1977•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 14

  • Values and Morals

    Open Access•Jaegwon Jaegwon Kim, Alvin I Goldman et al.•BOOK•Values and Morals•1978•Citada por: 13

  • What is Justified Belief?

    Alvin I Goldman•CHAPTER•Justification and Knowledge•1979

  • Values and Morals

    Guy Wallace, Alvin I Goldman et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1981

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Values and Morals. Edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim. (Reidel, 1979. Pp. xvii + 331.) G. Wallace G. Wallace Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 31, Issue 122, January 1981, Pages 81–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218686 Published: 01 January 1981

  • Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

    Alvin I Goldman, Richard Rorty•REVIEW•The Philosophical Review•1981•Citada por: 2

  • Epistemology and the theory of problem solving

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1983•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 13

  • Philosophical Explanations

    Alvin I Goldman, Robert Nozick•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1983•Citada por: 1

  • The relation between epistemology and psychology

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1985•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 19

  • Epistemology and cognition

    Alvin I Goldman•BOOK•Epistemology and cognition•1986

  • Foundations of social epistemics

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Synthese•1987•Citada por: 9•Referencias: 14

  • Strong and Weak Justification

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•1988•Citada por: 22

  • Metaphysics, Mind, and Mental Science

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•1989

    L'A. distingue, dans la ligne de Strawson, metaphysique descriptive et metaphysique prescriptive. Quine serait purement descriptif. L'A. discute des liens entre theorie de l'esprit (theory of mind) et metaphysique a partir de cette distinction. Il discute notamment de la nature de l'ontologie naive (folk ontology) qui est impliquee par cette theorie de l'esprit

  • Epistemology and Cognition

    Gary Hatfield, Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1989

    Introduction Part I: Theoretical Foundations 1. The Elements of Epistemology 2. Skepticism 3. Knowledge 4. Justification: A Rule Framework 5. Justification and Reliability 6. Problem Solving, Power, and Speed 7. Truth and Realism 8. The Problem of Content Part II: Assessing Our Cognitive Resources 9. Perception 10. Memory 11. Constraints on Representation 12. Internal Codes 13. Deductive Reasoning 14. Probability judgments 15. Acceptance and Unce…

  • Epistemology and Cognition

    Robert Audi, Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1989

    Introduction Part I: Theoretical Foundations 1. The Elements of Epistemology 2. Skepticism 3. Knowledge 4. Justification: A Rule Framework 5. Justification and Reliability 6. Problem Solving, Power, and Speed 7. Truth and Realism 8. The Problem of Content Part II: Assessing Our Cognitive Resources 9. Perception 10. Memory 11. Constraints on Representation 12. Internal Codes 13. Deductive Reasoning 14. Probability judgments 15. Acceptance and Unce…

  • Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science

    Alvin I Goldman•BOOK•Readings in Philosophy and…•1993

    This collection of readings shows how cognitive science can influence most of the primary branches of philosophy, as well as how philosophy critically examines the foundations of cognitive science. Its broad coverage extends beyond current texts that focus mainly on the impact of cognitive science on philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, to include materials that are relevant to five other branches of philosophy: epistemology, philosop…

  • Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Consciousness and Cognition•1993

  • Ethics and Cognitive Science

    Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Ethics•1993•Citada por: 7

  • Liaisons

    Andrew Pessin, Alvin I Goldman et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1994

  • Science, Publicity, and Consciousness

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1997•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 13

    A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific …

  • Why Citizens Should Vote

    Open Access•Alvin I Goldman•CHAPTER•Responsibility•1999

    Why should a citizen vote? There are two ways to interpret this question: in a prudential sense, and in a moral (or quasi-moral) sense. Under the first interpretation, the question asks why–or under what circumstances–it is in a citizen's self-interest to vote. Under the second interpretation, it asks what moral (or quasi-moral) reasons citizens have for voting. I shall mainly try to answer the moral version of the question, but my answer may als…

Philosophy (40 obras) · Epistemology (38 obras) · Psychology (26 obras) · Computer Science (18 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (16 obras) · Sociology (16 obras) · Cognitive science (11 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Cognition (10 obras) · Law (8 obras)

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