Francisco Garfias
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1095415 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Francisco Garfias |
| NOMBRES | Francisco |
| APELLIDO | Garfias |
| FIRMA | GARFIAS F |
| AFILIACIONES | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0332-3716 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 121 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2002 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
The Jesuit expulsion
Fiscal legibility and state development
We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them …
When State Building Backfires
We examine the complementary influence of elite politics, popular grievances, and central government weakness on rebellion. Efforts to strengthen the central state often come at the expense of the elite intermediaries charged with maintaining local political control. By driving a wedge between local elites and the central government, centralizing reforms can reduce intermediaries' willingness to repress mobilization, providing an opening for popu…
From Conquest to Centralization
Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state …
The Politics of Property Taxation
Property titling enables tax collection and encourages private investment. Yet, governments across the developing world often fail to invest in land registration systems, such as cadastral maps, that record land ownership and values. In this paper, we describe and estimate the fiscal benefits and political costs that elected officials face when deciding whether to invest in this critical fiscal infrastructure. Focusing on Brazilian municipalities…
Elite Coalitions, Limited Government, and Fiscal Capacity Development
Limited government supported by elite coalitions can facilitate the development of fiscal capacity by tying rulers' hands and enhancing their credibility. This paper presents evidence of the effect of the Mining Tribunal, an institution for the mining elite in late colonial Mexico that credibly constrained the Spanish Crown, on the development of fiscal capacity. The mining elite resisted the development of a strong fiscal state that was controll…
Can You Hear Me Now? How Communication Technology Affects Protest and Repression
Commentators covering recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, commonly claim that cell phones enable protests. Yet, existing empirical work does not conclusively support this contention: some studies find that these technologies actually reduce collective action; many others struggle to overcome the selection problems that dog observational research. We propose two mechanisms through which cell phones affect protests: (1) by enabling co…
Elite Competition and State Capacity Development
International wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity. This article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict. Under conditions of intra-elite conflict, political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals, expropriate their assets, and consolidate authority. Because this political consolidati…
Juan Ramon en su reino
Francisco Garfias, Juan en su reino. Huelva: E. de la Juan 1995. 187 pp. Unidad (Cuaderno de Textos) de Zenobia g Juan (Y estudios juanramonianos). Ed. Carmen Hernandez-Pinzon Moreno. Huelva: Juan 1996. 97 pp. Juan Moguer (Poesia y prosa). 4th ed. Huelva: E. de la Juan 1996. 214 pp. Ernestina de Champourcin, La ardilla y la rosa (Juan Jimenez en mi memoria). 2nd enlgd. ed. Huelva: E. de la Juan 1997. 193 pp. Exposicion internacional de arte corre…
Elite Competition and State Capacity Development
International wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity. This article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict. Under conditions of intra-elite conflict, political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals, expropriate their assets, and consolidate authority. Because this political consolidati…
Can You Hear Me Now? How Communication Technology Affects Protest and Repression
Commentators covering recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, commonly claim that cell phones enable protests. Yet, existing empirical work does not conclusively support this contention: some studies find that these technologies actually reduce collective action; many others struggle to overcome the selection problems that dog observational research. We propose two mechanisms through which cell phones affect protests: (1) by enabling co…
From Conquest to Centralization
Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state …
When State Building Backfires
We examine the complementary influence of elite politics, popular grievances, and central government weakness on rebellion. Efforts to strengthen the central state often come at the expense of the elite intermediaries charged with maintaining local political control. By driving a wedge between local elites and the central government, centralizing reforms can reduce intermediaries' willingness to repress mobilization, providing an opening for popu…
The Politics of Property Taxation
Property titling enables tax collection and encourages private investment. Yet, governments across the developing world often fail to invest in land registration systems, such as cadastral maps, that record land ownership and values. In this paper, we describe and estimate the fiscal benefits and political costs that elected officials face when deciding whether to invest in this critical fiscal infrastructure. Focusing on Brazilian municipalities…
Elite Coalitions, Limited Government, and Fiscal Capacity Development
Limited government supported by elite coalitions can facilitate the development of fiscal capacity by tying rulers' hands and enhancing their credibility. This paper presents evidence of the effect of the Mining Tribunal, an institution for the mining elite in late colonial Mexico that credibly constrained the Spanish Crown, on the development of fiscal capacity. The mining elite resisted the development of a strong fiscal state that was controll…
Fiscal legibility and state development
We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them …
Juan Ramon en su reino
Francisco Garfias, Juan en su reino. Huelva: E. de la Juan 1995. 187 pp. Unidad (Cuaderno de Textos) de Zenobia g Juan (Y estudios juanramonianos). Ed. Carmen Hernandez-Pinzon Moreno. Huelva: Juan 1996. 97 pp. Juan Moguer (Poesia y prosa). 4th ed. Huelva: E. de la Juan 1996. 214 pp. Ernestina de Champourcin, La ardilla y la rosa (Juan Jimenez en mi memoria). 2nd enlgd. ed. Huelva: E. de la Juan 1997. 193 pp. Exposicion internacional de arte corre…
Can You Hear Me Now? How Communication Technology Affects Protest and Repression
Commentators covering recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, commonly claim that cell phones enable protests. Yet, existing empirical work does not conclusively support this contention: some studies find that these technologies actually reduce collective action; many others struggle to overcome the selection problems that dog observational research. We propose two mechanisms through which cell phones affect protests: (1) by enabling co…
Elite Competition and State Capacity Development
International wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity. This article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict. Under conditions of intra-elite conflict, political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals, expropriate their assets, and consolidate authority. Because this political consolidati…
Elite Coalitions, Limited Government, and Fiscal Capacity Development
Limited government supported by elite coalitions can facilitate the development of fiscal capacity by tying rulers' hands and enhancing their credibility. This paper presents evidence of the effect of the Mining Tribunal, an institution for the mining elite in late colonial Mexico that credibly constrained the Spanish Crown, on the development of fiscal capacity. The mining elite resisted the development of a strong fiscal state that was controll…
From Conquest to Centralization
Why do governments centralize control over regions? We present a theory of the transition from indirect to direct rule, focusing on the strategic interaction between a ruler and local potentates who provide civil order in exchange for a share of tax revenue. When the threat of rebellion from below falls and elites become less crucial intermediaries, the ruler is able to centralize power, replacing local potentates with direct agents of the state …
The Politics of Property Taxation
Property titling enables tax collection and encourages private investment. Yet, governments across the developing world often fail to invest in land registration systems, such as cadastral maps, that record land ownership and values. In this paper, we describe and estimate the fiscal benefits and political costs that elected officials face when deciding whether to invest in this critical fiscal infrastructure. Focusing on Brazilian municipalities…
When State Building Backfires
We examine the complementary influence of elite politics, popular grievances, and central government weakness on rebellion. Efforts to strengthen the central state often come at the expense of the elite intermediaries charged with maintaining local political control. By driving a wedge between local elites and the central government, centralizing reforms can reduce intermediaries' willingness to repress mobilization, providing an opening for popu…
Fiscal legibility and state development
We examine how fiscal legibility, the ability of central authorities to observe local conditions for the purposes of taxation, shapes political centralization and state development. When rulers lack information about the periphery, they may benefit from ceding autonomy to tax‐collecting intermediaries to encourage fiscal performance. As information quality improves, rulers become better able to monitor and sanction local officials, allowing them …
The Jesuit expulsion
Political science (8 obras) · Economics (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Politics (6 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (5 obras) · Political economy (5 obras) · State (computer science (5 obras) · Historical Economic and Social Studies (4 obras) · Market economy (4 obras)