Donald Wittman
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1095669 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Donald Wittman |
| NOMBRES | Donald |
| APELLIDO | Wittman |
| FIRMA | WITTMAN D |
| AFILIACIONES | University of California, Santa Cruz |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1073-4345 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 23 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 671 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1973 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
District versus at-large voting
Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions
Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalize…
Overview Of Political Economy
This introductory article discusses a set of issues and approaches that have provided interesting results, and are most likely to prompt a number of researches in the next few years. It first looks at the research conducted on endogenous institutions, before focusing on legislative institutions. It looks at the revelation and aggregation of information, where the discussion is focused on the voters, particularly the voters who are uninformed in o…
The Reach of Political Economy
This introductory article discusses a set of issues and approaches that have provided interesting results, and are most likely to prompt a number of researches in the next few years. It first looks at the research conducted on endogenous institutions, before focusing on legislative institutions. It looks at the revelation and aggregation of information, where the discussion is focused on the voters, particularly the voters who are uninformed in o…
How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median
This article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always …
Bargaining in the Shadow of War
This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram…
The Myth of the Rational Voter
While Bryan Caplan’s theory of rational irrationality is important and original, he does not actually demonstrate that the theory explains public opinion about economics. The theory holds that voters are aware of the insignificance of their votes, and therefore feel free to vote based on whatever beliefs they “prefer” to hold, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are true. Yet by voting, voters suggest that they do not, in fact, understand …
Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property
Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics
Democracy is widely accepted today, perhaps as never before, as the most suitable form of government. But what is democracy, and does it always produce good government? Democracy is often associated with the existence of competitive elections. But theory and experience suggest that these are not sufficient for democracy to function reasonably well. In this book, which was originally published in 2003, a number of experts from North America and Eu…
The Wealth and Size of Nations
This article provides a general theory explaining the geographic and population size and wealth of nations. Successful countries create conditions for high productivity in the economic sphere by enforcing property rights and providing social overhead capital and at the same time minimize political costs by creating a system of rules that reduce influence costs and allow for diverse preferences. Countries also need an effective military apparatus …
Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences
INTRODUCTION In An Economic Theory of Democracy , Anthony Downs characterized a political party as a team whose goal is to win the election. Although such an assumption concerning political parties is a reasonable first step, it is open to two important criticisms. The party may not be a team, and the goal of the party leaders may not be to win the election. Consider the latter criticism. It would be strange if the voters were interested in polic…
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
By applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis, the author argues that democratic markets work as well as economic markets. In particular, he shows that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal-agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection
This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating an…
Multi-candidate equilibria
The Peak Income Hypothesis
Candidate Motivation
A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative sta…
Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location
Most discussions of environmental externalities and pollution address a rather narrow problem: when a particular polluter damages a particular victim or pollutee, what type of pollution tax or other corrective measure will give the parties incentives to reduce pollution to a socially optimal level?1 In this paper we generalize that analysis. Rather than viewing the locations of polluters or pollutees as necessarily fixed, we regard the spatial lo…
Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
How a War Ends
This article discusses the necessary conditions for two countries at war to come to a settlement and explores how domestic and military costs, time preferences and attitudes toward risk affect the timing and the outcome of the peace. It views the termination of war as a process of rational calculations by the participants; unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by a settlement, the war will continue. An important result of thi…
Candidates with policy preferences
Various Concepts of Power Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches
The notion of power may well be central to all of the social sciences, yet the prevailing ways of thinking about power are very unsatisfactory. Intuitive ideas about power appear at first sight to have little logical consistency and are therefore confusing, while the more precise ideas that have been offered appear to be too narrow and are therefore ignored. Perhaps the main reason for the intractability of the concept is that it encompasses a nu…
Cheating and control
Parties as Utility Maximizers
The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concern…
Candidate Motivation
A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative sta…
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
By applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis, the author argues that democratic markets work as well as economic markets. In particular, he shows that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal-agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
How a War Ends
This article discusses the necessary conditions for two countries at war to come to a settlement and explores how domestic and military costs, time preferences and attitudes toward risk affect the timing and the outcome of the peace. It views the termination of war as a process of rational calculations by the participants; unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by a settlement, the war will continue. An important result of thi…
Parties as Utility Maximizers
The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concern…
Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
The Wealth and Size of Nations
This article provides a general theory explaining the geographic and population size and wealth of nations. Successful countries create conditions for high productivity in the economic sphere by enforcing property rights and providing social overhead capital and at the same time minimize political costs by creating a system of rules that reduce influence costs and allow for diverse preferences. Countries also need an effective military apparatus …
Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection
This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating an…
Bargaining in the Shadow of War
This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram…
The Myth of the Rational Voter
While Bryan Caplan’s theory of rational irrationality is important and original, he does not actually demonstrate that the theory explains public opinion about economics. The theory holds that voters are aware of the insignificance of their votes, and therefore feel free to vote based on whatever beliefs they “prefer” to hold, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are true. Yet by voting, voters suggest that they do not, in fact, understand …
Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions
Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalize…
Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property
Multi-candidate equilibria
Various Concepts of Power Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches
The notion of power may well be central to all of the social sciences, yet the prevailing ways of thinking about power are very unsatisfactory. Intuitive ideas about power appear at first sight to have little logical consistency and are therefore confusing, while the more precise ideas that have been offered appear to be too narrow and are therefore ignored. Perhaps the main reason for the intractability of the concept is that it encompasses a nu…
How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median
This article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always …
Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location
Most discussions of environmental externalities and pollution address a rather narrow problem: when a particular polluter damages a particular victim or pollutee, what type of pollution tax or other corrective measure will give the parties incentives to reduce pollution to a socially optimal level?1 In this paper we generalize that analysis. Rather than viewing the locations of polluters or pollutees as necessarily fixed, we regard the spatial lo…
Cheating and control
Parties as Utility Maximizers
The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concern…
Various Concepts of Power Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches
The notion of power may well be central to all of the social sciences, yet the prevailing ways of thinking about power are very unsatisfactory. Intuitive ideas about power appear at first sight to have little logical consistency and are therefore confusing, while the more precise ideas that have been offered appear to be too narrow and are therefore ignored. Perhaps the main reason for the intractability of the concept is that it encompasses a nu…
Candidates with policy preferences
How a War Ends
This article discusses the necessary conditions for two countries at war to come to a settlement and explores how domestic and military costs, time preferences and attitudes toward risk affect the timing and the outcome of the peace. It views the termination of war as a process of rational calculations by the participants; unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by a settlement, the war will continue. An important result of thi…
Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location
Most discussions of environmental externalities and pollution address a rather narrow problem: when a particular polluter damages a particular victim or pollutee, what type of pollution tax or other corrective measure will give the parties incentives to reduce pollution to a socially optimal level?1 In this paper we generalize that analysis. Rather than viewing the locations of polluters or pollutees as necessarily fixed, we regard the spatial lo…
The Peak Income Hypothesis
Candidate Motivation
A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative sta…
Multi-candidate equilibria
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
By applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis, the author argues that democratic markets work as well as economic markets. In particular, he shows that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal-agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection
This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating an…
Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences
INTRODUCTION In An Economic Theory of Democracy , Anthony Downs characterized a political party as a team whose goal is to win the election. Although such an assumption concerning political parties is a reasonable first step, it is open to two important criticisms. The party may not be a team, and the goal of the party leaders may not be to win the election. Consider the latter criticism. It would be strange if the voters were interested in polic…
The Wealth and Size of Nations
This article provides a general theory explaining the geographic and population size and wealth of nations. Successful countries create conditions for high productivity in the economic sphere by enforcing property rights and providing social overhead capital and at the same time minimize political costs by creating a system of rules that reduce influence costs and allow for diverse preferences. Countries also need an effective military apparatus …
Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics
Democracy is widely accepted today, perhaps as never before, as the most suitable form of government. But what is democracy, and does it always produce good government? Democracy is often associated with the existence of competitive elections. But theory and experience suggest that these are not sufficient for democracy to function reasonably well. In this book, which was originally published in 2003, a number of experts from North America and Eu…
Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property
The Myth of the Rational Voter
While Bryan Caplan’s theory of rational irrationality is important and original, he does not actually demonstrate that the theory explains public opinion about economics. The theory holds that voters are aware of the insignificance of their votes, and therefore feel free to vote based on whatever beliefs they “prefer” to hold, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are true. Yet by voting, voters suggest that they do not, in fact, understand …
The Reach of Political Economy
This introductory article discusses a set of issues and approaches that have provided interesting results, and are most likely to prompt a number of researches in the next few years. It first looks at the research conducted on endogenous institutions, before focusing on legislative institutions. It looks at the revelation and aggregation of information, where the discussion is focused on the voters, particularly the voters who are uninformed in o…
How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median
This article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always …
Bargaining in the Shadow of War
This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram…
Overview Of Political Economy
This introductory article discusses a set of issues and approaches that have provided interesting results, and are most likely to prompt a number of researches in the next few years. It first looks at the research conducted on endogenous institutions, before focusing on legislative institutions. It looks at the revelation and aggregation of information, where the discussion is focused on the voters, particularly the voters who are uninformed in o…
Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions
Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy or something akin to a monarchy, in which heredity plays a primary role. These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control of church doctrine and finances. They also induce different institutional responses. This article explains cases in which screening is highly institutionalize…
District versus at-large voting
Economics (21 obras) · Political science (16 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Politics (11 obras) · Computer Science (10 obras) · Microeconomics (9 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Political economy (7 obras) · Mathematical economics (6 obras) · Sociology (6 obras)