David W Rohde
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1099136 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | David W Rohde |
| NOMBRES | David W |
| APELLIDO | Rohde |
| FIRMA | ROHDE D W |
| AFILIACIONES | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0661-6266 |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 53 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1246 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 52 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1971 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2017 |
| ÍNDICE H | 19 |
Does the Gift Keep on Giving? House Leadership PAC Donations before and after Majority Status
Party leaders face a significant trade-off financing races when the party is out of power: while they care about gaining control of the House, they do not know how willing a potential representative will be to work with and for the party once elected. Leadership political action committee (LPAC) contributions are a major mechanism of leadership control over the financing of congressional campaigns, with the hope of influencing the future behavior…
Setting the Table
This article joins the growing tide of research that studies party effects in the United States Senate. Previous work has shown that certain procedural tools disproportionately advantage the majority party at the expense of the minority. We build on this research by exploiting a new dataset that allows us to study motions to table amendments from the 91st to the 111th Congress. By examining the success of these motions, analyzing the voting calcu…
Blame, Responsibility, and the Tea Party in the 2010 Midterm Elections
Measuring variations in party unity voting
Measures of party divisiveness have been widely used in scholarly literature for a variety of different purposes. However, conventional measures of party divisiveness, such as the percentage of party votes in a particular Congress, fail to consider important changes in the agenda from one Congress to the next. We introduce a measure that controls for such changes, drawing attention to the effect that agenda change has on observed party divisivene…
Reflections on the Practice of Theorizing
This article focuses on the theory of Conditional Party Government (CPG). It seeks to recapitulate the development of the argument for CPG, pulling together various strands articulated during work on the theory over the last four decades in order to explain why the theory took the form it did. The discussion focuses on some of the most important evidence that relates to the predictions of CPG, in order to account for the evolution of the theory o…
House Appropriations After the Republican Revolution
This paper applies the theory of “conditional party government” (CPG) to the interaction between the majority party and the Appropriations Committee in the period following the Republican Revolution of 1995. In effort to extend the analysis of Aldrich and Rohde (2000a), we examine how actions within the Committee have changed over time and analyze whether behavior and outcomes continue to match the expectations of CPG. What we find is that under …
Rules to Live By
A great deal of research in the 1990s was devoted to exploring the consequences of the ceding of greater agenda control to the majority leadership in the House during the era of Democratic control. The intent of this article is to build on that earlier work to discuss the continuing consequences of strengthened parties for decision making from the 1990s onward. Specifically, we find that as the parties became increasingly homogenous over time, pa…
Propensão ao risco e ambição progressiva
O artigo analisa a decisão dos membros da Câmara de Deputados dos Estados Unidos (House of Representatives) de concorrer ou não a um cargo superior (governador ou senador) durante o período de 1954 a 1974. O trabalho difere de análises anteriores sobre ambição por oferecer uma base teórica mais concreta para o estudo da ambição progressiva e tentar predizer quais deputados vão se candidatar a cargos superiores, mais do que apenas analisar as carr…
The Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate
The political parties in the Senate are almost as polarized at they are in the House. Nevertheless, the explanations for party polarization work better in the House than they do in the Senate. In this article, we argue that the polarization in the House has directly contributed to polarization in the Senate. We find that almost the entire growth in Senate party polarization since the early 1970s can be accounted for by Republican senators who pre…
What a Difference Twenty-Five Years Makes
This article provides a critical overview of some major theoretical perspectives in the literature on party leadership, organization, and activity in the US House from the 1970s on. It then addresses a few of the major issues raised in this work in more detail, and describes some avenues for future research that can build on the solid foundation recent work has offered. The Democratic majority in the House established a series of institutional re…
Dimensions, Issues, and Bills
One of the fundamental findings in the congressional literature is that one or sometimes two dimensions can successfully describe roll-call voting. In this paper we investigate if we can reach the same conclusions about low dimensionality when we divide the roll-call agenda into subsets of relatively homogeneous subject matter. We are primarily interested in the degree to which the same ordering of representatives is yielded across these differen…
Consensus, Conflict, and Partisanship in House Decision Making
Although conflict and partisanship are deeply entrenched in the public's view of the U.S. Congress, political scientists have noted that consensus characterizes much of the legislative branch's operations. We build on an expanding literature that moves beyond a focus on roll call voting and explore individual bills as the unit of analysis in an attempt to obtain an accurate picture of the broader context in which House decision making occurs. Dra…
Why Not Parties?
War for the Floor
This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives to the issue of procedural control of the legislative agenda via special rules. In particular, we draw out a facet of cartel and conditional party government theories that has not been addressed in prior analyses: the simultaneous interrelationship between positive and negative agenda control. Using roll‐call data on two procedural matters—votes t…
Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives
The elevated levels of party polarization observed in the contemporary Congress have been attributed to a variety of factors. One of the more commonly recurring themes among observers of congressional politics is that changes in district boundaries resulting from the redistricting process are a root cause. Using a new data set linking congressional districts from 1962 to 2002, we offer a direct test of this claim. Our results show that although t…
Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate
The requirements of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of Supreme Court nominees present two anomalies: under what circumstances can ideologically extreme nominees win confirmation and, given political polarization and the possibility of a filibuster, how are any nominees successful? This paper employs a simple unidimensional spatial model to explore these anomalies. The principal results show that little change in Court policy is po…
Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975-1996
Why are some foreign policy votes partisan and others bipartisan? The authors argue that an electoral connection drives partisanship in congressional foreign policy voting. Members of Congress depend on core supporters for mobilization and money, and primary voters are likely to follow the opinion cues of partisan elites; as a result, when Republican and Democratic opinion elites hold more distinct views on an issue, one may expect to observe mor…
Fear in the Voting Booth
Ideology, Electoral Incentives, and Congressional Politics
Following the work of Downs and Mayhew, some theories of legislative politics assume that candidates are motivated only by electoral interests and their behavior is driven by the median voter in their district. Other theories, however, posit that legislator behavior is driven by additional factors such as member's policy interests or those of the primary constituency. It is our theoretical expectation that Downs was not incorrect but rather incom…
The 2004 Presidential Election
PAUL R. ABRAMSON is a professor of political science at Michigan State University. JOHN H. ALDRICH is Pfizer-Pratt University Professor of Political Science at Duke University. DAVID W. ROHDE is University Distinguished Professor in the department of political science at Michigan State University. They are coauthors of a series of twelve books on U.S. presidential and congressional elections, the most recent of which is Change and Continuity in t…
Will Changing the Rules Change the Game
Professors Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde discuss the major reform introduced by the Democratic Party for its 2004 presidential nomination contest rules that will lead to a large number of delegates being chosen early in the delegate selection window. They show that the 2004 contest will be more front-loaded than any contest since the Democrats introduced a delegate selection window in 1980. They argue that these rules, alo…
Partisanship, Consensus, and Committee-Floor Divergence
Although some studies of Congress have employed aggregate-level ideological measures to characterize the outlier tendencies of congressional committees, such measures cannot reveal intracommittee variation in the propensity for disagreement between committees and the floor. In this analysis, we examine differences in voting behavior between members of the committee to which bills were initially referred and the House in the 96th and 104th Congres…
Partisanship and the Purse
We analyze floor decision making on taxing and spending legislation during the 96 th , 100 th , and 104 th Congresses in order to assess how electoral forces, fiscal pressures, and institutional change have affected the role of the money committees. Examination of decision making on legislation from these committees provides insight into how different committees and different institutions responded to this volatile post‐reform environment. We fin…
The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes
We examine the U.S. Congressional elections of 1862-63, which resulted in a stunning setback for President Abraham Lincoln and the incumbent Republican Party. After the electoral dust had cleared, the Republicans lost control of the House, as their share of seats declined from 59 percent to just over 46 percent. While historians contend that the national electorate's general unhappiness with the war effort produced a largely systematic backlash a…
Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House
Distributive, informational, and partisan rationales provide contrasting accounts of legislative politics. Which of these theories best explains the decisions and policies of the House Agriculture Committee? We contend that all are appropriate, at various times, depending upon the particular issues and circumstances. By analyzing issues within the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Committee and the Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of …
Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition
This study analyzes the decisions of members of the House on whether to seek higher office (governor or senator) during the period 1954-1974. It differs from previous ambition analyses in that it offers a more concrete theoretical base for the study of progressive ambition and it attempts to predict which members will seek higher office rather than just analyze the careers of members who did run. Hypotheses are offered which deal with the probabi…
"Sophisticated" Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries
Voters in multicandidate contests may confront circumstances under which it is in their interest to vote for a second- or even lower-ranked candidate. The U.S. electoral system, typically offering a choice between only two major contenders, rarely presents opportunities for this "sophisticated" voting. In presidential primaries, however, many plausible candidates may compete. We investigate the presence of sophisticated voting in the 1988 preside…
The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee
This study applies the theory of "conditional party government" to the interaction between the Republican party and the Appropriations Committee in the 104th House, seen in the context of developments since the 96th Congress. As expected by the theory, we find that the relatively homogenous preferences of the Republican contingent in the House led them to adopt new institutional arrangements to enhance the powers of their leaders, which in turn w…
Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response
This paper presents an initial attempt at a systematic analysis of the veto process. The authors argue that outcomes at all three stages of the process-the veto decision, the override attempt, and the success of those attempts-depend upon the state of the political environment (e.g., stage of the electoral cycle) and the prevailing resources of the president. Relevant presidential resources are the proportion of congressional seats controlled by …
Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives
This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative cour…
The Transition to Republican Rule in the House
John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 4 (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 541-567
War for the Floor
This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives to the issue of procedural control of the legislative agenda via special rules. In particular, we draw out a facet of cartel and conditional party government theories that has not been addressed in prior analyses: the simultaneous interrelationship between positive and negative agenda control. Using roll‐call data on two procedural matters—votes t…
Parties and Committees in the House
The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes
We examine the U.S. Congressional elections of 1862-63, which resulted in a stunning setback for President Abraham Lincoln and the incumbent Republican Party. After the electoral dust had cleared, the Republicans lost control of the House, as their share of seats declined from 59 percent to just over 46 percent. While historians contend that the national electorate's general unhappiness with the war effort produced a largely systematic backlash a…
Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House
Distributive, informational, and partisan rationales provide contrasting accounts of legislative politics. Which of these theories best explains the decisions and policies of the House Agriculture Committee? We contend that all are appropriate, at various times, depending upon the particular issues and circumstances. By analyzing issues within the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Committee and the Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of …
Progressive Ambition among United States Senators
A rational-choice model is used to account for the decisions of United States Senators to run for president. The model predicts that senators will be more likely to run for president if their relative costs of running are low, if they have no political liabilities that might reduce their chances of winning, and if they have a propensity to take risks, which we measure by their past willingness to take risks in running for the Senate. The model wo…
Dimensions, Issues, and Bills
One of the fundamental findings in the congressional literature is that one or sometimes two dimensions can successfully describe roll-call voting. In this paper we investigate if we can reach the same conclusions about low dimensionality when we divide the roll-call agenda into subsets of relatively homogeneous subject matter. We are primarily interested in the degree to which the same ordering of representatives is yielded across these differen…
Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics
Journal Article Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot Get access Paul R. Abramson, Paul R. Abramson PAUL R. ABRAMSON is professor of political science at Michigan State University. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John H. Aldrich, John H. Aldrich JOHN H. ALDRICH is professor of political science and chairman of the department at Duke University. Search for…
The Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate
The political parties in the Senate are almost as polarized at they are in the House. Nevertheless, the explanations for party polarization work better in the House than they do in the Senate. In this article, we argue that the polarization in the House has directly contributed to polarization in the Senate. We find that almost the entire growth in Senate party polarization since the early 1970s can be accounted for by Republican senators who pre…
Fear in the Voting Booth
Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives
The elevated levels of party polarization observed in the contemporary Congress have been attributed to a variety of factors. One of the more commonly recurring themes among observers of congressional politics is that changes in district boundaries resulting from the redistricting process are a root cause. Using a new data set linking congressional districts from 1962 to 2002, we offer a direct test of this claim. Our results show that although t…
Measuring variations in party unity voting
Measures of party divisiveness have been widely used in scholarly literature for a variety of different purposes. However, conventional measures of party divisiveness, such as the percentage of party votes in a particular Congress, fail to consider important changes in the agenda from one Congress to the next. We introduce a measure that controls for such changes, drawing attention to the effect that agenda change has on observed party divisivene…
Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate
The requirements of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of Supreme Court nominees present two anomalies: under what circumstances can ideologically extreme nominees win confirmation and, given political polarization and the possibility of a filibuster, how are any nominees successful? This paper employs a simple unidimensional spatial model to explore these anomalies. The principal results show that little change in Court policy is po…
The Measurement of Public Opinion about Public Policy
The ability to measure mass attitudes on policy matters is intimately related to the format in which policy questions are presented to respondents. In this paper we examine a set of alternate question formats and contrast them with the seven-point format used in the more recent election studies of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of the University of Michigan. The analysis is based on a sample of 280 respondents interviewed by the CPS in 19…
Challenges to the American Two-Party System
Recent successes by independent presidential candidates raise questions about the stability of the American two-party system. Students of electoral behavior point to party decline, whereas analysts of party organization see growth and transformation. Analyses of the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 National Election Study surveys are used to determine whether support for Wallace, Anderson, and Perot resulted from dissatisfaction with the current two-pa…
Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives
This paper examines the role of leadership in the U.S. House in the context of arguments raised in Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government. It begins with a discussion of the speakerships of Henry Clay and Thomas Reed as counterexamples to Wilson's generalizations (a model that links the degree of preference homogeneity among legislative followers to a leader's decision about whether to exert policy leadership is presented in an Appendix). Next…
Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 1975-1996
Why are some foreign policy votes partisan and others bipartisan? The authors argue that an electoral connection drives partisanship in congressional foreign policy voting. Members of Congress depend on core supporters for mobilization and money, and primary voters are likely to follow the opinion cues of partisan elites; as a result, when Republican and Democratic opinion elites hold more distinct views on an issue, one may expect to observe mor…
Committee Reform in the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee Bill of Rights
Prior to 1971 committee-related reforms in the House were primarily changes in the House rules, which had to be voted on by the full membership. After 1971 most committee reforms were in the form of resolutions passed by the Democratic Caucus. The post-1970 reforms dealt primarily with the selection of committee chairmen and the make-up and powers of subcommittees. The most recent of these reforms was the Subcommittee Bill of Rights which establi…
Studying Congressional Norms
Edward Schneier argues that the research of the last fifteen years that has concluded that congressional norms have changed greatly since the 1950s is mistaken, and that congressional norms persist today essentially unchanged. This paper dissents from that view. It contends that Schneier's conclusion is partly based on an unjustified shift in the conception of norms in Congress, and partly on insufficient–and in some degree, misleading–evidence
Blame, Responsibility, and the Tea Party in the 2010 Midterm Elections
Rebellion and Authority
Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives
This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative cour…
Committee Reform in the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee Bill of Rights
Prior to 1971 committee-related reforms in the House were primarily changes in the House rules, which had to be voted on by the full membership. After 1971 most committee reforms were in the form of resolutions passed by the Democratic Caucus. The post-1970 reforms dealt primarily with the selection of committee chairmen and the make-up and powers of subcommittees. The most recent of these reforms was the Subcommittee Bill of Rights which establi…
Congressional Power
The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator
Robert L. Peabody, Norman J. Ornstein, David W. Rohde, The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator: Many Are Called but Few Are Chosen, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), pp. 237-258
Some Clarifications Regarding a Theory of Supreme Court Coalition Formation
This note is deliberately entitled a clarification and not a rejoinder, because my primary purpose is not to dispute the criticisms these authors have offered of some of my work on Supreme Court coalition formation. This is particularly true of the Hoyer-Mayer-Bernd critique. I agree by and large with the general points they make at the beginning of their paper. Indeed, I am not bothered greatly by their application of these general comments to m…
Membership Turnover and Congressional Reform
Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition
This study analyzes the decisions of members of the House on whether to seek higher office (governor or senator) during the period 1954-1974. It differs from previous ambition analyses in that it offers a more concrete theoretical base for the study of progressive ambition and it attempts to predict which members will seek higher office rather than just analyze the careers of members who did run. Hypotheses are offered which deal with the probabi…
Baljit Singh
The Measurement of Public Opinion about Public Policy
The ability to measure mass attitudes on policy matters is intimately related to the format in which policy questions are presented to respondents. In this paper we examine a set of alternate question formats and contrast them with the seven-point format used in the more recent election studies of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of the University of Michigan. The analysis is based on a sample of 280 respondents interviewed by the CPS in 19…
Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response
This paper presents an initial attempt at a systematic analysis of the veto process. The authors argue that outcomes at all three stages of the process-the veto decision, the override attempt, and the success of those attempts-depend upon the state of the political environment (e.g., stage of the electoral cycle) and the prevailing resources of the president. Relevant presidential resources are the proportion of congressional seats controlled by …
Progressive Ambition among United States Senators
A rational-choice model is used to account for the decisions of United States Senators to run for president. The model predicts that senators will be more likely to run for president if their relative costs of running are low, if they have no political liabilities that might reduce their chances of winning, and if they have a propensity to take risks, which we measure by their past willingness to take risks in running for the Senate. The model wo…
Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives
This paper examines the role of leadership in the U.S. House in the context of arguments raised in Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government. It begins with a discussion of the speakerships of Henry Clay and Thomas Reed as counterexamples to Wilson's generalizations (a model that links the degree of preference homogeneity among legislative followers to a leader's decision about whether to exert policy leadership is presented in an Appendix). Next…
Studying Congressional Norms
Edward Schneier argues that the research of the last fifteen years that has concluded that congressional norms have changed greatly since the 1950s is mistaken, and that congressional norms persist today essentially unchanged. This paper dissents from that view. It contends that Schneier's conclusion is partly based on an unjustified shift in the conception of norms in Congress, and partly on insufficient–and in some degree, misleading–evidence
Home Style and Washington Work
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Since the Second World War, congressional parties have been characterized as declining in strength and influence. Research has generally attributed this decline to policy conflicts within parties, to growing electoral independence of members, and to the impact of the congressional reforms of the 1970s. Yet the 1980s witnessed a strong resurgence of parties and party leadership-especially in the House of Representatives. Offering a concise and com…
Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections
Parties and leaders in the postreform house
"Sophisticated" Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries
Voters in multicandidate contests may confront circumstances under which it is in their interest to vote for a second- or even lower-ranked candidate. The U.S. electoral system, typically offering a choice between only two major contenders, rarely presents opportunities for this "sophisticated" voting. In presidential primaries, however, many plausible candidates may compete. We investigate the presence of sophisticated voting in the 1988 preside…
Parties and Committees in the House
Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics
Journal Article Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot Get access Paul R. Abramson, Paul R. Abramson PAUL R. ABRAMSON is professor of political science at Michigan State University. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John H. Aldrich, John H. Aldrich JOHN H. ALDRICH is professor of political science and chairman of the department at Duke University. Search for…
The Transition to Republican Rule in the House
John H. Aldrich, David W. Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 4 (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 541-567
Fighting Fire With Water
While White (1989) thoroughly examined the House Appropriations Committee after the congressional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, we begin to offer an updated picture of the counterpart committee in the Senate. We find that there has been considerable change in the behavior of appropriators in the postreform era. Specifically, partisanship within the Senate has increased substantially, but even more interesting is the rise of partisanship within …
Challenges to the American Two-Party System
The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee
This study applies the theory of "conditional party government" to the interaction between the Republican party and the Appropriations Committee in the 104th House, seen in the context of developments since the 96th Congress. As expected by the theory, we find that the relatively homogenous preferences of the Republican contingent in the House led them to adopt new institutional arrangements to enhance the powers of their leaders, which in turn w…
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