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Paul Pietroski

Datos Biográficos

ID1102127
NOMBREPaul Pietroski
NOMBRESPaul
APELLIDOPietroski
FIRMAPIETROSKI P
AFILIACIONESUniversity of Maryland, College Park
ORCID0000-0002-6352-8772
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS15
TOTAL DE CITAS35
TOTAL COMO AUTOR15
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1995
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2023
ÍNDICE H3
  • Psycholinguistic evidence for restricted quantification

    Open Access•Timothy Knowlton, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Natural Language Semantics•2023•Referencias: 62

  • The mental representation of universal quantifiers

    Open Access•Timothy Knowlton, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Linguistics and Philosophy•2022

  • Replies to Critics

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022•Referencias: 3

    From my perspective, replying to Santorio and Szabo was both enjoyable and challenging. There are relatively few points of clear disagreement to focus on. But regarding certain theoretical options, we're inclined to make different bets about which ones will prove most fruitful. So I'll emphasize this, if only to keep things interesting, and pass over agreement largely in silence. In the précis above, and in the book, I focused on a certain tradit…

  • Precis of Conjoining Meanings

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022

    Let me start by thanking Professors Santorio and Szabo for their insightful comments and careful readings of Conjoining Meanings (CM). They highlight the main theses and describe the project in helpful ways.1 So instead of multiplying summaries, let me say a little about what motivated the project. Chomsky was influential. But teaching truth-theoretic semantics, for many years, really convinced me of the need for a different conception of linguis…

  • A narrow path from meanings to contents

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski, Paul M Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • Responses to comments on Conjoining meanings

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Mind & Language•2020

    After some brief introductory remarks, I respond to the three commentaries on Conjoining meanings that appear in this issue

  • Conjoining Meanings

    Paul Pietroski, Paul M Pietroski•BOOK•Conjoining Meanings•2018

    Humans naturally acquire languages that connect meanings with pronunciations. These distinctive languages are described here as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. Children acquire meaningful lexical items that can be combined, in certain ways, to form meaningful complex expressions. This raises questions about what meanings are, how they can be combined, and what kinds of meanings lexical items can have. This book argues …

  • Describing I-junction

    Paul Pietroski, Paul M Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2014

    The meaning of a noun phrase like ‘brown cow’, or ‘cow that ate grass’, is somehow conjunctive. But conjunctive in what sense? Are the meanings of other phrases—e.g, ‘ate quickly’, ‘ate grass’, and ‘at noon’—similarly conjunctive? I suggest a possible answer, in the context of a broader conception of natural language semantics. But my main aim is to highlight some underdiscussed questions and some implications of our ignorance

  • Interface transparency and the psychosemantics of most

    Open Access•Jeffrey Lidz, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Natural Language Semantics•2011•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 32

  • Is Generative Grammar deceptively simple or simply deceptive

    Open Access•Stephen Crain, Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Lingua•2006•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 3

  • Quantification and Second‐Order Monadicity

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2003•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 6

    The first part of this paper reviews some developments regarding the apparent mismatch between the logical and grammatical forms of quantificational constructions like 'Pat kicked every bottle'. I suggest that (even given quantifier-raising) many current theories still posit an undesirable mismatch. But all is well if we can treat determiners (words like 'every', 'no', and 'most') as second-order monadic predicates without treating them as predic…

  • Why language acquisition is a snap

    Stephen Crain, Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•The Linguistic Review•2002

    Nativists inspired by Chomsky are apt to provide arguments with the follow-ing general form: languages exhibit interesting generalizations that are not suggested by casual (or even intensive) examination of what people actually say; correspondingly, adults (i.e., just about anyone above the age of four) know much more about language than they could plausibly have learned on the basis of their experience; so absent an alternative account of the re…

  • Causing Actions

    Georg Theiner, Timothy O’Connor et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002

  • Believing in Language

    Open Access•Susan Dwyer, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1996•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 15

    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language—e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue …

  • When Other Things Aren't Equal

    Paul Pietroski, Georges Rey•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1995•Citada por: 25•Referencias: 18

    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ‘real’ laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, …

  • When Other Things Aren't Equal

    Paul Pietroski, Georges Rey•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1995•Citada por: 25•Referencias: 18

    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ‘real’ laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, …

  • Interface transparency and the psychosemantics of most

    Open Access•Jeffrey Lidz, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Natural Language Semantics•2011•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 32

  • Believing in Language

    Open Access•Susan Dwyer, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1996•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 15

    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language—e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue …

  • Is Generative Grammar deceptively simple or simply deceptive

    Open Access•Stephen Crain, Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Lingua•2006•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 3

  • Quantification and Second‐Order Monadicity

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2003•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 6

    The first part of this paper reviews some developments regarding the apparent mismatch between the logical and grammatical forms of quantificational constructions like 'Pat kicked every bottle'. I suggest that (even given quantifier-raising) many current theories still posit an undesirable mismatch. But all is well if we can treat determiners (words like 'every', 'no', and 'most') as second-order monadic predicates without treating them as predic…

  • When Other Things Aren't Equal

    Paul Pietroski, Georges Rey•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1995•Citada por: 25•Referencias: 18

    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ‘real’ laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, …

  • Believing in Language

    Open Access•Susan Dwyer, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1996•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 15

    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language—e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue …

  • Why language acquisition is a snap

    Stephen Crain, Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•The Linguistic Review•2002

    Nativists inspired by Chomsky are apt to provide arguments with the follow-ing general form: languages exhibit interesting generalizations that are not suggested by casual (or even intensive) examination of what people actually say; correspondingly, adults (i.e., just about anyone above the age of four) know much more about language than they could plausibly have learned on the basis of their experience; so absent an alternative account of the re…

  • Causing Actions

    Georg Theiner, Timothy O’Connor et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002

  • Quantification and Second‐Order Monadicity

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2003•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 6

    The first part of this paper reviews some developments regarding the apparent mismatch between the logical and grammatical forms of quantificational constructions like 'Pat kicked every bottle'. I suggest that (even given quantifier-raising) many current theories still posit an undesirable mismatch. But all is well if we can treat determiners (words like 'every', 'no', and 'most') as second-order monadic predicates without treating them as predic…

  • Is Generative Grammar deceptively simple or simply deceptive

    Open Access•Stephen Crain, Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Lingua•2006•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 3

  • Interface transparency and the psychosemantics of most

    Open Access•Jeffrey Lidz, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Natural Language Semantics•2011•Citada por: 4•Referencias: 32

  • Describing I-junction

    Paul Pietroski, Paul M Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•ProtoSociology•2014

    The meaning of a noun phrase like ‘brown cow’, or ‘cow that ate grass’, is somehow conjunctive. But conjunctive in what sense? Are the meanings of other phrases—e.g, ‘ate quickly’, ‘ate grass’, and ‘at noon’—similarly conjunctive? I suggest a possible answer, in the context of a broader conception of natural language semantics. But my main aim is to highlight some underdiscussed questions and some implications of our ignorance

  • Conjoining Meanings

    Paul Pietroski, Paul M Pietroski•BOOK•Conjoining Meanings•2018

    Humans naturally acquire languages that connect meanings with pronunciations. These distinctive languages are described here as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. Children acquire meaningful lexical items that can be combined, in certain ways, to form meaningful complex expressions. This raises questions about what meanings are, how they can be combined, and what kinds of meanings lexical items can have. This book argues …

  • Responses to comments on Conjoining meanings

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Mind & Language•2020

    After some brief introductory remarks, I respond to the three commentaries on Conjoining meanings that appear in this issue

  • A narrow path from meanings to contents

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski, Paul M Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • The mental representation of universal quantifiers

    Open Access•Timothy Knowlton, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Linguistics and Philosophy•2022

  • Replies to Critics

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022•Referencias: 3

    From my perspective, replying to Santorio and Szabo was both enjoyable and challenging. There are relatively few points of clear disagreement to focus on. But regarding certain theoretical options, we're inclined to make different bets about which ones will prove most fruitful. So I'll emphasize this, if only to keep things interesting, and pass over agreement largely in silence. In the précis above, and in the book, I focused on a certain tradit…

  • Precis of Conjoining Meanings

    Open Access•Paul Pietroski•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2022

    Let me start by thanking Professors Santorio and Szabo for their insightful comments and careful readings of Conjoining Meanings (CM). They highlight the main theses and describe the project in helpful ways.1 So instead of multiplying summaries, let me say a little about what motivated the project. Chomsky was influential. But teaching truth-theoretic semantics, for many years, really convinced me of the need for a different conception of linguis…

  • Psycholinguistic evidence for restricted quantification

    Open Access•Timothy Knowlton, Paul Pietroski et al.•ARTICLE•Natural Language Semantics•2023•Referencias: 62

Philosophy (13 obras) · Linguistics (11 obras) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (11 obras) · Computer Science (9 obras) · Epistemology (9 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Language Development and Disorders (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras)

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