Stephane Wolton
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1115304 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stephane Wolton |
| NOMBRES | Stephane |
| APELLIDO | Wolton |
| FIRMA | WOLTON S |
| AFILIACIONES | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1405-650X |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 17 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 88 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 17 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2000 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
White, Male, and Angry
From the bottom to the top of society, many white men are angry. This article provides a reputation-based rationale for this anger. Individuals care about their social status (elite vs. non-elite) and their social reputation (how they expect others to perceive them). Everyone is uncertain about how one becomes a member of the elite. When new information reveals that the system is biased in favor of white men, the social reputation of all white me…
Decentralised information transmission in the shadow of conflict
Miscalculations due to lack of information are often seen as one of the main causes of war. Yet, a privately informed country has multiple channels to share information and avoid a costly conflict. I study three ways information can be transmitted – sunk cost signals, audience costs, and military build-up. In a fully decentralised setting, where the uninformed country can perfectly adjust its response to the information it learns, the three chann…
A Letter from the Editors-in-Chief
Executive Absolutism
We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive’s ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more…
Lobbying, Inside and Out
Special interest groups (SIGs) have multiple channels of influence: contributing to decision-makers or providing them with information (henceforth, inside lobbying) and grassroots mobilizations or advertising their position to voters (henceforth, outside lobbying). How do these channels interact? I study a signaling model in which a politician chooses the scope of a reform, two SIGs, one defending the status quo, the other pushing for change, use…
After Citizens United
Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability
The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is…
Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy
This article assesses the normative and positive claims regarding the consequences of biased media using a political agency framework that includes a strategic voter, polarized politicians, and news providers. My model predicts that voters are always better informed with unbiased than with biased outlets even when the latter have opposite ideological preferences. However, biased media may improve voter welfare. Contrary to several scholars' fears…
Mass Purges
This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework to study the features of mass purges in authoritarian regimes. We contend that mass purges are an instrument of top-down accountability meant to motivate and screen a multitude of agents (e.g., single-party members, state bureaucrats). We show that the set of purged agents is well delineated in mild purges, whereas no performance indicator is a guarantee of safety in violent purges. The proportion…
The Politician’s Province
Politicians, especially executives, regularly seek to project their influence into new policy domains. In some instances, they do so only after having secured the requisite statutory authority; in others, they intervene without prior authorization, hoping that their actions henceforth serve as precedent for future policy involvement. To investigate the conditions under which politicians pursue one strategy versus another, we study a stylized mode…
Electoral Imbalances and Their Consequences
This paper studies the consequences for the electoral process of reputational and partisan imbalance; that is, asymmetries in voters' evaluations of candidates' quality (for example, due to incumbency) and of party labels (for example, due to ideology). Our theory is predicated on the notion that voters are ``rationally ignorant'' as they face cognitive constraints on their ability to acquire and process political information. Our model rationali…
Rule versus Discretion
As markets evolve, new regulatory concerns emerge. In response, policy makers institute new requirements for private businesses. Because they impose costs and generate uncertainty, these requirements may deter firm investment. To reduce regulatory uncertainty and favor investment, a principal can choose a rule-based regulatory framework. However, unlike discretion, rules do not adapt to circumstances and are thus inefficient. Using a micro-founde…
Citizens United
The 2010 US Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. Federal Electoral Commission lifted restrictions on the funding by unions and corporations of groups engaging in independent political advertising (outside spending). Many have criticized the majority opinion’s premise that outside spending cannot corrupt or distort the electoral process. Fewer have examined the implications of this decision under the Court’s assumptions. Using a game-the…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
The Voters' Curses
Scholars have long deplored voters' lack of interest in politics and argued in favor of greater political engagement. We present a formal theory of elections where successful communication of campaign messages requires both effort by candidates and attention from voters. Voters' interest in politics affects their attention and impacts the effectiveness of the electoral process as a screening and disciplining device. In line with existing theories…
Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation
In democratic systems, the rich have diverse channels through which they can influence policies. In a model of taxation, I study the capacity of the rich to constrain the fiscal choice of a government by starting a costly political conflict (for example, a press campaign), which imposes a cost on the government and influences the fate of the government’s fiscal plan. I show that the government’s tax proposal depends critically on the marginal dis…
Barbed Wire Europe
‘Barbed Wire Europe: Conference against Immigration Detention’ held in Ruskin College, Oxford, 15–17 September 2000 Get access SUKE WOLTON SUKE WOLTON St Cross College, University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2000, Pages 415–423, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.4.415 Published: 01 December 2000
Mass Purges
This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework to study the features of mass purges in authoritarian regimes. We contend that mass purges are an instrument of top-down accountability meant to motivate and screen a multitude of agents (e.g., single-party members, state bureaucrats). We show that the set of purged agents is well delineated in mild purges, whereas no performance indicator is a guarantee of safety in violent purges. The proportion…
After Citizens United
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
The Voters' Curses
Scholars have long deplored voters' lack of interest in politics and argued in favor of greater political engagement. We present a formal theory of elections where successful communication of campaign messages requires both effort by candidates and attention from voters. Voters' interest in politics affects their attention and impacts the effectiveness of the electoral process as a screening and disciplining device. In line with existing theories…
Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability
The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is…
The Politician’s Province
Politicians, especially executives, regularly seek to project their influence into new policy domains. In some instances, they do so only after having secured the requisite statutory authority; in others, they intervene without prior authorization, hoping that their actions henceforth serve as precedent for future policy involvement. To investigate the conditions under which politicians pursue one strategy versus another, we study a stylized mode…
Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy
This article assesses the normative and positive claims regarding the consequences of biased media using a political agency framework that includes a strategic voter, polarized politicians, and news providers. My model predicts that voters are always better informed with unbiased than with biased outlets even when the latter have opposite ideological preferences. However, biased media may improve voter welfare. Contrary to several scholars' fears…
Electoral Imbalances and Their Consequences
This paper studies the consequences for the electoral process of reputational and partisan imbalance; that is, asymmetries in voters' evaluations of candidates' quality (for example, due to incumbency) and of party labels (for example, due to ideology). Our theory is predicated on the notion that voters are ``rationally ignorant'' as they face cognitive constraints on their ability to acquire and process political information. Our model rationali…
Citizens United
The 2010 US Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. Federal Electoral Commission lifted restrictions on the funding by unions and corporations of groups engaging in independent political advertising (outside spending). Many have criticized the majority opinion’s premise that outside spending cannot corrupt or distort the electoral process. Fewer have examined the implications of this decision under the Court’s assumptions. Using a game-the…
Executive Absolutism
We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive’s ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more…
Lobbying, Inside and Out
Special interest groups (SIGs) have multiple channels of influence: contributing to decision-makers or providing them with information (henceforth, inside lobbying) and grassroots mobilizations or advertising their position to voters (henceforth, outside lobbying). How do these channels interact? I study a signaling model in which a politician chooses the scope of a reform, two SIGs, one defending the status quo, the other pushing for change, use…
Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation
In democratic systems, the rich have diverse channels through which they can influence policies. In a model of taxation, I study the capacity of the rich to constrain the fiscal choice of a government by starting a costly political conflict (for example, a press campaign), which imposes a cost on the government and influences the fate of the government’s fiscal plan. I show that the government’s tax proposal depends critically on the marginal dis…
White, Male, and Angry
From the bottom to the top of society, many white men are angry. This article provides a reputation-based rationale for this anger. Individuals care about their social status (elite vs. non-elite) and their social reputation (how they expect others to perceive them). Everyone is uncertain about how one becomes a member of the elite. When new information reveals that the system is biased in favor of white men, the social reputation of all white me…
Rule versus Discretion
As markets evolve, new regulatory concerns emerge. In response, policy makers institute new requirements for private businesses. Because they impose costs and generate uncertainty, these requirements may deter firm investment. To reduce regulatory uncertainty and favor investment, a principal can choose a rule-based regulatory framework. However, unlike discretion, rules do not adapt to circumstances and are thus inefficient. Using a micro-founde…
Barbed Wire Europe
‘Barbed Wire Europe: Conference against Immigration Detention’ held in Ruskin College, Oxford, 15–17 September 2000 Get access SUKE WOLTON SUKE WOLTON St Cross College, University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2000, Pages 415–423, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.4.415 Published: 01 December 2000
Barbed Wire Europe
‘Barbed Wire Europe: Conference against Immigration Detention’ held in Ruskin College, Oxford, 15–17 September 2000 Get access SUKE WOLTON SUKE WOLTON St Cross College, University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2000, Pages 415–423, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.4.415 Published: 01 December 2000
Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation
In democratic systems, the rich have diverse channels through which they can influence policies. In a model of taxation, I study the capacity of the rich to constrain the fiscal choice of a government by starting a costly political conflict (for example, a press campaign), which imposes a cost on the government and influences the fate of the government’s fiscal plan. I show that the government’s tax proposal depends critically on the marginal dis…
The Voters' Curses
Scholars have long deplored voters' lack of interest in politics and argued in favor of greater political engagement. We present a formal theory of elections where successful communication of campaign messages requires both effort by candidates and attention from voters. Voters' interest in politics affects their attention and impacts the effectiveness of the electoral process as a screening and disciplining device. In line with existing theories…
Rule versus Discretion
As markets evolve, new regulatory concerns emerge. In response, policy makers institute new requirements for private businesses. Because they impose costs and generate uncertainty, these requirements may deter firm investment. To reduce regulatory uncertainty and favor investment, a principal can choose a rule-based regulatory framework. However, unlike discretion, rules do not adapt to circumstances and are thus inefficient. Using a micro-founde…
Citizens United
The 2010 US Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. Federal Electoral Commission lifted restrictions on the funding by unions and corporations of groups engaging in independent political advertising (outside spending). Many have criticized the majority opinion’s premise that outside spending cannot corrupt or distort the electoral process. Fewer have examined the implications of this decision under the Court’s assumptions. Using a game-the…
Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy‐relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (f…
The Politician’s Province
Politicians, especially executives, regularly seek to project their influence into new policy domains. In some instances, they do so only after having secured the requisite statutory authority; in others, they intervene without prior authorization, hoping that their actions henceforth serve as precedent for future policy involvement. To investigate the conditions under which politicians pursue one strategy versus another, we study a stylized mode…
Electoral Imbalances and Their Consequences
This paper studies the consequences for the electoral process of reputational and partisan imbalance; that is, asymmetries in voters' evaluations of candidates' quality (for example, due to incumbency) and of party labels (for example, due to ideology). Our theory is predicated on the notion that voters are ``rationally ignorant'' as they face cognitive constraints on their ability to acquire and process political information. Our model rationali…
Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability
The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is…
Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy
This article assesses the normative and positive claims regarding the consequences of biased media using a political agency framework that includes a strategic voter, polarized politicians, and news providers. My model predicts that voters are always better informed with unbiased than with biased outlets even when the latter have opposite ideological preferences. However, biased media may improve voter welfare. Contrary to several scholars' fears…
Mass Purges
This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework to study the features of mass purges in authoritarian regimes. We contend that mass purges are an instrument of top-down accountability meant to motivate and screen a multitude of agents (e.g., single-party members, state bureaucrats). We show that the set of purged agents is well delineated in mild purges, whereas no performance indicator is a guarantee of safety in violent purges. The proportion…
After Citizens United
Lobbying, Inside and Out
Special interest groups (SIGs) have multiple channels of influence: contributing to decision-makers or providing them with information (henceforth, inside lobbying) and grassroots mobilizations or advertising their position to voters (henceforth, outside lobbying). How do these channels interact? I study a signaling model in which a politician chooses the scope of a reform, two SIGs, one defending the status quo, the other pushing for change, use…
A Letter from the Editors-in-Chief
Executive Absolutism
We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive’s ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more…
Decentralised information transmission in the shadow of conflict
Miscalculations due to lack of information are often seen as one of the main causes of war. Yet, a privately informed country has multiple channels to share information and avoid a costly conflict. I study three ways information can be transmitted – sunk cost signals, audience costs, and military build-up. In a fully decentralised setting, where the uninformed country can perfectly adjust its response to the information it learns, the three chann…
White, Male, and Angry
From the bottom to the top of society, many white men are angry. This article provides a reputation-based rationale for this anger. Individuals care about their social status (elite vs. non-elite) and their social reputation (how they expect others to perceive them). Everyone is uncertain about how one becomes a member of the elite. When new information reveals that the system is biased in favor of white men, the social reputation of all white me…
Political science (15 obras) · Economics (13 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Law (12 obras) · Politics (12 obras) · Public economics (10 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 obras) · Media Influence and Politics (8 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Political economy (6 obras)