Yoaav Isaacs
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1127377 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Yoaav Isaacs |
| NOMBRES | Yoaav |
| APELLIDO | Isaacs |
| FIRMA | ISAACS Y |
| AFILIACIONES | Baylor University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7288-1850 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2014 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Doomsday or Multiverse Bias
Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self‐locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors …
Conditionals and KK
In this paper, we explore the tension between the KK thesis and an attractive principle concerning the assertability of conditionals. We explore the prospects for defending the KK thesis against the problems posed, and conclude that they are dim. We therefore maintain that the pattern of assertability conditions for conditionals poses a powerful new argument against the KK thesis
Counting Your Chickens
Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the ‘inefficacy objection’ argue that, due to the scale and complexity of markets, the expected effects of your chicken purchases are negligible. So the expected effects of eating chicken do not make it wrong.We argue that this objection does not succeed, in two steps. First, empiric…
Updating without evidence
Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence —your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for plannin…
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idea…
Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance
The rationality of epistemic akrasia
A Probabilistic Analysis of Title IX Reforms
Infinite Prospects
People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic—but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the Countable Sure Thing Principle , as well as an infinitary ge…
The Fallacy of Calibrationism
Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base‐rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct
Duty and Knowledge
Infinite Prospects
People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic—but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the Countable Sure Thing Principle , as well as an infinitary ge…
The rationality of epistemic akrasia
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idea…
The Fallacy of Calibrationism
Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base‐rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct
Duty and Knowledge
Duty and Knowledge
The Fallacy of Calibrationism
Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base‐rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct
Infinite Prospects
People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic—but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the Countable Sure Thing Principle , as well as an infinitary ge…
Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance
The rationality of epistemic akrasia
A Probabilistic Analysis of Title IX Reforms
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idea…
Updating without evidence
Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence —your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for plannin…
Counting Your Chickens
Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the ‘inefficacy objection’ argue that, due to the scale and complexity of markets, the expected effects of your chicken purchases are negligible. So the expected effects of eating chicken do not make it wrong.We argue that this objection does not succeed, in two steps. First, empiric…
Conditionals and KK
In this paper, we explore the tension between the KK thesis and an attractive principle concerning the assertability of conditionals. We explore the prospects for defending the KK thesis against the problems posed, and conclude that they are dim. We therefore maintain that the pattern of assertability conditions for conditionals poses a powerful new argument against the KK thesis
Doomsday or Multiverse Bias
Bayesian epistemology faces serious challenges when dealing with self‐locating evidence. This paper argues that, given two modest assumptions about how confirmation should work (Patterning and Live Centers), Bayesianism faces an unavoidable dilemma. We must either accept an implausible form of reasoning where our mere existence provides evidence that the future is short (Doomsday), or accept an equally implausible form where our existence favors …
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Mathematical economics (3 obras)