Alex Kaiserman
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1128396 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Alex Kaiserman |
| NOMBRES | Alex |
| APELLIDO | Kaiserman |
| FIRMA | KAISERMAN A |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7209-5980 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Fair Opportunity and Responsibility
What's Wrong with Prepunishment
Punishing someone for a crime before they have committed it is widely considered morally abhorrent. But there is little agreement on what exactly is supposed to be wrong with it. In this paper, I critically evaluate several objections to the permissibility of prepunishment, making points along the way about the connections between time, knowledge, desert, deterrence and duty. I conclude that, although the conditions under which it could permissib…
Alternative possibilities in context
Frankfurt cases are often presented as counterexamples to the principle that one is morally responsible for one’s action only if one could have acted otherwise. But ‘could have acted otherwise’ is context-sensitive; it’s therefore open to a proponent of this principle to reply that although there is a salient sense in which agents in Frankfurt-style cases couldn’t have acted otherwise, there’s another, different sense in which they could have, an…
Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’
Much of our ordinary thought and talk about responsibility exhibits what I call the ‘pie fallacy’—the fallacy of thinking that there is a fixed amount of responsibility for every outcome, to be distributed among all those, if any, who are responsible for it. The pie fallacy is a fallacy, I argue, because how responsible an agent is for some outcome is fully grounded in facts about the agent, the outcome and the relationships between them; it does…
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will
Some actions are free and others are not. But free will also comes in degrees. This paper offers a novel account of degrees of free will, taking as its starting point the idea that an action is free to the extent to which the agent was sensitive, in acting, to reasons for or against performing that action. Though lip service is often paid to the idea that reasons‐sensitivity comes in degrees, however, the details turn out to be harder to pin down…
More of a Cause
It is often natural to compare two events by describing one as 'more of a cause' of some effect than the other. But what do such comparisons amount to, exactly? This paper aims to provide a guided tour of the recent literature on 'degrees of causation'. Section2looks at what I call 'dependence measures', which arise from thinking of causes asdifference-makers. Section3looks at what I call 'production measures', which arise from thinking of causes…
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will
Some actions are free and others are not. But free will also comes in degrees. This paper offers a novel account of degrees of free will, taking as its starting point the idea that an action is free to the extent to which the agent was sensitive, in acting, to reasons for or against performing that action. Though lip service is often paid to the idea that reasons‐sensitivity comes in degrees, however, the details turn out to be harder to pin down…
More of a Cause
It is often natural to compare two events by describing one as 'more of a cause' of some effect than the other. But what do such comparisons amount to, exactly? This paper aims to provide a guided tour of the recent literature on 'degrees of causation'. Section2looks at what I call 'dependence measures', which arise from thinking of causes asdifference-makers. Section3looks at what I call 'production measures', which arise from thinking of causes…
More of a Cause
It is often natural to compare two events by describing one as 'more of a cause' of some effect than the other. But what do such comparisons amount to, exactly? This paper aims to provide a guided tour of the recent literature on 'degrees of causation'. Section2looks at what I call 'dependence measures', which arise from thinking of causes asdifference-makers. Section3looks at what I call 'production measures', which arise from thinking of causes…
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will
Some actions are free and others are not. But free will also comes in degrees. This paper offers a novel account of degrees of free will, taking as its starting point the idea that an action is free to the extent to which the agent was sensitive, in acting, to reasons for or against performing that action. Though lip service is often paid to the idea that reasons‐sensitivity comes in degrees, however, the details turn out to be harder to pin down…
Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’
Much of our ordinary thought and talk about responsibility exhibits what I call the ‘pie fallacy’—the fallacy of thinking that there is a fixed amount of responsibility for every outcome, to be distributed among all those, if any, who are responsible for it. The pie fallacy is a fallacy, I argue, because how responsible an agent is for some outcome is fully grounded in facts about the agent, the outcome and the relationships between them; it does…
Alternative possibilities in context
Frankfurt cases are often presented as counterexamples to the principle that one is morally responsible for one’s action only if one could have acted otherwise. But ‘could have acted otherwise’ is context-sensitive; it’s therefore open to a proponent of this principle to reply that although there is a salient sense in which agents in Frankfurt-style cases couldn’t have acted otherwise, there’s another, different sense in which they could have, an…
What's Wrong with Prepunishment
Punishing someone for a crime before they have committed it is widely considered morally abhorrent. But there is little agreement on what exactly is supposed to be wrong with it. In this paper, I critically evaluate several objections to the permissibility of prepunishment, making points along the way about the connections between time, knowledge, desert, deterrence and duty. I conclude that, although the conditions under which it could permissib…
Fair Opportunity and Responsibility
Philosophy (6 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Law and economics (3 obras) · Sociology (3 obras) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · History (2 obras) · Law (2 obras)