Brian Cutter
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1144591 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Brian Cutter |
| NOMBRES | Brian |
| APELLIDO | Cutter |
| FIRMA | CUTTER B |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Notre Dame |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5036-1141 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2014 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
The problem of nomological harmony
Our universe features a harmonious match between laws and states: applying its laws to its states generates other states. This is a striking fact. Matters might have been otherwise. The universe might have been stillborn in a state unengaged by its laws. The problem of nomological harmony is that of explaining the noted striking fact. After introducing and developing this problem, we canvass candidate solutions and identify some of their virtues …
Illusion, delusion, and neural sense data
This commentary on Adam Pautz's excellent book, Perception, explores the consequences of “spatial illusionism,” the view that the spatial properties presented in experience aren't instantiated in the extra-mental world. First, I consider whether spatial illusionism entails that our ordinary beliefs about the physical world are mostly false. I then argue that spatial illusionism threatens to undermine two arguments Pautz's defends in Perception: h…
The Inconceivability Argument
This paper develops and defends a new argument against physicalist views of consciousness: the inconceivability argument. The argument has two main premises. First, it is not (ideally, positively) conceivable that phenomenal truths are grounded in physical truths. (For example, one cannot positively conceive of a situation in which someone has a vivid experience of pink wholly in virtue of the movements of colorless, insentient atoms.) Second, (i…
From Moral Realism to Axiarchism
Moral realism faces a well known genealogical debunking challenge. I argue that the moral realist’s best response may involve abandoning metaphysical naturalism in favor of some form of axiarchism—the view, very roughly, that the natural world is “ordered to the good.” Axiarchism comes in both theistic and non-theistic forms, but all forms agree that the natural world exists and has certain basic features because it is good for it to exist and ha…
The mind-body problem and the color-body problem
Color and a priori knowledge
A puzzle about the experience of left and right
Imagine your mirror‐inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would her experiences be the same as yours, or would they be phenomenally mirror‐inverted? I argue, first, that her experiences would be phenomenally the same as yours. I then show that this conclusion gives rise to a puzzle, one that I believe pushes us toward some surprising and philosophically significant conclusions about the nature of perception. When …
Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori
This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori , with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p , then it is possible that someone knows innately that p . (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori . After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the …
The Metaphysical Implications of the Moral Significance of Consciousness
Pains and Reasons
In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behaviour. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of …
Pains and Reasons
In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behaviour. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of …
The Metaphysical Implications of the Moral Significance of Consciousness
Pains and Reasons
In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behaviour. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of …
The Metaphysical Implications of the Moral Significance of Consciousness
Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori
This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori , with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p , then it is possible that someone knows innately that p . (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori . After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the …
Color and a priori knowledge
A puzzle about the experience of left and right
Imagine your mirror‐inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would her experiences be the same as yours, or would they be phenomenally mirror‐inverted? I argue, first, that her experiences would be phenomenally the same as yours. I then show that this conclusion gives rise to a puzzle, one that I believe pushes us toward some surprising and philosophically significant conclusions about the nature of perception. When …
The Inconceivability Argument
This paper develops and defends a new argument against physicalist views of consciousness: the inconceivability argument. The argument has two main premises. First, it is not (ideally, positively) conceivable that phenomenal truths are grounded in physical truths. (For example, one cannot positively conceive of a situation in which someone has a vivid experience of pink wholly in virtue of the movements of colorless, insentient atoms.) Second, (i…
From Moral Realism to Axiarchism
Moral realism faces a well known genealogical debunking challenge. I argue that the moral realist’s best response may involve abandoning metaphysical naturalism in favor of some form of axiarchism—the view, very roughly, that the natural world is “ordered to the good.” Axiarchism comes in both theistic and non-theistic forms, but all forms agree that the natural world exists and has certain basic features because it is good for it to exist and ha…
The mind-body problem and the color-body problem
The problem of nomological harmony
Our universe features a harmonious match between laws and states: applying its laws to its states generates other states. This is a striking fact. Matters might have been otherwise. The universe might have been stillborn in a state unengaged by its laws. The problem of nomological harmony is that of explaining the noted striking fact. After introducing and developing this problem, we canvass candidate solutions and identify some of their virtues …
Illusion, delusion, and neural sense data
This commentary on Adam Pautz's excellent book, Perception, explores the consequences of “spatial illusionism,” the view that the spatial properties presented in experience aren't instantiated in the extra-mental world. First, I consider whether spatial illusionism entails that our ordinary beliefs about the physical world are mostly false. I then argue that spatial illusionism threatens to undermine two arguments Pautz's defends in Perception: h…
Epistemology (8 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Metaphysics (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Consciousness (3 obras) · Linguistics (3 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 obras)