Cristian Larroulet Philippi
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1165115 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Cristian Larroulet Philippi |
| NOMBRES | Cristian Larroulet |
| APELLIDO | Philippi |
| FIRMA | PHILIPPI C L |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Cambridge |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5793-4670 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Lessons for human science measurement from the quantification of earthquake size
It remains controversial whether the human sciences can quantify the phenomena they study. The feasibility of quantification is usually assessed by identifying similarities and differences to quantitative measurement in physics. We argue that the case studies used to exemplify physical measurement are not sufficiently representative to underwrite such assessments. We substantiate this thesis by reconstructing how seismologists quantified "earthqu…
Against Prohibition (or, When Using Ordinal Scales to Compare Groups Is OK)
There is a widely held view on measurement inferences, that goes back to Stevens’s theory of measurement scales and ‘permissible statistics’. This view defends the following prohibition: you should not make inferences from averages taken with ordinal scales (versus quantitative scales: interval or ratio). This prohibition is general—it applies to all ordinal scales—and it is sometimes endorsed without qualification. Adhering to it dramatically li…
Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption
Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak’s challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and well-being empirical researchers may be justified in makin…
Is Quantitative Measurement in the Human Sciences Doomed? On the Quantity Objection
Previous articleNext article No AccessIs Quantitative Measurement in the Human Sciences Doomed? On the Quantity ObjectionCristian Larroulet PhilippiCristian Larroulet PhilippiPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookxLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Just Accepted Society: The British Society for the Philoso…
There Is Cause to Randomize
While practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional and observational studies alike. The upshot: Pr…
Valid for What? On the Very Idea of Unconditional Validity
What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics a…
On Measurement Scales
There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) and a set of prescriptions regarding measurement inferences. This article casts doubt on the adequacy of this received view. To do this, I propose an epistemic characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, that is, one in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This novel characterization reveals the ordinal/interval …
Distorted quality signals in school markets
Well-Ordered Science’s Basic Problem
Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)—of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal theories that helps clarifying WOS’s…
There Is Cause to Randomize
While practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional and observational studies alike. The upshot: Pr…
Is Quantitative Measurement in the Human Sciences Doomed? On the Quantity Objection
Previous articleNext article No AccessIs Quantitative Measurement in the Human Sciences Doomed? On the Quantity ObjectionCristian Larroulet PhilippiCristian Larroulet PhilippiPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookxLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Just Accepted Society: The British Society for the Philoso…
Valid for What? On the Very Idea of Unconditional Validity
What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics a…
On Measurement Scales
There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) and a set of prescriptions regarding measurement inferences. This article casts doubt on the adequacy of this received view. To do this, I propose an epistemic characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, that is, one in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This novel characterization reveals the ordinal/interval …
Well-Ordered Science’s Basic Problem
Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)—of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal theories that helps clarifying WOS’s…
Against Prohibition (or, When Using Ordinal Scales to Compare Groups Is OK)
There is a widely held view on measurement inferences, that goes back to Stevens’s theory of measurement scales and ‘permissible statistics’. This view defends the following prohibition: you should not make inferences from averages taken with ordinal scales (versus quantitative scales: interval or ratio). This prohibition is general—it applies to all ordinal scales—and it is sometimes endorsed without qualification. Adhering to it dramatically li…
Distorted quality signals in school markets
Distorted quality signals in school markets
Well-Ordered Science’s Basic Problem
Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)—of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal theories that helps clarifying WOS’s…
Valid for What? On the Very Idea of Unconditional Validity
What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics a…
On Measurement Scales
There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) and a set of prescriptions regarding measurement inferences. This article casts doubt on the adequacy of this received view. To do this, I propose an epistemic characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, that is, one in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This novel characterization reveals the ordinal/interval …
There Is Cause to Randomize
While practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional and observational studies alike. The upshot: Pr…
Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption
Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak’s challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and well-being empirical researchers may be justified in makin…
Is Quantitative Measurement in the Human Sciences Doomed? On the Quantity Objection
Previous articleNext article No AccessIs Quantitative Measurement in the Human Sciences Doomed? On the Quantity ObjectionCristian Larroulet PhilippiCristian Larroulet PhilippiPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookxLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Just Accepted Society: The British Society for the Philoso…
Against Prohibition (or, When Using Ordinal Scales to Compare Groups Is OK)
There is a widely held view on measurement inferences, that goes back to Stevens’s theory of measurement scales and ‘permissible statistics’. This view defends the following prohibition: you should not make inferences from averages taken with ordinal scales (versus quantitative scales: interval or ratio). This prohibition is general—it applies to all ordinal scales—and it is sometimes endorsed without qualification. Adhering to it dramatically li…
Lessons for human science measurement from the quantification of earthquake size
It remains controversial whether the human sciences can quantify the phenomena they study. The feasibility of quantification is usually assessed by identifying similarities and differences to quantitative measurement in physics. We argue that the case studies used to exemplify physical measurement are not sufficiently representative to underwrite such assessments. We substantiate this thesis by reconstructing how seismologists quantified "earthqu…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Physics (3 obras) · Sociology (3 obras) · Context (archaeology) (2 obras)