Nicholas G Napolio
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1235587 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Nicholas G Napolio |
| NOMBRES | Nicholas G |
| APELLIDO | Napolio |
| FIRMA | NAPOLIO N G |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Southern California |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8879-0726 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Executive Policymaking Coalitions, Veto Activation, and Collective Action Problems
Thousands of federal policies have been produced by coalitions of executive agencies over the last few decades. Despite this, little attention has been paid to why agencies collaborate. The decision among relatively autonomous agencies to collaborate and therefore cede some of their power demands theoretical attention. I argue that agencies form coalitions to overcome legislative oversight attempts by activating veto points and exploiting collect…
Executive coalition building
Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling …
Implementing presidential particularism
Do agencies implement the president's particularistic goals uniformly? This paper clarifies the presidential particularism literature by explicitly considering the mechanism through which the president pursues their policy goals: executive agencies. The constellation of bureaucratic agencies responsible for allocating grants plays a key role in facilitating or frustrating presidential policy priorities. Using a dataset of 21 agencies over 14 year…
Mind the (Participation) Gap
This study exploits the introduction of a new type of public financing of elections—campaign finance vouchers—to estimate the effects of neighborhood-level political cross-pressure on citizens’ decisions to participate in low-cost political activities which vary in their publicness: voting (private) and vouchering (public). Does proximity to ideologically divergent neighbors affect one’s use of publicly disclosed campaign finance vouchers? We fin…
Southern Republicans in Congress during the pre-Reagan era
We examine the composition, background, and voting behavior of Republican members of Congress from the ex-Confederate states in the 1952–1980 period—a time during which Southern GOP membership in Congress began to increase steadily. We find that this new generation of Southern Republicans were often born in the South, came from the private sector—where they previously worked in business like much of the non-Southern wing of the Republican Party—a…
Conflict over Congressional Reapportionment
In 1929, Congress passed a law capping the US House of Representatives at 435 seats, delegating the power to reapportion to the Executive Branch, and empowering state legislatures to redistrict with few federal limitations. The 1929 law was a compromise after nearly ten years of squabbling over how to apportion pursuant to the 1920 Census. In this article, we consider the apportionment debates of the 1920s both to better understand the politics o…
The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate‐Confirmed Appointee Vacancies
We examine the influence of discretionary agency outlays on the relative length of Senate‐confirmed presidential appointee vacancies over time. We argue that key Senate pivots in the appointment process are more (or less) likely to extend a vacancy based on an agency's discretionary spending outlays to the Senator's state. We combine a uniquely thorough dataset on PAS vacancies with federal budget data by state and agency and show that co‐partisa…
Crossing Over
Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature's members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed…
The Mixed Effects of Candidate Visits on Campaign Donations in the 2020 Presidential Election
Recent scholarship on the effect of candidate visits in presidential elections has found that appearances by candidates appear to mobilize both supporters and opponents. Specifically, in the 2016 presidential election, donations to campaigns of the visiting presidential candidates increased, but—in the case of Republican nominee Donald Trump—so did donations to his opponent, Hillary Clinton. In this paper, we extend this research by assessing the…
Bifurcating American identity
Although scholars of American nationalism debate whether its essence is civic, ethnic, or a civic–ethnic blend, the tendency is to presume it is a single, indissoluble phenomenon. Questioning that assumption, this article collects and analyzes statements from 2016 U.S. presidential candidates to understand how they situated Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexual (LGB) Americans within the nation’s parameters. Events during the 2016 presidential election – …
Their Boot in Our Face No Longer? Administrative Sectionalism and Resistance to Federal Authority in the U.S. South
What explains state agency resistance to actions taken by their federal counterparts? And do sectional tensions make state bureaucratic nonacquiescence particularly likely in the U.S. South? We theorize that state resistance to federal administrative policy is more likely among Southern state bureaus due to administrative sectionalism. We argue that state agencies can and do resist federal administrative orders independent of other political cons…
Implementing presidential particularism
Do agencies implement the president's particularistic goals uniformly? This paper clarifies the presidential particularism literature by explicitly considering the mechanism through which the president pursues their policy goals: executive agencies. The constellation of bureaucratic agencies responsible for allocating grants plays a key role in facilitating or frustrating presidential policy priorities. Using a dataset of 21 agencies over 14 year…
Bifurcating American identity
Although scholars of American nationalism debate whether its essence is civic, ethnic, or a civic–ethnic blend, the tendency is to presume it is a single, indissoluble phenomenon. Questioning that assumption, this article collects and analyzes statements from 2016 U.S. presidential candidates to understand how they situated Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexual (LGB) Americans within the nation’s parameters. Events during the 2016 presidential election – …
The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate‐Confirmed Appointee Vacancies
We examine the influence of discretionary agency outlays on the relative length of Senate‐confirmed presidential appointee vacancies over time. We argue that key Senate pivots in the appointment process are more (or less) likely to extend a vacancy based on an agency's discretionary spending outlays to the Senator's state. We combine a uniquely thorough dataset on PAS vacancies with federal budget data by state and agency and show that co‐partisa…
Crossing Over
Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature's members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed…
Their Boot in Our Face No Longer? Administrative Sectionalism and Resistance to Federal Authority in the U.S. South
What explains state agency resistance to actions taken by their federal counterparts? And do sectional tensions make state bureaucratic nonacquiescence particularly likely in the U.S. South? We theorize that state resistance to federal administrative policy is more likely among Southern state bureaus due to administrative sectionalism. We argue that state agencies can and do resist federal administrative orders independent of other political cons…
Executive coalition building
Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling …
Conflict over Congressional Reapportionment
In 1929, Congress passed a law capping the US House of Representatives at 435 seats, delegating the power to reapportion to the Executive Branch, and empowering state legislatures to redistrict with few federal limitations. The 1929 law was a compromise after nearly ten years of squabbling over how to apportion pursuant to the 1920 Census. In this article, we consider the apportionment debates of the 1920s both to better understand the politics o…
Bifurcating American identity
Although scholars of American nationalism debate whether its essence is civic, ethnic, or a civic–ethnic blend, the tendency is to presume it is a single, indissoluble phenomenon. Questioning that assumption, this article collects and analyzes statements from 2016 U.S. presidential candidates to understand how they situated Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexual (LGB) Americans within the nation’s parameters. Events during the 2016 presidential election – …
Their Boot in Our Face No Longer? Administrative Sectionalism and Resistance to Federal Authority in the U.S. South
What explains state agency resistance to actions taken by their federal counterparts? And do sectional tensions make state bureaucratic nonacquiescence particularly likely in the U.S. South? We theorize that state resistance to federal administrative policy is more likely among Southern state bureaus due to administrative sectionalism. We argue that state agencies can and do resist federal administrative orders independent of other political cons…
The Mixed Effects of Candidate Visits on Campaign Donations in the 2020 Presidential Election
Recent scholarship on the effect of candidate visits in presidential elections has found that appearances by candidates appear to mobilize both supporters and opponents. Specifically, in the 2016 presidential election, donations to campaigns of the visiting presidential candidates increased, but—in the case of Republican nominee Donald Trump—so did donations to his opponent, Hillary Clinton. In this paper, we extend this research by assessing the…
Mind the (Participation) Gap
This study exploits the introduction of a new type of public financing of elections—campaign finance vouchers—to estimate the effects of neighborhood-level political cross-pressure on citizens’ decisions to participate in low-cost political activities which vary in their publicness: voting (private) and vouchering (public). Does proximity to ideologically divergent neighbors affect one’s use of publicly disclosed campaign finance vouchers? We fin…
Southern Republicans in Congress during the pre-Reagan era
We examine the composition, background, and voting behavior of Republican members of Congress from the ex-Confederate states in the 1952–1980 period—a time during which Southern GOP membership in Congress began to increase steadily. We find that this new generation of Southern Republicans were often born in the South, came from the private sector—where they previously worked in business like much of the non-Southern wing of the Republican Party—a…
Conflict over Congressional Reapportionment
In 1929, Congress passed a law capping the US House of Representatives at 435 seats, delegating the power to reapportion to the Executive Branch, and empowering state legislatures to redistrict with few federal limitations. The 1929 law was a compromise after nearly ten years of squabbling over how to apportion pursuant to the 1920 Census. In this article, we consider the apportionment debates of the 1920s both to better understand the politics o…
The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate‐Confirmed Appointee Vacancies
We examine the influence of discretionary agency outlays on the relative length of Senate‐confirmed presidential appointee vacancies over time. We argue that key Senate pivots in the appointment process are more (or less) likely to extend a vacancy based on an agency's discretionary spending outlays to the Senator's state. We combine a uniquely thorough dataset on PAS vacancies with federal budget data by state and agency and show that co‐partisa…
Crossing Over
Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature's members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed…
Implementing presidential particularism
Do agencies implement the president's particularistic goals uniformly? This paper clarifies the presidential particularism literature by explicitly considering the mechanism through which the president pursues their policy goals: executive agencies. The constellation of bureaucratic agencies responsible for allocating grants plays a key role in facilitating or frustrating presidential policy priorities. Using a dataset of 21 agencies over 14 year…
Executive coalition building
Why do executive agencies form coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies’ dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by signaling …
Executive Policymaking Coalitions, Veto Activation, and Collective Action Problems
Thousands of federal policies have been produced by coalitions of executive agencies over the last few decades. Despite this, little attention has been paid to why agencies collaborate. The decision among relatively autonomous agencies to collaborate and therefore cede some of their power demands theoretical attention. I argue that agencies form coalitions to overcome legislative oversight attempts by activating veto points and exploiting collect…
Law (11 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Political science (11 obras) · Politics (11 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (9 obras) · Public Administration (8 obras) · Public Administration (8 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Economics (5 obras) · Political economy (5 obras)