Julia Zakkou
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1286724 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Julia Zakkou |
| NOMBRES | Julia |
| APELLIDO | Zakkou |
| FIRMA | ZAKKOU J |
| AFILIACIONES | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1754-6758 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Power collapse
What distinguishes things that are endowed with agency from those that lack it? Some scholars in the Aristotelian tradition suggest a distinction in terms of two kinds of powers: agents have both one-way and two-way powers; non-agents, by contrast, have only one-way powers. I call this view Aristotelianism . In this paper, I examine different ways to think of one-way and two-way powers. First, I argue that the conditional analysis faces a problem…
Epistemic luminosity, factives, and anti-factives
KK, or Epistemic Luminosity, is the thesis that knowledge is transparent. While unpopular for quite some time, KK has lately had a comeback. Most of the discussion aims to defuse anti KK arguments concerning inexact knowledge and the norm of assertion. Dorst (Mind 128(512):1227–1259, 2019), however, presents an entirely novel argument for KK. He argues that conditionals of the form ‘If $$\lnot$$ Kp, then p’, such as ‘If I don’t know that Padua is…
Entailed conversational implicatures
Many philosophers and linguists agree that there are two kinds of conversational implicatures: there are not only the well-known paradigm examples of conversational implicatures that are not entailed by the sentences that are used to bring them about; there are also less-often discussed conversational implicatures that are entailed by the sentences in question. In this paper, I take a closer look by examining classical candidates as well as novel…
Conventional Evaluativity
Some expressions, such as ‘generous’ and ‘stingy’, are used not only to describe the world around us. They are also used to evaluate the things to which they are applied. In this paper, I suggest a novel account of how this evaluation is conveyed—the conventional triggering view. It partly agrees and partly disagrees with both the standard semantic view and its popular pragmatic contender. Like the former and unlike the latter, my view has it tha…
On proper presupposition
This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified…
Agentive Duality reconsidered
A growing consensus in the literature on agentive modals has it that ability modals like ‘can’ or ‘able to’ have a dual , i.e. interpretations of ‘must’ or ‘cannot but’ which stand to necessity as ability stands to possibility . We argue that this thesis (which we call ‘Agentive Duality’) is much more controversial than meets the eye. While Agentive Duality follows from the orthodox possibility analysis of ability given natural assumptions, it si…
Much at stake in knowledge
Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth‐value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth‐relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects . But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show …
Taste, traits, and tendencies
Many experiential properties are naturally understood as dispositions such that e.g. a cake tastes good to you iff you are disposed to get gustatory pleasure when you eat it. Such dispositional analyses, however, face a challenge. It has been widely observed that one cannot properly assert “The cake tastes good to me” unless one has tried it. This acquaintance requirement is puzzling on the dispositional account because it should be possible to b…
Variations on Anderson Conditionals
1 Following von Fintel and Iatridou (ms), one might prefer to speak of conditionals with x-marking and conditionals with o-marking. 2 For subjunctive conditionals that seem to suggest that the antecedent is true, see most prominently Anderson (1951). For subjunctive conditionals that seem to leave it open what the truth value of the antecedent is, see Stalnaker (1975) and Edgington (2008). For indicative conditionals that seem to suggest that the…
Presupposing counterfactuality
There is long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers of both non-past subjunctive (or ‘would’) conditionals and past subjunctive (or ‘would have’) conditionals need not convey counterfactuality. The relationship between the conditionals in question and the counterfactuality of their antecedents is thus not one of presupposing. It is one of conve…
The cancellability test for conversational implicatures
Many people follow Grice in thinking that all conversational implicatures are cancellable. And often enough, they use this insight as a test for conversational implicatures. If you want to find out whether something is a conversational implicature, the test has it, you should ask yourself whether the thing in question is cancellable; if you find that it is not cancellable, you can infer that it is not a conversational implicature. If you find tha…
The cancellability test for conversational implicatures
Many people follow Grice in thinking that all conversational implicatures are cancellable. And often enough, they use this insight as a test for conversational implicatures. If you want to find out whether something is a conversational implicature, the test has it, you should ask yourself whether the thing in question is cancellable; if you find that it is not cancellable, you can infer that it is not a conversational implicature. If you find tha…
On proper presupposition
This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified…
The cancellability test for conversational implicatures
Many people follow Grice in thinking that all conversational implicatures are cancellable. And often enough, they use this insight as a test for conversational implicatures. If you want to find out whether something is a conversational implicature, the test has it, you should ask yourself whether the thing in question is cancellable; if you find that it is not cancellable, you can infer that it is not a conversational implicature. If you find tha…
Presupposing counterfactuality
There is long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers of both non-past subjunctive (or ‘would’) conditionals and past subjunctive (or ‘would have’) conditionals need not convey counterfactuality. The relationship between the conditionals in question and the counterfactuality of their antecedents is thus not one of presupposing. It is one of conve…
Much at stake in knowledge
Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth‐value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth‐relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects . But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show …
Taste, traits, and tendencies
Many experiential properties are naturally understood as dispositions such that e.g. a cake tastes good to you iff you are disposed to get gustatory pleasure when you eat it. Such dispositional analyses, however, face a challenge. It has been widely observed that one cannot properly assert “The cake tastes good to me” unless one has tried it. This acquaintance requirement is puzzling on the dispositional account because it should be possible to b…
Variations on Anderson Conditionals
1 Following von Fintel and Iatridou (ms), one might prefer to speak of conditionals with x-marking and conditionals with o-marking. 2 For subjunctive conditionals that seem to suggest that the antecedent is true, see most prominently Anderson (1951). For subjunctive conditionals that seem to leave it open what the truth value of the antecedent is, see Stalnaker (1975) and Edgington (2008). For indicative conditionals that seem to suggest that the…
Agentive Duality reconsidered
A growing consensus in the literature on agentive modals has it that ability modals like ‘can’ or ‘able to’ have a dual , i.e. interpretations of ‘must’ or ‘cannot but’ which stand to necessity as ability stands to possibility . We argue that this thesis (which we call ‘Agentive Duality’) is much more controversial than meets the eye. While Agentive Duality follows from the orthodox possibility analysis of ability given natural assumptions, it si…
Conventional Evaluativity
Some expressions, such as ‘generous’ and ‘stingy’, are used not only to describe the world around us. They are also used to evaluate the things to which they are applied. In this paper, I suggest a novel account of how this evaluation is conveyed—the conventional triggering view. It partly agrees and partly disagrees with both the standard semantic view and its popular pragmatic contender. Like the former and unlike the latter, my view has it tha…
On proper presupposition
This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified…
Entailed conversational implicatures
Many philosophers and linguists agree that there are two kinds of conversational implicatures: there are not only the well-known paradigm examples of conversational implicatures that are not entailed by the sentences that are used to bring them about; there are also less-often discussed conversational implicatures that are entailed by the sentences in question. In this paper, I take a closer look by examining classical candidates as well as novel…
Power collapse
What distinguishes things that are endowed with agency from those that lack it? Some scholars in the Aristotelian tradition suggest a distinction in terms of two kinds of powers: agents have both one-way and two-way powers; non-agents, by contrast, have only one-way powers. I call this view Aristotelianism . In this paper, I examine different ways to think of one-way and two-way powers. First, I argue that the conditional analysis faces a problem…
Epistemic luminosity, factives, and anti-factives
KK, or Epistemic Luminosity, is the thesis that knowledge is transparent. While unpopular for quite some time, KK has lately had a comeback. Most of the discussion aims to defuse anti KK arguments concerning inexact knowledge and the norm of assertion. Dorst (Mind 128(512):1227–1259, 2019), however, presents an entirely novel argument for KK. He argues that conditionals of the form ‘If $$\lnot$$ Kp, then p’, such as ‘If I don’t know that Padua is…
Philosophy (8 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Linguistics (6 obras) · Metaphysics (6 obras) · Philosophy of language (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Philosophy of mind (4 obras)