Sven E Feldmann
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1455002 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Sven E Feldmann |
| NOMBRES | Sven E |
| APELLIDO | Feldmann |
| FIRMA | FELDMANN S E |
| AFILIACIONES | Northwestern University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2812-2117 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 78 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2002 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2006 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Structural Reform Litigation
Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts perm…
Strategic Appointments
This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appoint…
Political Competition
Political Competition: Theory and Applications. By John E. Roemer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 352p. $60.00. John Roemer sets out to slaughter a golden calf of positive political theory: the Downsian model of electoral competition and its famous implication, the median voter theorem. Roemer contends that not only is the premise of the Downsian model—political parties seeking election without policy objectives of their own—histo…
Lobbying Legislatures
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic …
Strategic Appointments
This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appoint…
Lobbying Legislatures
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic …
Political Competition
Political Competition: Theory and Applications. By John E. Roemer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 352p. $60.00. John Roemer sets out to slaughter a golden calf of positive political theory: the Downsian model of electoral competition and its famous implication, the median voter theorem. Roemer contends that not only is the premise of the Downsian model—political parties seeking election without policy objectives of their own—histo…
Structural Reform Litigation
Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts perm…
Lobbying Legislatures
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic …
Political Competition
Political Competition: Theory and Applications. By John E. Roemer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 352p. $60.00. John Roemer sets out to slaughter a golden calf of positive political theory: the Downsian model of electoral competition and its famous implication, the median voter theorem. Roemer contends that not only is the premise of the Downsian model—political parties seeking election without policy objectives of their own—histo…
Structural Reform Litigation
Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts perm…
Strategic Appointments
This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appoint…
Economics (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Politics (4 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Public Administration (3 obras) · Bureaucracy (2 obras) · Incentive (2 obras) · Legislature (2 obras) · Negotiation (2 obras)