Nicola Giocoli
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1458481 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Nicola Giocoli |
| NOMBRES | Nicola |
| APELLIDO | Giocoli |
| FIRMA | GIOCOLI N |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Pisa |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0655-7884 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2003 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Neither Populist nor Neoclassical
Contemporary critics of American antitrust law lament a supposed misinterpretation by modern, welfare-driven enforcers of the true meaning of the competition principle. This essay contributes to the debate by reconstructing the principle's historical origin. While it did not feature in the Sherman Act, the competition principle was introduced by the Supreme Court during the early years of antitrust law. The court formulated alternative versions o…
Beyond trust
Given the unconditional favour that scholars imbued with classical ideas should bestow on any manifestation of business freedom and entrepreneurial spirit, it was not a given that classical jurists and economists would join the ranks of those who in the late 19th century complained about the corporatisation of the American economy. The usual explanation is that they did so out of doctrinal and practical concerns for the effect of the associated r…
Rejected! Antitrust Economists as Expert Witnesses in the Post- Daubert World
Economists regularly appear as expert witnesses in antitrust litigations. This paper analyzes how their models and methodologies have performed vis-à-vis the standards of relevance and reliability affirmed by the US Supreme Court in Daubert and its progeny. Some explanations for the economists’ troubles when facing a Daubert challenge in antitrust cases are provided
Free From What? Classical Competition and the Early Decades of American Antitrust
Classical economists characterised free competition as, alternatively, freedom of contract and freedom to trade. These notions were still at centre stage of the economic discourse during the Gilded Age and early Progressive Era, notwithstanding the dramatic rise in industrial size and concentration. In particular, they played a key role during the so-called formative era of American antitrust (1890–1914). The essay argues that the history of econ…
The classical limits to police power and the economic foundations of the Slaughterhouse dissents
The (Rail)Road toLochner
The controversy over railroad rates regulation was a fundamental component of the jurisprudential trajectory that culminated in Lochner v. New York (1905) and the so-called laissez-faire era of U.S. constitutional law. Constitutional protection of property required that regulation preserve the value of the regulated business. This article builds on Siegel (1984) to argue that, by selecting, as in Smyth v. Ames (1898), reproduction cost as the cor…
From Wald to Savage
Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. An economic agent is deemed rational when she maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes's rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is of g…
Robert Leonard, Von Neumann, Morgenstern and the Creation of Game Theory
In this much-awaited volume, the historian of economic thought Robert Leonard presents the results of his two-decade-long research on the life and intellectual achievements of the two founders of modern game theory, the Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann and the Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern. The end result was well worth the wait because Leonard has produced a fascinating book which should be recommended first and foremost to econom…
Nash Equilibrium
Research Article| November 01 2004 Nash Equilibrium Nicola Giocoli Nicola Giocoli Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2004) 36 (4): 639–666. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-4-639 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Nicola Giocoli; Nash Equilibrium. History of Political Economy 1 November 2004; 36 (4): 639–666. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-4-6…
Modeling Rational Agents
The book explores the evolution, through the first half of the 20th century, of the key neoclassical concept of rationality. The analysis begins with the development of modern decision theory, covers the interwar debates over the role of perfect foresight and analyses the first game-theoretic solution concepts of von Neumann and Nash.
Conjecturizing” Cournot
Research Article| June 01 2003 “Conjecturizing” Cournot: The Conjectural Variations Approach to Duopoly Theory Nicola Giocoli Nicola Giocoli Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2003) 35 (2): 175–204. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-2-175 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon T…
From Wald to Savage
Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. An economic agent is deemed rational when she maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes's rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is of g…
Nash Equilibrium
Research Article| November 01 2004 Nash Equilibrium Nicola Giocoli Nicola Giocoli Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2004) 36 (4): 639–666. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-4-639 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Nicola Giocoli; Nash Equilibrium. History of Political Economy 1 November 2004; 36 (4): 639–666. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-4-6…
The (Rail)Road toLochner
The controversy over railroad rates regulation was a fundamental component of the jurisprudential trajectory that culminated in Lochner v. New York (1905) and the so-called laissez-faire era of U.S. constitutional law. Constitutional protection of property required that regulation preserve the value of the regulated business. This article builds on Siegel (1984) to argue that, by selecting, as in Smyth v. Ames (1898), reproduction cost as the cor…
Conjecturizing” Cournot
Research Article| June 01 2003 “Conjecturizing” Cournot: The Conjectural Variations Approach to Duopoly Theory Nicola Giocoli Nicola Giocoli Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2003) 35 (2): 175–204. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-2-175 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon T…
Modeling Rational Agents
The book explores the evolution, through the first half of the 20th century, of the key neoclassical concept of rationality. The analysis begins with the development of modern decision theory, covers the interwar debates over the role of perfect foresight and analyses the first game-theoretic solution concepts of von Neumann and Nash.
Conjecturizing” Cournot
Research Article| June 01 2003 “Conjecturizing” Cournot: The Conjectural Variations Approach to Duopoly Theory Nicola Giocoli Nicola Giocoli Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2003) 35 (2): 175–204. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-2-175 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon T…
Nash Equilibrium
Research Article| November 01 2004 Nash Equilibrium Nicola Giocoli Nicola Giocoli Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2004) 36 (4): 639–666. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-4-639 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Nicola Giocoli; Nash Equilibrium. History of Political Economy 1 November 2004; 36 (4): 639–666. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-36-4-6…
Robert Leonard, Von Neumann, Morgenstern and the Creation of Game Theory
In this much-awaited volume, the historian of economic thought Robert Leonard presents the results of his two-decade-long research on the life and intellectual achievements of the two founders of modern game theory, the Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann and the Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern. The end result was well worth the wait because Leonard has produced a fascinating book which should be recommended first and foremost to econom…
From Wald to Savage
Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. An economic agent is deemed rational when she maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes's rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is of g…
The (Rail)Road toLochner
The controversy over railroad rates regulation was a fundamental component of the jurisprudential trajectory that culminated in Lochner v. New York (1905) and the so-called laissez-faire era of U.S. constitutional law. Constitutional protection of property required that regulation preserve the value of the regulated business. This article builds on Siegel (1984) to argue that, by selecting, as in Smyth v. Ames (1898), reproduction cost as the cor…
The classical limits to police power and the economic foundations of the Slaughterhouse dissents
Rejected! Antitrust Economists as Expert Witnesses in the Post- Daubert World
Economists regularly appear as expert witnesses in antitrust litigations. This paper analyzes how their models and methodologies have performed vis-à-vis the standards of relevance and reliability affirmed by the US Supreme Court in Daubert and its progeny. Some explanations for the economists’ troubles when facing a Daubert challenge in antitrust cases are provided
Free From What? Classical Competition and the Early Decades of American Antitrust
Classical economists characterised free competition as, alternatively, freedom of contract and freedom to trade. These notions were still at centre stage of the economic discourse during the Gilded Age and early Progressive Era, notwithstanding the dramatic rise in industrial size and concentration. In particular, they played a key role during the so-called formative era of American antitrust (1890–1914). The essay argues that the history of econ…
Beyond trust
Given the unconditional favour that scholars imbued with classical ideas should bestow on any manifestation of business freedom and entrepreneurial spirit, it was not a given that classical jurists and economists would join the ranks of those who in the late 19th century complained about the corporatisation of the American economy. The usual explanation is that they did so out of doctrinal and practical concerns for the effect of the associated r…
Neither Populist nor Neoclassical
Contemporary critics of American antitrust law lament a supposed misinterpretation by modern, welfare-driven enforcers of the true meaning of the competition principle. This essay contributes to the debate by reconstructing the principle's historical origin. While it did not feature in the Sherman Act, the competition principle was introduced by the Supreme Court during the early years of antitrust law. The court formulated alternative versions o…
Economics (10 obras) · Economic Theory and Institutions (9 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Political science (7 obras) · Law and economics (6 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Mathematical economics (5 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Supreme court (4 obras)