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Agnès Baehni

Datos Biográficos

ID1629164
NOMBREAgnès Baehni
NOMBRESAgnès
APELLIDOBaehni
FIRMABAEHNI A
AFILIACIONESUniversity of Geneva
ORCID0000-0002-7605-9346
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS4
TOTAL DE CITAS0
OBRAS COMO AUTOR4
OBRAS COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2025
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2025
ÍNDICE H0
  • A (new) defense of self‐forgiveness

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2025

    In this article, I try to resolve a contradiction arising from the combination of two theses: (1) self‐forgiveness is sometimes morally justified and (2) only victims can rightly forgive. As has been pointed out by other philosophers, both are plausible, but the two taken together are inconsistent. In the literature, self‐forgiveness is painted as an “imperfect” form of forgiveness or as a “second‐best option” because it entails a violation of th…

  • What Is the Point of Self-Blame

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni•ARTICLE•Res Publica. Revista de Historia…•2025•Referencias: 4

    The functionalist approach to blame seeks to tell us what blame is by looking at what blame does. This approach is promising as it seems important to know what we are doing when we are blaming. However, a challenge arises from the inadequacy of existing views in addressing self-blame. In this paper, I first explore how self-blame cannot be accurately understood on existing functionalist theories of blame. Then, I suggest a remedy to this problem …

  • Moral duties to past-selves

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni, Vincent Grandjean•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2025•Referencias: 2

    This paper offers a positive account of moral duties to past-selves, based on two plausible beliefs, (1) we have moral duties toward persons who are no longer present; and (2) we have moral duties toward ourselves. Specifically, our inquiry centers on moral duties toward our past-selves. We begin by addressing various objections challenging the viability of such duties and subsequently present three arguments supporting their plausibility. These …

  • Borderline personality disorder and moral responsibility

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni•ARTICLE•Medicine Health Care and Philosophy•2025•Referencias: 2

    This paper seeks to determine the extent to which individuals with borderline personality disorders can be held morally responsible for a particular subset of their actions: disproportionate anger, aggressions and displays of temper. BPD individuals are indeed typically perceived as “difficult patients” (Sulzer 2015:82; Bodner et al. 2011), significantly more so than schizophrenic or depressive patients (Markam 2003). The “responsibility question…

Sin obras prominentes en esta página.

  • A (new) defense of self‐forgiveness

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2025

    In this article, I try to resolve a contradiction arising from the combination of two theses: (1) self‐forgiveness is sometimes morally justified and (2) only victims can rightly forgive. As has been pointed out by other philosophers, both are plausible, but the two taken together are inconsistent. In the literature, self‐forgiveness is painted as an “imperfect” form of forgiveness or as a “second‐best option” because it entails a violation of th…

  • What Is the Point of Self-Blame

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni•ARTICLE•Res Publica. Revista de Historia…•2025•Referencias: 4

    The functionalist approach to blame seeks to tell us what blame is by looking at what blame does. This approach is promising as it seems important to know what we are doing when we are blaming. However, a challenge arises from the inadequacy of existing views in addressing self-blame. In this paper, I first explore how self-blame cannot be accurately understood on existing functionalist theories of blame. Then, I suggest a remedy to this problem …

  • Moral duties to past-selves

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni, Vincent Grandjean•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2025•Referencias: 2

    This paper offers a positive account of moral duties to past-selves, based on two plausible beliefs, (1) we have moral duties toward persons who are no longer present; and (2) we have moral duties toward ourselves. Specifically, our inquiry centers on moral duties toward our past-selves. We begin by addressing various objections challenging the viability of such duties and subsequently present three arguments supporting their plausibility. These …

  • Borderline personality disorder and moral responsibility

    Open Access•Agnès Baehni•ARTICLE•Medicine Health Care and Philosophy•2025•Referencias: 2

    This paper seeks to determine the extent to which individuals with borderline personality disorders can be held morally responsible for a particular subset of their actions: disproportionate anger, aggressions and displays of temper. BPD individuals are indeed typically perceived as “difficult patients” (Sulzer 2015:82; Bodner et al. 2011), significantly more so than schizophrenic or depressive patients (Markam 2003). The “responsibility question…

Epistemology (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Social Psychology (3 obras) · Blame (2 obras) · Free Will and Agency (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Social Psychology (2 obras)

Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae