Collin
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 18367 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Collin |
| APELLIDO | Collin |
| FIRMA | COLLIN |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Manchester |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0949-1072 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 34 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 37 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 34 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1972 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Fossil fuel corporations owe climate reparations
This article provides a philosophical argument that business corporations, especially fossil fuel corporations, bear moral obligations for climate reparation. It identifies four philosophical grounds of such duties. Reparative actions might include monetary transfers, structural remediation or relationship repair. The article offers contributions in two places. First, the proposed ethical obligations provide normative foundations for legislative …
Group blameworthiness and group rights
The following pair of claims is standardly endorsed by philosophers working on group agency: (1) groups are capable of irreducible moral agency and, therefore, can be blameworthy; (2) groups are not capable of irreducible moral patiency, and, therefore, lack moral rights. This paper argues that the best case for (1) brings (2) into question. Section 2 paints the standard picture, on which groups’ blameworthiness derives from their functionalist o…
Rage against the Machine
David Estlund has recently asked how structural injustice can warrant resentment and indignation, given that it cannot fully be traced to culpable conduct. This article answers Estlund’s question. I propose that a social structure is an object that persists through time and is materially constituted by humans in relation. I use accounts of the point of blame to vindicate attitudes of resentment and indignation that target social structures themse…
States’ culpability through time
Some contemporary states are morally culpable for historically distant wrongs. But which states for which wrongs? The answer is not obvious, due to secessions, unions, and the formation of new states in the time since the wrongs occurred. This paper develops a framework for answering the question. The argument begins by outlining a picture of states’ agency on which states’ culpability is distinct from the culpability of states’ members. It then …
Attachment, Security, and Relational Networks
Regarding friendship, as Simon Keller recently put it: "If you want to feel bad about yourself, read the philosophical literature on friendship.It is full of descriptions of deep, profound, intense friendships, presented as illustrations of real friendship, true friendship, good friendship, deep friendship, or friendship at its best."(2023, 1) Such friendships are conceptualised as holding between two people; Keller provides numerous historical a…
Group Responsibility and Historicism
In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or…
Abilities and Obligations
Responsible Citizens, Irresponsible States
Anyone who has lived abroad knows the frustration of being held liable for the misdeeds of their country. Israelis get grilled about Palestine, Chinese receive disbelief over Xinjiang, and Britons are berated for colonialism. ‘It’s not my fault!’ some are tempted to reply. ‘I attend protests; or I am politically repressed; or I wasn’t even born yet!’ Sometimes, the effects of our states’ wrongdoings hit us materially. When states pay compensation…
Climate obligations and social norms
Many governments are failing to act sufficiently strongly on climate change. Given this, what should motivated affluent individuals in high-consumption societies do? This paper argues that social norms are a particularly valuable target for individual climate action. Within norm-promotion, the paper makes the case for a focus on anti-fossil fuel norms specifically. Section 1 outlines gaps in the existing literature on individuals’ climate change …
Care for a Profit
We vindicate the widespread intuition that there is something morally problematic with for-profit corporations providing care to young children and elders. But instead of putting forward an empirical argument showing that for-profit corporations score worse than not-for-profits when it comes to meeting the basic needs of these vulnerable groups, we develop a philosophical argument about the nature of the relationship between a care organisation, …
Introduction
This contribution examines the methodology of Christine Hobden’s Citizenship in a Globalised World. It introduces some concepts, themes, and arguments that arise in the discussion by the three commentators Ashwini Vasanthamukar, Anna Stilz, and Shuk Ying Chan in this book symposium. It then examines Hobden’s approach to non-ideal political theorising and her proposal for citizens’ responsibilities
I, Volkswagen
Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don't hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don't hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call 'moral self-awareness'. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives…
We the People
When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest th…
How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents
Are obligations of collective agents—such as states, businesses, and non-profits—ever overdemanding? I argue they are not. I consider two seemingly attractive routes to collective overdemandingness: that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would be overdemanding for members; and that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would frustrate the collective’s permissible deep preferenc…
Precis of Group Duties
This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals
Response to Critics
This is a response to the critial comments by Anne Schwenkenbecher, Olle Blomberg, Bill Wringe and Gunnar Björnsson
Are Organizations' Religious Exemptions Democratically Defensible
Theorists of democratic multiculturalism have long defended individuals' religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Examples include Sikhs being exempt from motorcycle helmet laws, or Jews and Muslims being exempt from humane animal slaughter laws. This essay investigates religious exemptions for organizations. Should organizations ever be granted exemptions from generally applicable laws in democratic societies, where those exemptions …
Beyond Individualism
In this chapter, Stephanie Collins examines the idea that individuals can acquire ‘membership duties’ as a result of being members of a group that itself bears duties. In particular, powerful and wealthy states are duty-bearing groups, and their citizens have derivative membership duties (for example, to contribute to putting right wrongs that have been done in the past by the group in question, and to increase the extent to which the group fulfi…
Collective Responsibility Gaps
Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective (diffuse, teleological, and agential) and three kinds of responsibility (causal, moral, and prospective). It then explains how gaps—i.e. ca…
Group Duties
Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into …
Duties of Group Agents and Group Members
The Government Should Be Ashamed’
When we say that ‘the government should be ashamed’, can we be taken literally? I argue that we can: organisations have duties over their emotions. Emotions have both functional and felt components. Often, emotions’ moral value derives from their functional components: from what they cause and what causes them. In these cases, organisations can have emotional duties in the same way that they can have duties to act. However, emotions’ value partly…
The Present and the Future of the Research Excellence Framework Impact Agenda in the UK Academy
One of the most extensively discussed requirements introduced in the 2014 Research Excellence Framework was impact. In this review piece, we focus on the linear and temporal consequences of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) impact system. We link such consequences to our own research agendas to provide a sense of empirical richness to the broad concerns that arise from the impact agenda and to highlight the effects of the Research Excellenc…
Responsibility for states' actions
Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what "the state" is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in parti…
Expériences migratoires de nouveaux-arrivants haïtiens établis au Québec depuis la catastrophe ayant frappé Haïti le 12 janvier 2010
Après le séisme survenu en Haïti le 12 janvier 2010, un programme spécial de parrainage fut mis en place par le Canada afin de permettre à quelques milliers de citoyens haïtiens de rejoindre leur famille résidant dans la province du Québec, l’un des principaux lieux d’immigration pour les Haïtiens depuis les années 1960. Cet article s’appuie sur l’analyse thématique d’une série d’entrevues semi-dirigées réalisées en 2012 avec des nouveaux-arrivan…
Analysing ethnobotanical and fishery-related importance of mangroves of the East-Godavari Delta (Andhra Pradesh, India) for conservation and management purposes
Mangrove forests, though essentially common and wide-spread, are highly threatened. Local societies along with their knowledge about the mangrove also are endangered, while they are still underrepresented as scientific research topics. With the present study we document local utilization patterns, and perception of ecosystem change. We illustrate how information generated by ethnobiological research can be used to strengthen the management of the…
The Present and the Future of the Research Excellence Framework Impact Agenda in the UK Academy
One of the most extensively discussed requirements introduced in the 2014 Research Excellence Framework was impact. In this review piece, we focus on the linear and temporal consequences of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) impact system. We link such consequences to our own research agendas to provide a sense of empirical richness to the broad concerns that arise from the impact agenda and to highlight the effects of the Research Excellenc…
Distributing States' Duties
WE tend to think states have moral duties: duties to alleviate global warming, protect citizens' moral rights, admit asylum seekers, or wage only just wars.1 This common-sense view accords with a growing philosophical consensus that states are corporate moral agents, able to bear duties as entities conceptually distinct from—though supervenient upon and constituted by—their members. States have clear membership rules and decision-making procedure…
Collectives' and individuals' obligations
Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don't cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups' pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree t…
Duties to Make Friends
Group Responsibility and Historicism
In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or…
I, Volkswagen
Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don't hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don't hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call 'moral self-awareness'. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives…
Responsibility for states' actions
Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what "the state" is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in parti…
Expériences migratoires de nouveaux-arrivants haïtiens établis au Québec depuis la catastrophe ayant frappé Haïti le 12 janvier 2010
Après le séisme survenu en Haïti le 12 janvier 2010, un programme spécial de parrainage fut mis en place par le Canada afin de permettre à quelques milliers de citoyens haïtiens de rejoindre leur famille résidant dans la province du Québec, l’un des principaux lieux d’immigration pour les Haïtiens depuis les années 1960. Cet article s’appuie sur l’analyse thématique d’une série d’entrevues semi-dirigées réalisées en 2012 avec des nouveaux-arrivan…
Table des matières et index analytique du volume VIII
On trouvera aprs chaque titre l'indication du numro, en chiffres arabes
Analysing ethnobotanical and fishery-related importance of mangroves of the East-Godavari Delta (Andhra Pradesh, India) for conservation and management purposes
Mangrove forests, though essentially common and wide-spread, are highly threatened. Local societies along with their knowledge about the mangrove also are endangered, while they are still underrepresented as scientific research topics. With the present study we document local utilization patterns, and perception of ecosystem change. We illustrate how information generated by ethnobiological research can be used to strengthen the management of the…
The Development of Gaze Following in a Third‐Party Context
Infants follow the gaze of an individual with whom they are directly interacting by the end of the first year. By 18 months infants are capable of learning novel words in observational (or third‐party) contexts (Floor & Akhtar, 2006). To examine third‐party gaze following in 12‐ and 18‐month‐olds, the parent and experimenter engaged in a conversation while the infant was present. For 8 trials approximately every 30 sec the experimenter would turn…
Carolingian Debate over Sacred Space
Retracing the contours of a bitter controversy over the meaning of sacred architecture that flared up among some of the leading lights of the Carolingian renaissance, Collins explores how ninth-centur
Duties to Make Friends
The Core of Care Ethics
The ethics of care has flourished in recent decades yet we remain without a succinct statement of its core theoretical commitment. This study argues for a simple care ethical slogan: dependency relati
Distributing States' Duties
WE tend to think states have moral duties: duties to alleviate global warming, protect citizens' moral rights, admit asylum seekers, or wage only just wars.1 This common-sense view accords with a growing philosophical consensus that states are corporate moral agents, able to bear duties as entities conceptually distinct from—though supervenient upon and constituted by—their members. States have clear membership rules and decision-making procedure…
Collectives' and individuals' obligations
Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don't cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups' pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree t…
Expériences migratoires de nouveaux-arrivants haïtiens établis au Québec depuis la catastrophe ayant frappé Haïti le 12 janvier 2010
Après le séisme survenu en Haïti le 12 janvier 2010, un programme spécial de parrainage fut mis en place par le Canada afin de permettre à quelques milliers de citoyens haïtiens de rejoindre leur famille résidant dans la province du Québec, l’un des principaux lieux d’immigration pour les Haïtiens depuis les années 1960. Cet article s’appuie sur l’analyse thématique d’une série d’entrevues semi-dirigées réalisées en 2012 avec des nouveaux-arrivan…
The Claims and Duties of Socioeconomic Human Rights
A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection’, and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic co…
Duties of Group Agents and Group Members
The Government Should Be Ashamed’
When we say that ‘the government should be ashamed’, can we be taken literally? I argue that we can: organisations have duties over their emotions. Emotions have both functional and felt components. Often, emotions’ moral value derives from their functional components: from what they cause and what causes them. In these cases, organisations can have emotional duties in the same way that they can have duties to act. However, emotions’ value partly…
The Present and the Future of the Research Excellence Framework Impact Agenda in the UK Academy
One of the most extensively discussed requirements introduced in the 2014 Research Excellence Framework was impact. In this review piece, we focus on the linear and temporal consequences of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) impact system. We link such consequences to our own research agendas to provide a sense of empirical richness to the broad concerns that arise from the impact agenda and to highlight the effects of the Research Excellenc…
Responsibility for states' actions
Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what "the state" is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in parti…
Beyond Individualism
In this chapter, Stephanie Collins examines the idea that individuals can acquire ‘membership duties’ as a result of being members of a group that itself bears duties. In particular, powerful and wealthy states are duty-bearing groups, and their citizens have derivative membership duties (for example, to contribute to putting right wrongs that have been done in the past by the group in question, and to increase the extent to which the group fulfi…
Collective Responsibility Gaps
Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective (diffuse, teleological, and agential) and three kinds of responsibility (causal, moral, and prospective). It then explains how gaps—i.e. ca…
Group Duties
Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into …
How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents
Are obligations of collective agents—such as states, businesses, and non-profits—ever overdemanding? I argue they are not. I consider two seemingly attractive routes to collective overdemandingness: that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would be overdemanding for members; and that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would frustrate the collective’s permissible deep preferenc…
Precis of Group Duties
This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals
Response to Critics
This is a response to the critial comments by Anne Schwenkenbecher, Olle Blomberg, Bill Wringe and Gunnar Björnsson
Are Organizations' Religious Exemptions Democratically Defensible
Theorists of democratic multiculturalism have long defended individuals' religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Examples include Sikhs being exempt from motorcycle helmet laws, or Jews and Muslims being exempt from humane animal slaughter laws. This essay investigates religious exemptions for organizations. Should organizations ever be granted exemptions from generally applicable laws in democratic societies, where those exemptions …
We the People
When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest th…
Care for a Profit
We vindicate the widespread intuition that there is something morally problematic with for-profit corporations providing care to young children and elders. But instead of putting forward an empirical argument showing that for-profit corporations score worse than not-for-profits when it comes to meeting the basic needs of these vulnerable groups, we develop a philosophical argument about the nature of the relationship between a care organisation, …
Introduction
This contribution examines the methodology of Christine Hobden’s Citizenship in a Globalised World. It introduces some concepts, themes, and arguments that arise in the discussion by the three commentators Ashwini Vasanthamukar, Anna Stilz, and Shuk Ying Chan in this book symposium. It then examines Hobden’s approach to non-ideal political theorising and her proposal for citizens’ responsibilities
I, Volkswagen
Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don't hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don't hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call 'moral self-awareness'. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives…
Political science (20 obras) · Sociology (19 obras) · Law (17 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (16 obras) · Philosophy (13 obras) · Free Will and Agency (12 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Law and economics (11 obras) · Psychology (11 obras) · Politics (9 obras)