Keren Yarhi-Milo
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 2179458 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Keren Yarhi-Milo |
| NOMBRES | Keren |
| APELLIDO | Yarhi-Milo |
| FIRMA | YARHI-MILO K |
| AFILIACIONES | Princeton University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5856-5173 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 22 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 714 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 22 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2012 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 12 |
Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force
How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions agains…
Democratic Reputations in Crises and War
Many international relations theories argue that leaders and publics use regime type to draw inferences about behavior in conflict, with implications for how democracies act as well as how they are treated by other states. We show that these beliefs can be studied as reputations, and we build a framework around reputations that adhere to regime types and whose content implicates not just resolve but a host of other important attributes and expect…
Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs
It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiti…
The Many Faces of Credibility
The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that an actor’s past record of keeping her word determines her cooperative credibility, and that mutual perceptions of credibility are essential in sustaining cooperation. Yet competing reputation-skeptic and psychological perspectives dispute this conventional wisdom, suggesting that assessments of cooperative credibility result from observers’ judgments about the other’s capabilities and …
To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States
Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military miss…
Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security
A wave of recent scholarship has breathed new life into the study of reputation and credibility in international politics. In this review article, the authors welcome this development while offering a framework for evaluating collective progress, a series of related critiques, and a set of suggestions for future research. The article details how the books under review represent an important step toward consensus on the importance of reputation in…
How Do Observers Assess Resolve? – Corrigendum
How Do Observers Assess Resolve
Despite a plethora of theoretical frameworks, IR scholars have struggled with the question of how observers assess resolve. We make two important contributions in this direction. Conceptually, we develop an integrative framework that unites otherwise disconnected theories, viewing them as a set of heuristics actors use to simplify information-rich environments. Methodologically, we employ a conjoint experiment that provides empirical traction imp…
Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies
Many theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies. Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption. We use experiments to examine two mechanisms—responsiveness and selection—through which opinion could shape decisions about the use of military force. We tested responsiveness by asking members of the Is…
Response to Christopher J. Fettweis’s review of Who Fights for Reputation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Arms, Alliances, and Patron-Client Relationships
In “To Arm or to Ally?” Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper present an elegant and powerful theory that explains conditions under which a great power (in their case, the United States) offers a client state arms, an alliance commitment, or both.1 Their article does not give due attention, however, to what motivates a patron to provide security assistance to clients in the first place—especially its desire to influence its client…
Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes
Do costly signals work? Despite their widespread popularity, both hands-tying and sunk-cost signaling have come under criticism, and there’s little direct evidence that leaders understand costly signals the way our models tell us they should. We present evidence from a survey experiment fielded on a unique sample of elite decision makers from the Israeli Knesset. We find that both types of costly signaling are effective in shaping assessments of …
The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling
This paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possibl…
Covert Communication
Can states credibly communicate their intentions through covert policy tools, despite the absence of credibility-enhancing publicity? Most extant research suggests covert action and secrecy in general are uniquely uninformative and often used as an alternative to signaling. Yet episodes such as Richard Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia suggest that leaders have used covert action to convey intentions and coerce adversaries. This article builds a…
To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances
How do great powers decide whether to provide arms to or form alliances with client states? This “patron's dilemma” revolves around a decision about how to best provide security to clients without becoming entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Strong commitments worsen the risk of entrapment, whereas weak commitments intensify fears of abandonment. This traditional alliance dilemma can be addressed through the provision of arms and alliances. Great po…
Soviet Leaders and Intelligence
There are very few people who can write about Soviet leaders’ thinking and the role that intelligence played in shaping their views with the authority that Raymond Garthoff can and does in his new book. For students of the Cold War, Garthoff’s work is widely recognized. Among others, he has written two important books on the Cold War: Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan and The Great Transition: American–Sovi…
The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits
Why do some peace summits succeed while others fail? We offer an explanation that highlights the importance of empathy between leaders. Studies in negotiations and psychology show that empathy—the ability to take the perspective of others and understand their cognitive and affective states without necessarily sympathizing with them—is critical in overcoming biases, transcending long-held enmities, and increasing the likelihood of cooperation. We …
Revisiting Reputation
Policy-makers and political scientists have long believed that states must make policy with an eye to maintaining a good reputation, especially a good reputation for resolve. Recent work, however, has argued that reputations for resolve do not form, and hence that past actions do not influence observers' behavior in subsequent interactions. This conclusion is theoretically problematic and unsupported by the evidence offered by reputation critics.…
Knowing the Adversary
In the Eye of the Beholder
How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations …
Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors
Private diplomacy and secret agreements among adversaries are major features of international relations. Sometimes secret reassurance has resulted in cooperation and even peace between longtime adversaries. Yet rationalist theories consider private diplomatic communication as cheap talk. How do we explain this gap between theoretical expectations and the empirical record? I offer a theory that explains how, why, and when a leader may convince an …
The Personal Touch
What counts as evidence that the other side is sincere? Within mainstream international relations literature, scholars have focused on costly signals. We argue, however, that in the real world leaders do not simply look at costly signals, but they rely to an important extent on their personal impressions of other leaders, taking these as credible indicators of sincerity. Our approach thus builds both upon the literature on interstate communicatio…
Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies
Many theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies. Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption. We use experiments to examine two mechanisms—responsiveness and selection—through which opinion could shape decisions about the use of military force. We tested responsiveness by asking members of the Is…
Revisiting Reputation
Policy-makers and political scientists have long believed that states must make policy with an eye to maintaining a good reputation, especially a good reputation for resolve. Recent work, however, has argued that reputations for resolve do not form, and hence that past actions do not influence observers' behavior in subsequent interactions. This conclusion is theoretically problematic and unsupported by the evidence offered by reputation critics.…
Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes
Do costly signals work? Despite their widespread popularity, both hands-tying and sunk-cost signaling have come under criticism, and there’s little direct evidence that leaders understand costly signals the way our models tell us they should. We present evidence from a survey experiment fielded on a unique sample of elite decision makers from the Israeli Knesset. We find that both types of costly signaling are effective in shaping assessments of …
The Personal Touch
What counts as evidence that the other side is sincere? Within mainstream international relations literature, scholars have focused on costly signals. We argue, however, that in the real world leaders do not simply look at costly signals, but they rely to an important extent on their personal impressions of other leaders, taking these as credible indicators of sincerity. Our approach thus builds both upon the literature on interstate communicatio…
The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling
This paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possibl…
Covert Communication
Can states credibly communicate their intentions through covert policy tools, despite the absence of credibility-enhancing publicity? Most extant research suggests covert action and secrecy in general are uniquely uninformative and often used as an alternative to signaling. Yet episodes such as Richard Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia suggest that leaders have used covert action to convey intentions and coerce adversaries. This article builds a…
How Do Observers Assess Resolve
Despite a plethora of theoretical frameworks, IR scholars have struggled with the question of how observers assess resolve. We make two important contributions in this direction. Conceptually, we develop an integrative framework that unites otherwise disconnected theories, viewing them as a set of heuristics actors use to simplify information-rich environments. Methodologically, we employ a conjoint experiment that provides empirical traction imp…
Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors
Private diplomacy and secret agreements among adversaries are major features of international relations. Sometimes secret reassurance has resulted in cooperation and even peace between longtime adversaries. Yet rationalist theories consider private diplomatic communication as cheap talk. How do we explain this gap between theoretical expectations and the empirical record? I offer a theory that explains how, why, and when a leader may convince an …
Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security
A wave of recent scholarship has breathed new life into the study of reputation and credibility in international politics. In this review article, the authors welcome this development while offering a framework for evaluating collective progress, a series of related critiques, and a set of suggestions for future research. The article details how the books under review represent an important step toward consensus on the importance of reputation in…
In the Eye of the Beholder
How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations …
To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances
How do great powers decide whether to provide arms to or form alliances with client states? This “patron's dilemma” revolves around a decision about how to best provide security to clients without becoming entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Strong commitments worsen the risk of entrapment, whereas weak commitments intensify fears of abandonment. This traditional alliance dilemma can be addressed through the provision of arms and alliances. Great po…
The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits
Why do some peace summits succeed while others fail? We offer an explanation that highlights the importance of empathy between leaders. Studies in negotiations and psychology show that empathy—the ability to take the perspective of others and understand their cognitive and affective states without necessarily sympathizing with them—is critical in overcoming biases, transcending long-held enmities, and increasing the likelihood of cooperation. We …
Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force
How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions agains…
Knowing the Adversary
Democratic Reputations in Crises and War
Many international relations theories argue that leaders and publics use regime type to draw inferences about behavior in conflict, with implications for how democracies act as well as how they are treated by other states. We show that these beliefs can be studied as reputations, and we build a framework around reputations that adhere to regime types and whose content implicates not just resolve but a host of other important attributes and expect…
Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs
It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiti…
To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States
Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military miss…
The Many Faces of Credibility
The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that an actor’s past record of keeping her word determines her cooperative credibility, and that mutual perceptions of credibility are essential in sustaining cooperation. Yet competing reputation-skeptic and psychological perspectives dispute this conventional wisdom, suggesting that assessments of cooperative credibility result from observers’ judgments about the other’s capabilities and …
The Personal Touch
What counts as evidence that the other side is sincere? Within mainstream international relations literature, scholars have focused on costly signals. We argue, however, that in the real world leaders do not simply look at costly signals, but they rely to an important extent on their personal impressions of other leaders, taking these as credible indicators of sincerity. Our approach thus builds both upon the literature on interstate communicatio…
In the Eye of the Beholder
How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations …
Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors
Private diplomacy and secret agreements among adversaries are major features of international relations. Sometimes secret reassurance has resulted in cooperation and even peace between longtime adversaries. Yet rationalist theories consider private diplomatic communication as cheap talk. How do we explain this gap between theoretical expectations and the empirical record? I offer a theory that explains how, why, and when a leader may convince an …
Knowing the Adversary
Revisiting Reputation
Policy-makers and political scientists have long believed that states must make policy with an eye to maintaining a good reputation, especially a good reputation for resolve. Recent work, however, has argued that reputations for resolve do not form, and hence that past actions do not influence observers' behavior in subsequent interactions. This conclusion is theoretically problematic and unsupported by the evidence offered by reputation critics.…
Covert Communication
Can states credibly communicate their intentions through covert policy tools, despite the absence of credibility-enhancing publicity? Most extant research suggests covert action and secrecy in general are uniquely uninformative and often used as an alternative to signaling. Yet episodes such as Richard Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia suggest that leaders have used covert action to convey intentions and coerce adversaries. This article builds a…
To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances
How do great powers decide whether to provide arms to or form alliances with client states? This “patron's dilemma” revolves around a decision about how to best provide security to clients without becoming entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Strong commitments worsen the risk of entrapment, whereas weak commitments intensify fears of abandonment. This traditional alliance dilemma can be addressed through the provision of arms and alliances. Great po…
Soviet Leaders and Intelligence
There are very few people who can write about Soviet leaders’ thinking and the role that intelligence played in shaping their views with the authority that Raymond Garthoff can and does in his new book. For students of the Cold War, Garthoff’s work is widely recognized. Among others, he has written two important books on the Cold War: Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan and The Great Transition: American–Sovi…
The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits
Why do some peace summits succeed while others fail? We offer an explanation that highlights the importance of empathy between leaders. Studies in negotiations and psychology show that empathy—the ability to take the perspective of others and understand their cognitive and affective states without necessarily sympathizing with them—is critical in overcoming biases, transcending long-held enmities, and increasing the likelihood of cooperation. We …
The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling
This paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possibl…
Arms, Alliances, and Patron-Client Relationships
In “To Arm or to Ally?” Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper present an elegant and powerful theory that explains conditions under which a great power (in their case, the United States) offers a client state arms, an alliance commitment, or both.1 Their article does not give due attention, however, to what motivates a patron to provide security assistance to clients in the first place—especially its desire to influence its client…
Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes
Do costly signals work? Despite their widespread popularity, both hands-tying and sunk-cost signaling have come under criticism, and there’s little direct evidence that leaders understand costly signals the way our models tell us they should. We present evidence from a survey experiment fielded on a unique sample of elite decision makers from the Israeli Knesset. We find that both types of costly signaling are effective in shaping assessments of …
Response to Christopher J. Fettweis’s review of Who Fights for Reputation
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies
Many theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies. Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption. We use experiments to examine two mechanisms—responsiveness and selection—through which opinion could shape decisions about the use of military force. We tested responsiveness by asking members of the Is…
To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States
Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military miss…
Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security
A wave of recent scholarship has breathed new life into the study of reputation and credibility in international politics. In this review article, the authors welcome this development while offering a framework for evaluating collective progress, a series of related critiques, and a set of suggestions for future research. The article details how the books under review represent an important step toward consensus on the importance of reputation in…
How Do Observers Assess Resolve? – Corrigendum
How Do Observers Assess Resolve
Despite a plethora of theoretical frameworks, IR scholars have struggled with the question of how observers assess resolve. We make two important contributions in this direction. Conceptually, we develop an integrative framework that unites otherwise disconnected theories, viewing them as a set of heuristics actors use to simplify information-rich environments. Methodologically, we employ a conjoint experiment that provides empirical traction imp…
Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force
How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions agains…
Democratic Reputations in Crises and War
Many international relations theories argue that leaders and publics use regime type to draw inferences about behavior in conflict, with implications for how democracies act as well as how they are treated by other states. We show that these beliefs can be studied as reputations, and we build a framework around reputations that adhere to regime types and whose content implicates not just resolve but a host of other important attributes and expect…
Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs
It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiti…
The Many Faces of Credibility
The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that an actor’s past record of keeping her word determines her cooperative credibility, and that mutual perceptions of credibility are essential in sustaining cooperation. Yet competing reputation-skeptic and psychological perspectives dispute this conventional wisdom, suggesting that assessments of cooperative credibility result from observers’ judgments about the other’s capabilities and …
Political science (19 obras) · Law (17 obras) · Law (16 obras) · Psychology (13 obras) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (12 obras) · Politics (12 obras) · Social Psychology (12 obras) · Social Psychology (12 obras) · Economics (10 obras) · Sociology (10 obras)