Robert Pahre
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 223573 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Robert Pahre |
| NOMBRES | Robert |
| APELLIDO | Pahre |
| FIRMA | PAHRE R |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 180 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1989 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2019 |
| ÍNDICE H | 8 |
Creative Marginality
Fort Davis National Historic Site
National parks are selected as places of national importance, with national meaning. At the same time, the political process that shapes park management is often a local one. This biases park interpretation away from national concerns and toward local ones. The National Park Service's corporate interests and decision-making processes often reinforce the role of local interests except in the rare cases of congressional intervention. A close look a…
The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union
Among the many objections to Turkish membership of the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy‐making. We find that Turkey's preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream that it will have…
International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation
Cooperation between two agencies presents much the same problem whether these agencies are found in different countries or in the same country. This similarity is generally overlooked because the issues over which agencies negotiate often differ—defense and trade policy at the international level, transportation or land use at the domestic level. Demonstrating the analytical similarity of international cooperation to domestic interagency cooperat…
Hegemony and the International Economy
Power and leadership are among the central features of politics. They become even more visible in an environment such as the international system that lacks strong institutions. Without legislatures or administrative organs in a normal sense, political processes such as leadership, persuasion, and coercion come to the fore.These processes, especially the question of leadership, are central to many policy questions. Is Franco-German leadership of …
Patently Misleading
We develop a model of international negotiation in which states anticipate that the agreements they sign will only be partly implemented. The results differ significantly from theories of domestic ratification that have previously been applied to this problem. Negotiators do not try to satisfy the implementer and may even choose agreements that the implementer would explicitly reject in a ratification model. Partial implementation also makes it p…
Formal Theory and Case-Study Methods in EU Studies
EU studies have long been dominated by case studies, although formal theories have made substantial inroads into the field over the past decade. This article examines the advantages and challenges of combining these two methods, with an analysis grounded in both the philosophy of science and research design. Looking at the philosophy of science highlights several practices and principles shared by formal theorists and case-study researchers. The …
House Rules
International bargaining depends not only on the negotiators but also on the domestic political system in which they find themselves. Knowing this, countries often change domestic political institutions to influence the outcomes of international negotiations and/or to shape the domestic distributional consequences of those negotiations. This institutional change generally occurs in an already-rich institutional environment, where many different a…
Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union
A growing consensus maintains that divided government makes international cooperation more difficult. This paper takes issue with this claim. While divided government does make treaty ratification more difficult, it also affects the outcome when cooperation breaks down. To understand this effect of divided government, I bring the reversion point into the heart of the analysis of cooperation. If divided government makes this reversion point more u…
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations
Though substantively important, centralized negotiations have received less theoretical attention than problems of centralized monitoring and enforcement. I address this gap by examining variation in a particular form of centralized negotiations that I call “clustering.” Clustering occurs when a state negotiates with several other states at the same time. Clustering enables states to avoid having to make concessions on the same issue to one state…
Reactions and Reciprocity
If one country lowers its tariffs, other countries might follow suit by liberalizing or defend their market by raising tariffs or do nothing at all. The question of a state's reaction to the tariff policy of another has been undertheorized, although it plays an important, implicit role in debates between theories. To understand these reactions, the author proposes a model of trade policy and tariff reciprocity that encompasses variables from both…
Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union
Many scholars argue that domestic politics can tie the hands of diplomats, who can sometimes exploit these constraints for bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The author examines domestic institutions that make such constraints permanent, and thus credible, in a parliamentary system. Existing “divided government” theories are unable to explain the pattern of parliamentary constraints that we find because they treat executive prefer…
Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics
How do the links between domestic politics and the international system affect the way that states interact in the global arena? Scholars are giving this question greater attention today than they have in the past. One reason is that many see the end of the cold war as having made domestic politics more important in foreign policy matters. Similarly, the increasing importance of economic affairs in international relations has made domestic intere…
Positivist discourse and social scientific communities
1995). Positivist discourse and social scientific communities: Towards an epistemological sociology of science. Social Epistemology: Vol. 9, Knowledge (EX) Change, pp. 233-255
Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
There is a remarkable consensus among scholars of international relations that bilateral cooperation is easier to achieve than multilateral cooperation. This essay proposes a formal model to show that this is incorrect, because a multilateral agreement may achieve what an equivalent series of bilateral agreements cannot. The author explores formally several different enforcement mechanisms, suggesting that the argument is robust. Throughout the e…
The Limits of Rationality
Creative Marginality
L'Innovation dans les sciences sociales
Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle
Fragmentation and recombination of the social sciences
Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union
Many scholars argue that domestic politics can tie the hands of diplomats, who can sometimes exploit these constraints for bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The author examines domestic institutions that make such constraints permanent, and thus credible, in a parliamentary system. Existing “divided government” theories are unable to explain the pattern of parliamentary constraints that we find because they treat executive prefer…
Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
There is a remarkable consensus among scholars of international relations that bilateral cooperation is easier to achieve than multilateral cooperation. This essay proposes a formal model to show that this is incorrect, because a multilateral agreement may achieve what an equivalent series of bilateral agreements cannot. The author explores formally several different enforcement mechanisms, suggesting that the argument is robust. Throughout the e…
Formal Theory and Case-Study Methods in EU Studies
EU studies have long been dominated by case studies, although formal theories have made substantial inroads into the field over the past decade. This article examines the advantages and challenges of combining these two methods, with an analysis grounded in both the philosophy of science and research design. Looking at the philosophy of science highlights several practices and principles shared by formal theorists and case-study researchers. The …
Patently Misleading
We develop a model of international negotiation in which states anticipate that the agreements they sign will only be partly implemented. The results differ significantly from theories of domestic ratification that have previously been applied to this problem. Negotiators do not try to satisfy the implementer and may even choose agreements that the implementer would explicitly reject in a ratification model. Partial implementation also makes it p…
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations
Though substantively important, centralized negotiations have received less theoretical attention than problems of centralized monitoring and enforcement. I address this gap by examining variation in a particular form of centralized negotiations that I call “clustering.” Clustering occurs when a state negotiates with several other states at the same time. Clustering enables states to avoid having to make concessions on the same issue to one state…
Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union
A growing consensus maintains that divided government makes international cooperation more difficult. This paper takes issue with this claim. While divided government does make treaty ratification more difficult, it also affects the outcome when cooperation breaks down. To understand this effect of divided government, I bring the reversion point into the heart of the analysis of cooperation. If divided government makes this reversion point more u…
Fragmentation and recombination of the social sciences
Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics
How do the links between domestic politics and the international system affect the way that states interact in the global arena? Scholars are giving this question greater attention today than they have in the past. One reason is that many see the end of the cold war as having made domestic politics more important in foreign policy matters. Similarly, the increasing importance of economic affairs in international relations has made domestic intere…
Reactions and Reciprocity
If one country lowers its tariffs, other countries might follow suit by liberalizing or defend their market by raising tariffs or do nothing at all. The question of a state's reaction to the tariff policy of another has been undertheorized, although it plays an important, implicit role in debates between theories. To understand these reactions, the author proposes a model of trade policy and tariff reciprocity that encompasses variables from both…
The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union
Among the many objections to Turkish membership of the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy‐making. We find that Turkey's preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream that it will have…
The Limits of Rationality
House Rules
International bargaining depends not only on the negotiators but also on the domestic political system in which they find themselves. Knowing this, countries often change domestic political institutions to influence the outcomes of international negotiations and/or to shape the domestic distributional consequences of those negotiations. This institutional change generally occurs in an already-rich institutional environment, where many different a…
International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation
Cooperation between two agencies presents much the same problem whether these agencies are found in different countries or in the same country. This similarity is generally overlooked because the issues over which agencies negotiate often differ—defense and trade policy at the international level, transportation or land use at the domestic level. Demonstrating the analytical similarity of international cooperation to domestic interagency cooperat…
Positivist discourse and social scientific communities
1995). Positivist discourse and social scientific communities: Towards an epistemological sociology of science. Social Epistemology: Vol. 9, Knowledge (EX) Change, pp. 233-255
Fragmentation and recombination of the social sciences
L'Innovation dans les sciences sociales
Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle
Creative Marginality
The Limits of Rationality
Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
There is a remarkable consensus among scholars of international relations that bilateral cooperation is easier to achieve than multilateral cooperation. This essay proposes a formal model to show that this is incorrect, because a multilateral agreement may achieve what an equivalent series of bilateral agreements cannot. The author explores formally several different enforcement mechanisms, suggesting that the argument is robust. Throughout the e…
Positivist discourse and social scientific communities
1995). Positivist discourse and social scientific communities: Towards an epistemological sociology of science. Social Epistemology: Vol. 9, Knowledge (EX) Change, pp. 233-255
Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union
Many scholars argue that domestic politics can tie the hands of diplomats, who can sometimes exploit these constraints for bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The author examines domestic institutions that make such constraints permanent, and thus credible, in a parliamentary system. Existing “divided government” theories are unable to explain the pattern of parliamentary constraints that we find because they treat executive prefer…
Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics
How do the links between domestic politics and the international system affect the way that states interact in the global arena? Scholars are giving this question greater attention today than they have in the past. One reason is that many see the end of the cold war as having made domestic politics more important in foreign policy matters. Similarly, the increasing importance of economic affairs in international relations has made domestic intere…
Reactions and Reciprocity
If one country lowers its tariffs, other countries might follow suit by liberalizing or defend their market by raising tariffs or do nothing at all. The question of a state's reaction to the tariff policy of another has been undertheorized, although it plays an important, implicit role in debates between theories. To understand these reactions, the author proposes a model of trade policy and tariff reciprocity that encompasses variables from both…
Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union
A growing consensus maintains that divided government makes international cooperation more difficult. This paper takes issue with this claim. While divided government does make treaty ratification more difficult, it also affects the outcome when cooperation breaks down. To understand this effect of divided government, I bring the reversion point into the heart of the analysis of cooperation. If divided government makes this reversion point more u…
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations
Though substantively important, centralized negotiations have received less theoretical attention than problems of centralized monitoring and enforcement. I address this gap by examining variation in a particular form of centralized negotiations that I call “clustering.” Clustering occurs when a state negotiates with several other states at the same time. Clustering enables states to avoid having to make concessions on the same issue to one state…
House Rules
International bargaining depends not only on the negotiators but also on the domestic political system in which they find themselves. Knowing this, countries often change domestic political institutions to influence the outcomes of international negotiations and/or to shape the domestic distributional consequences of those negotiations. This institutional change generally occurs in an already-rich institutional environment, where many different a…
Hegemony and the International Economy
Power and leadership are among the central features of politics. They become even more visible in an environment such as the international system that lacks strong institutions. Without legislatures or administrative organs in a normal sense, political processes such as leadership, persuasion, and coercion come to the fore.These processes, especially the question of leadership, are central to many policy questions. Is Franco-German leadership of …
Patently Misleading
We develop a model of international negotiation in which states anticipate that the agreements they sign will only be partly implemented. The results differ significantly from theories of domestic ratification that have previously been applied to this problem. Negotiators do not try to satisfy the implementer and may even choose agreements that the implementer would explicitly reject in a ratification model. Partial implementation also makes it p…
Formal Theory and Case-Study Methods in EU Studies
EU studies have long been dominated by case studies, although formal theories have made substantial inroads into the field over the past decade. This article examines the advantages and challenges of combining these two methods, with an analysis grounded in both the philosophy of science and research design. Looking at the philosophy of science highlights several practices and principles shared by formal theorists and case-study researchers. The …
The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union
Among the many objections to Turkish membership of the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy‐making. We find that Turkey's preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream that it will have…
International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation
Cooperation between two agencies presents much the same problem whether these agencies are found in different countries or in the same country. This similarity is generally overlooked because the issues over which agencies negotiate often differ—defense and trade policy at the international level, transportation or land use at the domestic level. Demonstrating the analytical similarity of international cooperation to domestic interagency cooperat…
Fort Davis National Historic Site
National parks are selected as places of national importance, with national meaning. At the same time, the political process that shapes park management is often a local one. This biases park interpretation away from national concerns and toward local ones. The National Park Service's corporate interests and decision-making processes often reinforce the role of local interests except in the rare cases of congressional intervention. A close look a…
Creative Marginality
Political science (14 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Sociology (11 obras) · Economics (10 obras) · Law (10 obras) · Politics (9 obras) · Negotiation (7 obras) · International trade (6 obras) · Law and economics (6 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras)