Mark J Roe
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 227651 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Mark J Roe |
| NOMBRES | Mark J |
| APELLIDO | Roe |
| FIRMA | ROE M J |
| AFILIACIONES | Columbia University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 63 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1991 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2012 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Capital Markets and Financial Politics
For capital markets to function, political institutions must support capitalism in general and the capitalism of financial markets in particular. Yet capital markets’ shape, support, and extent are often contested in the polity. Powerful elements — from politicians to mass popular movements — have reason to change, co-opt, and remove value from capital markets. And players in capital markets have reason to seek rules that favor their own capital …
The Political Determinants of Corporate Governance
The claim I advance is that the large firm's ownership structure is too often analyzed as one arising solely from organizational imperatives and technical foundations. The political and social predicates that make the large firm possible and that shape its form can deeply affect which firms, which ownership structures, and which governance arrangements survive and prosper, and which do not. To be concrete, much political analysis can be made to f…
Delaware's Competition
One of corporate law's enduring issues has been the extent to which state-to-state competitive pressures on Delaware make for a race to the top or the bottom.States, or at least some of them, compete with their corporate law to get corporate tax revenue and ancillary benefits.Delaware has "won" that race, with the overwhelming number of American large corporations chartering there.Here I ague that this long-standing debate is misconceived.Delawar…
Rents and Their Corporate Consequences
Product markets are weaker in some nations than they are in others. Weaker product markets, and the concomitant monopoly rents, can affect corporate govemance. They can do so directly by loosening a constraint on managers, thereby increasing managerial agency costs to shareholders-costs that shareholders would then seek to reduce otherwise. The monopoly profits can also affect corporate governance structures indirectly by setting up a fertile fie…
State of the Art
Journal Article State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research Get access John W. Cioffi John W. Cioffi 1John W. Cioffi is a Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; Research Associate, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE); BA, Rutgers College, 1986; JD, Rutgers School of Law–Newark, 1990; MA, University of Californ…
Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control
The large public firm dominates business in the United States despite its critical infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. Managers' agendas can differ from shareholders'; tying managers tightly to shareholders has been central to American corporate governance. But in other economically-advanced nations ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the del…
La corporate gouvernance en perspective
A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance
Strong Managers and Weak Owners
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Journal Article Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Get access Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. By (MARK J.) Roe. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xvi + 324. £19.95 hardback, US $24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 691 03683 7.) Keith Cowling Keith Cowling University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Schola…
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Journal Article Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. By Mark J. Roe. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. xvi, 324 pp. $24.95, ISBN 0-691-03683-7.) Get access Guocheng Hu Guocheng Hu Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 82, Issue 2, September 1995, Page 808, https://doi.org…
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provocative examination addresses essential issues facing American businesses today as they compete in the new international marketplace.
German “populism” and the large public corporation
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance
Why is the public corporation-with its fragmented shareholders buying and selling on the stock exchange-the dominant form of enterprise in the United States? Since Berle and Means, the conventional corporate law story begins with technology dictating large enterprises with capital needs so great that even a few wealthy individuals cannot provide enough. These enterprises consequently must draw capital from many dispersed shareholders. Shareholder…
A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance
Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control
The large public firm dominates business in the United States despite its critical infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. Managers' agendas can differ from shareholders'; tying managers tightly to shareholders has been central to American corporate governance. But in other economically-advanced nations ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the del…
Delaware's Competition
One of corporate law's enduring issues has been the extent to which state-to-state competitive pressures on Delaware make for a race to the top or the bottom.States, or at least some of them, compete with their corporate law to get corporate tax revenue and ancillary benefits.Delaware has "won" that race, with the overwhelming number of American large corporations chartering there.Here I ague that this long-standing debate is misconceived.Delawar…
Rents and Their Corporate Consequences
Product markets are weaker in some nations than they are in others. Weaker product markets, and the concomitant monopoly rents, can affect corporate govemance. They can do so directly by loosening a constraint on managers, thereby increasing managerial agency costs to shareholders-costs that shareholders would then seek to reduce otherwise. The monopoly profits can also affect corporate governance structures indirectly by setting up a fertile fie…
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Journal Article Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Get access Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. By (MARK J.) Roe. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xvi + 324. £19.95 hardback, US $24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 691 03683 7.) Keith Cowling Keith Cowling University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Schola…
Strong Managers and Weak Owners
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance
Why is the public corporation-with its fragmented shareholders buying and selling on the stock exchange-the dominant form of enterprise in the United States? Since Berle and Means, the conventional corporate law story begins with technology dictating large enterprises with capital needs so great that even a few wealthy individuals cannot provide enough. These enterprises consequently must draw capital from many dispersed shareholders. Shareholder…
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provocative examination addresses essential issues facing American businesses today as they compete in the new international marketplace.
German “populism” and the large public corporation
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Journal Article Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. By Mark J. Roe. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. xvi, 324 pp. $24.95, ISBN 0-691-03683-7.) Get access Guocheng Hu Guocheng Hu Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 82, Issue 2, September 1995, Page 808, https://doi.org…
Strong Managers, Weak Owners
Journal Article Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Get access Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. By (MARK J.) Roe. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xvi + 324. £19.95 hardback, US $24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 691 03683 7.) Keith Cowling Keith Cowling University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Schola…
Strong Managers and Weak Owners
La corporate gouvernance en perspective
A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance
State of the Art
Journal Article State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research Get access John W. Cioffi John W. Cioffi 1John W. Cioffi is a Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; Research Associate, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE); BA, Rutgers College, 1986; JD, Rutgers School of Law–Newark, 1990; MA, University of Californ…
Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control
The large public firm dominates business in the United States despite its critical infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. Managers' agendas can differ from shareholders'; tying managers tightly to shareholders has been central to American corporate governance. But in other economically-advanced nations ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the del…
Rents and Their Corporate Consequences
Product markets are weaker in some nations than they are in others. Weaker product markets, and the concomitant monopoly rents, can affect corporate govemance. They can do so directly by loosening a constraint on managers, thereby increasing managerial agency costs to shareholders-costs that shareholders would then seek to reduce otherwise. The monopoly profits can also affect corporate governance structures indirectly by setting up a fertile fie…
Delaware's Competition
One of corporate law's enduring issues has been the extent to which state-to-state competitive pressures on Delaware make for a race to the top or the bottom.States, or at least some of them, compete with their corporate law to get corporate tax revenue and ancillary benefits.Delaware has "won" that race, with the overwhelming number of American large corporations chartering there.Here I ague that this long-standing debate is misconceived.Delawar…
The Political Determinants of Corporate Governance
The claim I advance is that the large firm's ownership structure is too often analyzed as one arising solely from organizational imperatives and technical foundations. The political and social predicates that make the large firm possible and that shape its form can deeply affect which firms, which ownership structures, and which governance arrangements survive and prosper, and which do not. To be concrete, much political analysis can be made to f…
Capital Markets and Financial Politics
For capital markets to function, political institutions must support capitalism in general and the capitalism of financial markets in particular. Yet capital markets’ shape, support, and extent are often contested in the polity. Powerful elements — from politicians to mass popular movements — have reason to change, co-opt, and remove value from capital markets. And players in capital markets have reason to seek rules that favor their own capital …
Business (10 obras) · Law (10 obras) · Political science (10 obras) · Politics (10 obras) · Economics (9 obras) · Finance (7 obras) · Finance (5 obras) · Management (5 obras) · Corporate governance (4 obras) · Law (4 obras)