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Stephen J Cimbala

Datos Biográficos

ID259627
NOMBREStephen J Cimbala
NOMBRESStephen J
APELLIDOCimbala
FIRMACIMBALA S J
AFILIACIONESPennsylvania State University
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS61
TOTAL DE CITAS11
TOTAL COMO AUTOR61
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1969
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2025
ÍNDICE H2
  • U.S. Strategic Posture Commission and the future of nuclear deterrence

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2025

  • The indelicate balance of terror

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2023

    Albert Wohlstetter's seminal essay of the early Cold War years, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," calls for revisiting in the current climate of geopolitics and military technology. The possible emergence of China as a near peer competitor with the United States and Russia in strategic nuclear forces changes the dynamics of nuclear deterrence, arms control and strategic stability in Asia and globally. In addition, future deterrence stability will…

  • Hypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence

    Stephen J Cimbala, Adam Lowther et al.•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2022

    This study explores the relationships between hypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence. This relationship is fraught with uncertainty because the velocity of innovation in hypersonics is difficult to forecast. Nevertheless, major nuclear powers are developing hypersonic weapons, including some that can be deployed on intercontinental launchers. Hypersonic glide vehicles or cruise missiles could threaten first strike stability by reducing the tim…

  • New START

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2021

    The United States and Russia must take the decision to extend the New START nuclear arms control treaty for five years by February, 2021 or the agreement will expire. Extension of New START will temporarily freeze the existing status quo as between the two leading nuclear powers and create breathing space for further and more extensive talks on a number of matters. These other issues could include: non-strategic nuclear forces; missile defenses; …

  • Colin Gray

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2021

    Colin Gray is very well known for his contributions to public policy debates on nuclear strategy and other national security issues. In addition, he deserves equal credit for his accomplishments as

  • The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•BOOK•The United States, Russia and…•2020

  • The United States, Russia and Nuclear Peace

    Stephen J Cimbala•BOOK•The United States, Russia and…•2020

  • Technology, Strategy, and Politics of Sdi

    Stephen J Cimbala•BOOK•Technology, Strategy, and…•2019

  • Nuclear arms race in Asia

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2018

    North Korea’s unpredictable behavior with respect to its nuclear arsenal is only one element of a nuclear arms competition among powers in Asia. Nuclear Asia is a potential cockpit for an outbreak of accidental nuclear war or deliberate nuclear first use, as among regional rivals and adversaries. In addition, a limited nuclear war between regional enemies could ignite intervention by outside powers and intensify, in terms of its potential for hor…

  • The third offset and nuclear weapons

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2017

    Third offset technologies are represented as game changing with respect to their implications for U.S. military strategy. In general, third offset technologies as applied to the art of war will emphasize information-driven conventional weapons that are smaller, lighter, and smarter, compared to earlier generations. How will weapons and systems based on third offset technologies coexist with nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and what are…

  • Nuclear cyberwar and crisis management

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2016•Citada por: 1

    The political and military dexterity required for nuclear crisis management during the Cold War was sufficiently stressful for policymakers and military advisors. Even more uncertain is the information environment of the twenty-first century and the “second nuclear age” with respect to its implications for the use of nuclear forces in coercive bargaining. Nuclear crisis management requires a degree of transparency about ongoing military operation…

  • A New Cold War? Missile Defenses, Nuclear Arms Reductions, and Cyber War

    Stephen J Cimbala, Roger N Mcdermott•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2015

    This study inquires whether the United States and Russia might be headed toward a new Cold War, at least with respect to certain aspects of their diplomatic-strategic behavior. Those aspects have to do with missile defenses, nuclear arms control, and conflict in cyberspace. Arguments pertinent to these three domains or issues are not necessarily transferable, as interpretations of trends in U.S.-Russian relations, to other aspects of their diplom…

  • Turmoil of Triads? Nuclear Reductions after New START

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2015

    The United States and Russia have options for resuming their strategic nuclear arms reductions, should more favorable political circumstances present themselves. Both share a responsibility for leadership in the global nonproliferation regime, and both the U.S. and Russia will face future trade-offs between domestic economic priorities and nuclear force modernization. Analysis suggests that reductions to a maximum number of 1,000 deployed nuclear…

  • Cyber War and Deterrence Stability

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2014

    Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and p…

  • The Asian Attraction

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2014

    The United States' military-strategic pivot toward Asia is motived by concerns about a rising China, about the increased significance of Asia on the world economic and political stages, and about the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear first use in that region. Nuclear Asia already numbers five acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states among its members: Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Failure to reverse Nort…

  • Missile Mayhem and Antimissile Angst

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2013

    The political context for nuclear arms reductions, as between the United States and Russia, seemed to stall in 2012 and appeared uncertain as to possible progress during the second term of U.S. President Barack Obama and the third term of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The prospect of a successor agreement to New START that would reduce the numbers of U.S.- and Russian-deployed strategic nuclear weapons to even lower levels was further clouded…

  • U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reductions

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Orbis•2013

  • Missile Defenses and the Russian-United States Reset

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2012

    The U.S.-Russian impasse over the Obama missile defense plan for Europe is a composite of both technology and politics. Russian threat assessments offer a pessimistic view of NATO enlargement into former Soviet security space and the deployment of any missile defense elements there. Russian objections to NATO European missile defenses have an aspect of attempted “reflexive control” over foreign and domestic audiences, but analysis shows that U.S.…

  • Minimum Deterrence and Missile Defenses

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2011

    Ratification and entry into force of the New START agreement open the door for possible additional reductions in both states' numbers of deployed long-range nuclear weapons and launchers, but the matrix of post–New START agreement involves nonlinearities with respect to the relationship between minimum deterrence and missile defenses. NATO's Lisbon summit in 2010 invited Russia to participate in a European missile defense system, but Russia is wa…

  • New START or Not? U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions in Perspective

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2010

    The New START agreement signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in April 2010 could be the basis for further nuclear arms reductions as well as U.S.-Russian cooperation and leadership on nuclear nonproliferation. Obama's ambitious agenda of nuclear limitation includes possible reductions in NATO and Russian substrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, a revised U.S. missile defense plan for Europe, and forw…

  • Anticipatory Attacks

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2008

    Anticipatory attack includes both preemptive and preventive attacks. Anticipatory attacks cannot be excluded as options for policymakers and military planners. On the other hand, preemption and preventive options must be used with care. Even when they are employed with favorable military results, anticipatory attacks can have undesirable political side effects. Nuclear anticipatory attacks raise issues in addition to conventional ones. Deterrence…

  • Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2008

    Russia and the United States have a special responsibility to connect “vertical” nuclear disarmament and “horizontal” nonproliferation. Russian and American behavior will influence the choices made by nonnuclear states about the decision for a nuclear weapons capability or for the acquisition of a complete nuclear fuel cycle with the potential for weaponization. This study uses an analytical model to examine the stability of a possible future wor…

  • Russia's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2007

    The U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship is not a Cold War anachronism, as many assume, but a vital constituent of a robust international body politic. War between Russia and America is unlikely, but misunderstanding and misperception with respect to their military ends and means are not. U.S. nuclear modernization plans impact on Russian perceptions of their great-power status and vice versa. The U.S. and Russia are downsizing their numbers of oper…

  • Nuclear Arms in Asia

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2007

    Neither a balance of power model nor a balance of terror model can predict with assurance whether nuclear Asia will be stable or unstable. Even if fewer than eight states in Asia become nuclear weapons states, the problems of crisis management and escalation control, growing out of clashes between conventional armed forces, becomes harder to manage. As well, nuclear weapons have psychological effects on their owners, and not always predictable on…

  • Parity in Peril? The Continuing Vitality of Russian-US Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Arms Control•2006

    The stability of nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia no longer can be regarded as a relic of the Cold War. The topic is rapidly re-emerging as one of ever-greater relevance and policy-strategic urgency. A more fluid international order, the complexity of post-Cold War security issues, and the pressure of incipient nuclear proliferation in Asia, make clarity in American-Russian nuclear arms control of first importance. Through …

Siguiente
  • Nuclear weapons in the new world order

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Journal of Strategic Studies•1993•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 5

  • Deterrence Stability with Smaller Forces

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Journal of Peace Research•1995•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 4

    Many scholars and policy-makers have assumed that reduction of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces to the lowest possible levels, perhaps to zero, is contributory to deterrence and crisis stability. This study tests a variety of reduced US and Russian nuclear forces, including hypothetical forces and START configurations, for their relative force advantage and for their ability to fulfil previously accepted standards of assured retaliation. I…

  • New Myths and Old Realities

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•World Politics•1971•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 4

    The national malaise over Vietnam has had many spillovers. Among them can be counted a shelf of works on the militaryindustrial complex and the role of the military establishment in American policy-making. Much of this material should never have been written; it is uninformed, naive, biased, and even nonsensical. Several recent contributions to the debate have attempted to raise the level of discussion by considering the defense problem as a matt…

  • Nuclear cyberwar and crisis management

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•2016•Citada por: 1

    The political and military dexterity required for nuclear crisis management during the Cold War was sufficiently stressful for policymakers and military advisors. Even more uncertain is the information environment of the twenty-first century and the “second nuclear age” with respect to its implications for the use of nuclear forces in coercive bargaining. Nuclear crisis management requires a degree of transparency about ongoing military operation…

  • Accidental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information Warfare

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1999•Citada por: 1

    Because of military professional enthusiasm for a post-nuclear world dominated by high technology, conventional weapons may be misplaced. Nuclear deterrence remains highly relevant to the new world order because of residual great power nuclear arsenals and nuclear proliferation. In addition, the possible combination of information warfare and a failure of nuclear deterrence is one troublesome aspect of the future technology and policy environment…

  • International Relations and Politics

    Open Access•Richard J Payne, Sam C Sarkesian et al.•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•1993•Citada por: 1

  • International Relations and Politics

    Open Access•Paul L Rosen, Astri Suhrke et al.•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•1991•Citada por: 1

  • Foreign Policy as an Issue Area

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1969•Referencias: 6

    James N. Rosenau has elaborated the issue area typology developed by Theodore Lowi in an ambitious attempt to categorize motivations, role structures, and interaction sequences which distinguish “domestic” from “foreign” issues. Lowi classified domestic issues into three areas: distribution of resources, regulation of resources, and redistribution of resources, and he equated interaction sequences in these areas with the coalition (distributive),…

  • "Leslie Gelb and Two Critics of "Vietnam

    Howard Margolis, Stephen J Cimbala et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Policy•1971

  • New Myths and Old Realities

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•World Politics•1971•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 4

    The national malaise over Vietnam has had many spillovers. Among them can be counted a shelf of works on the militaryindustrial complex and the role of the military establishment in American policy-making. Much of this material should never have been written; it is uninformed, naive, biased, and even nonsensical. Several recent contributions to the debate have attempted to raise the level of discussion by considering the defense problem as a matt…

  • Essence of Decision

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1972

  • The policy sciences and foreign policy

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Policy Sciences•1973

  • Priorities and Limits in Studying Foreign Policy

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Policy Studies Journal•1974•Referencias: 6

  • International Relations and Politics

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•1982

  • National Volunteer Service

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Journal of Voluntary Action…•1985

  • Forever MAD

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1985

    Mutual assured destruction has been the victim of its own successes. Understood in the context of changed technology and plausible scenarios, MAD contributes important insights pertinent to the issues of crisis and arms race stability. Adaptation to new environmental conditions will guarantee the survival of MAD; that adaptation will require some reconsideration of it as a sufficient condition, as well as a necessary one, for strategic stability

  • Closing the window of vulnerability

    Michael F Altfeld, Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Comparative Strategy•1986•Referencias: 4

    The Reagan Administration proposes to deploy 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs in Minuteman silos in order to reduce the current Soviet advantage in ICBMs. After that decision was taken the President announced what has come to be called the “Strategic Defense Initiative.” This paper compares the effectiveness of the proposed Peacekeeper deployment to that of a simple, fairly “leaky” point defense of the current U.S. Minuteman force. In addition, the effect o…

  • Flexible Targeting, Escalation Control, And War in Europe

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1986

    U.S. declaratory and employment policies have been modified toward escalation control and flexible targeting for war in Europe. These efforts, however useful in principle, are unlikely to make much difference given political constraints within which targeting and war plans must operate. Europeans fear the possibility of a general nuclear, regional nuclear, or conventional war. No U.S. declaratory policies can reassure them that NATO/Warsaw Pact w…

  • What Price Survivability? Progress vs. Perfection

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1986

    Expectations for the survivability of U.S. strategic forces and command, control, and communications (C 3 ) may exceed the requirements of political prudence and military necessity. U.S. forces and commanders need not be expected to survive improbable threats and extreme worst-case scenarios. Given technical limitations and political probabilities, the requirements for survivability should include allowing for evolutionary adjustment of capabilit…

  • The Reagan Defense Program

    Andrew J Pierre, Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1986

  • Superpower strategies

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Society•1986

  • U.S.—Soviet Command Reciprocity

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1987

    U.S. and Soviet strategic command, control, and communications are "survivably interdependent." Neither country can credibly deter nor plausibly fight wars involving the threat or use of nuclear forces without observing "rules of the road" about C 3 . These rules include clarification of their intentions during a crisis; exchange of information and persons to preserve crisis stability; and tacit agreement about not attacking the "brain" or "centr…

  • Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations

    Gregory F Treverton, Samuel Wells et al.•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1987

    This book presents papers on ballistic missile defense. Topics considered include the historical aspects of US strategic concepts and programs, Soviet perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), national security, international cooperation, nuclear proliferation, arms control and SDI, the technical feasibility of the SDI, foreign policy, and US and Soviet views on prospects for a cooperative transition in strategic defense

  • Doctrine and deterrence

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Society•1987

  • Amorphous Wars

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•International Journal of…•1988

  • Nato Strategy and Nuclear Weapons

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•The US Army War College Quarterly…•1988

  • Strategic Vulnerability

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1988

    Strategic vulnerability has evolved from a very simple and straightforward notion to a more complex one. Included in any meaningful discussion of vulnerability today must be strategic and decision-making issues that are incompletely conceptualized. Policymakers cannot have confidence that force exchange models or postattack firepower ratios reveal much or even most of the important components of vulnerability

  • Extended Deterrence And Nuclear Escalation

    Open Access•Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Armed Forces & Society•1988

    The relationship between extended deterrence and nuclear escalation in Europe is a principal component of NATO strategy. This relationship is explained by NATO in at least two very different, and somewhat contradictory, ways. The first way is that extended deterrence is made credible by the ability of one side to dominate the process of escalation or at least to match any move made by the opponent. The second way is that extended deterrence depen…

  • Nuclear Strategizing

    Gregory F Treverton, Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1988

  • Mainstreaming military deception

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•International Journal of…•1989

  • International Relations and Politics

    Open Access•Paul L Rosen, Astri Suhrke et al.•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•1991•Citada por: 1

  • Nuclear weapons in the new world order

    Stephen J Cimbala•ARTICLE•Journal of Strategic Studies•1993•Citada por: 3•Referencias: 5

Political science (59 obras) · Law (50 obras) · Law (41 obras) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (37 obras) · Nuclear weapon (31 obras) · Politics (29 obras) · Computer Science (28 obras) · Economics (27 obras) · Business (26 obras) · Political economy (25 obras)

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