Uri Bar-Joseph
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 288258 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Uri Bar-Joseph |
| NOMBRES | Uri |
| APELLIDO | Bar-Joseph |
| FIRMA | BAR-JOSEPH U |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Haifa |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 22 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 27 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1987 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Strategic Warning Intelligence
In 2018, as John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon were finishing their book, they estimated that U.S. strategic warning and counterdeception efforts were at one of their lowest points (p. 88). When we hear this sober assessment against the backdrop of President Donald Trump’s constant demand for intelligence to please, Dan Coats’s resignation as director of national intelligence (and the futile attempt to replace him with a typical Trump loyalist),…
Comparing National Approaches to the Study of Intelligence
This forum compares and contrasts national experiences in the development of intelligence studies from the perspective of seven countries: France, Japan, Israel, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The discussion is structured around a comparative framework that emphasizes five core dimensions that, we posit, are essential to the emergence of this subfield: access to relevant government information, institutionalization of …
Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century
This volumes discusses three principal issues: the Israeli army and the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA); Israel's present and future answers to the threays of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the impact of societal, political, and technological changes on Israel's future war objectives.
The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide
This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decisi…
The Best of Enemies
The Politicization of Intelligence
Additional informationNotes on contributorsURI BAR-JOSEPHProfessor Uri Bar-Joseph teaches International Relations in the School of Political Science at Haifa University in Israel. Long involved in security matters, he is the author of The Angel: Ashraf Marwan, the Mossad and the War of Yom Kippur (in Hebrew, 2011, 450 pages) and The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (in English, Albany, NY: State University of New Y…
Forecasting a Hurricane
The surprising ‘Arab Spring’ raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977–79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate ac…
The “Special Means of Collection”
Israeli narratives of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlight the army’s lack of preparedness in the wake of a successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, despite assumptions of Israel’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Using recently declassified government documents, this article reveals a communication breakdown among Israel’s leadership over the operational status of a top secret means of surveillance. T…
Confronting the Intelligence Fiasco of the Yom KippurWar
At the center of Israel's most traumatic event, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, stands an intelligence failure. Since the early 1990s, when senior intelligence officers who were involved in this fiasco started writing their memoirs, this event has become a source of major controversy in Israeli historiography. In response to the 2011 publication of the memoirs of the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, this article traces, describes and analyzes…
The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis
Intensified public debate over intelligence has taken place in recent years, primarily as the result of the critical role that it has played and continues to play in the war on terrorism. Other fac
Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator
Although Israel constitutes an interesting case for the study of civil—military relations, the role played by its Directory of Military Intelligence (AMAN) has rarely been discussed in this context. This role is of special interest, since Israel is the only liberal democracy today in which a military intelligence service functions as the leading national estimator not only in military but also in civilian affairs. The unique Israeli model is usua…
Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure
URI BAR-JOSEPH is an associate professor of international relations at Haifa University, Israel. His fields of expertise are national security, intelligence, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has published numerous articles and four books, including The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of the Yom Kippur War and Its Sources. JACK S. LEVY is Board of Governors professor at Rutgers University and a former president of the International Studies Ass…
Personal Functioning Under Stress
Much work has explored decision making under stress in political leadership. Less work has attempted to link the enormous emotional pressure of crisis with both the heightened sense of political accountability and responsibility and the increased need for social support under such circumstances. The authors examine the impact of political accountability, and the nature and quality of individual social support, on the relative performance of five …
Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War
Additional informationNotes on contributorsUri Bar-JosephDr. Uri Bar-Joseph, a senior lecturer at the International Relations Division, Haifa University, Israel, specializes in strategic and intelligence studies and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has published extensively on these subjects. His most recent book is The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Albany, N.Y.: The State University of New York Press, 2005)
Lessons not Learned
Last Chance to Avoid War
Most studies of the attempts to reach a political solution to the Egyptian–Israeli dispute between the wars of 1967 and 1973 focus predominantly on the Jarring mission (1968–71), the Rogers plan (1969–70) and Sadat's plan for a partial agreement in the Canal sector (early 1971). However, as this article shows on the basis of new archival documents, the most important diplomatic initiative during this period was Sadat's proposal for a comprehensiv…
Main Trends in the Historiography of the Yom Kippur War
Although the Yom Kippur War was the most traumatic event in Israel's history and had an enormous impact on Israel's subsequent development, it has not yet received the academic attention it deserves. The article reviews the somewhat dialectical form in which the academic and non-academic discussion of three critical aspects of the war has developed since the mid-1970s: the mistaken intelligence estimate before the war, and the institutions and pe…
The paradox of Israeli power
Israel's national security doctrine has become obsolete. While Israel enjoys unprecedented military superiority over its enemies, the security of Israelis is at an all-time low, and a nuclear threat, primarily from Iran, is on the rise. This paradoxical situation stems from a failure to adjust Israel's security doctrine to regional, global and technological changes since the mid-1970s. Four major components of this doctrine in particular are inad…
Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century
Rotem
Israel's Intelligence Failure Of 1973
I would like to thank Gabriel Ben-Dor, Richard K. Betts, Alexander L. George, Ben D. Mor, and Yigal Sheffy for their useful comments on this paper
The Best of Enemies
Last Chance to Avoid War
Most studies of the attempts to reach a political solution to the Egyptian–Israeli dispute between the wars of 1967 and 1973 focus predominantly on the Jarring mission (1968–71), the Rogers plan (1969–70) and Sadat's plan for a partial agreement in the Canal sector (early 1971). However, as this article shows on the basis of new archival documents, the most important diplomatic initiative during this period was Sadat's proposal for a comprehensiv…
Personal Functioning Under Stress
Much work has explored decision making under stress in political leadership. Less work has attempted to link the enormous emotional pressure of crisis with both the heightened sense of political accountability and responsibility and the increased need for social support under such circumstances. The authors examine the impact of political accountability, and the nature and quality of individual social support, on the relative performance of five …
The “Special Means of Collection”
Israeli narratives of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlight the army’s lack of preparedness in the wake of a successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, despite assumptions of Israel’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Using recently declassified government documents, this article reveals a communication breakdown among Israel’s leadership over the operational status of a top secret means of surveillance. T…
Rotem
Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure
URI BAR-JOSEPH is an associate professor of international relations at Haifa University, Israel. His fields of expertise are national security, intelligence, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has published numerous articles and four books, including The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of the Yom Kippur War and Its Sources. JACK S. LEVY is Board of Governors professor at Rutgers University and a former president of the International Studies Ass…
Israel's Intelligence Failure Of 1973
I would like to thank Gabriel Ben-Dor, Richard K. Betts, Alexander L. George, Ben D. Mor, and Yigal Sheffy for their useful comments on this paper
Comparing National Approaches to the Study of Intelligence
This forum compares and contrasts national experiences in the development of intelligence studies from the perspective of seven countries: France, Japan, Israel, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The discussion is structured around a comparative framework that emphasizes five core dimensions that, we posit, are essential to the emergence of this subfield: access to relevant government information, institutionalization of …
Forecasting a Hurricane
The surprising ‘Arab Spring’ raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977–79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate ac…
Lessons not Learned
The paradox of Israeli power
Israel's national security doctrine has become obsolete. While Israel enjoys unprecedented military superiority over its enemies, the security of Israelis is at an all-time low, and a nuclear threat, primarily from Iran, is on the rise. This paradoxical situation stems from a failure to adjust Israel's security doctrine to regional, global and technological changes since the mid-1970s. Four major components of this doctrine in particular are inad…
The Best of Enemies
Israel's Intelligence Failure Of 1973
I would like to thank Gabriel Ben-Dor, Richard K. Betts, Alexander L. George, Ben D. Mor, and Yigal Sheffy for their useful comments on this paper
Rotem
Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century
The paradox of Israeli power
Israel's national security doctrine has become obsolete. While Israel enjoys unprecedented military superiority over its enemies, the security of Israelis is at an all-time low, and a nuclear threat, primarily from Iran, is on the rise. This paradoxical situation stems from a failure to adjust Israel's security doctrine to regional, global and technological changes since the mid-1970s. Four major components of this doctrine in particular are inad…
Main Trends in the Historiography of the Yom Kippur War
Although the Yom Kippur War was the most traumatic event in Israel's history and had an enormous impact on Israel's subsequent development, it has not yet received the academic attention it deserves. The article reviews the somewhat dialectical form in which the academic and non-academic discussion of three critical aspects of the war has developed since the mid-1970s: the mistaken intelligence estimate before the war, and the institutions and pe…
Last Chance to Avoid War
Most studies of the attempts to reach a political solution to the Egyptian–Israeli dispute between the wars of 1967 and 1973 focus predominantly on the Jarring mission (1968–71), the Rogers plan (1969–70) and Sadat's plan for a partial agreement in the Canal sector (early 1971). However, as this article shows on the basis of new archival documents, the most important diplomatic initiative during this period was Sadat's proposal for a comprehensiv…
Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War
Additional informationNotes on contributorsUri Bar-JosephDr. Uri Bar-Joseph, a senior lecturer at the International Relations Division, Haifa University, Israel, specializes in strategic and intelligence studies and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has published extensively on these subjects. His most recent book is The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Albany, N.Y.: The State University of New York Press, 2005)
Lessons not Learned
Personal Functioning Under Stress
Much work has explored decision making under stress in political leadership. Less work has attempted to link the enormous emotional pressure of crisis with both the heightened sense of political accountability and responsibility and the increased need for social support under such circumstances. The authors examine the impact of political accountability, and the nature and quality of individual social support, on the relative performance of five …
Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure
URI BAR-JOSEPH is an associate professor of international relations at Haifa University, Israel. His fields of expertise are national security, intelligence, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has published numerous articles and four books, including The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of the Yom Kippur War and Its Sources. JACK S. LEVY is Board of Governors professor at Rutgers University and a former president of the International Studies Ass…
Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator
Although Israel constitutes an interesting case for the study of civil—military relations, the role played by its Directory of Military Intelligence (AMAN) has rarely been discussed in this context. This role is of special interest, since Israel is the only liberal democracy today in which a military intelligence service functions as the leading national estimator not only in military but also in civilian affairs. The unique Israeli model is usua…
The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis
Intensified public debate over intelligence has taken place in recent years, primarily as the result of the critical role that it has played and continues to play in the war on terrorism. Other fac
Confronting the Intelligence Fiasco of the Yom KippurWar
At the center of Israel's most traumatic event, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, stands an intelligence failure. Since the early 1990s, when senior intelligence officers who were involved in this fiasco started writing their memoirs, this event has become a source of major controversy in Israeli historiography. In response to the 2011 publication of the memoirs of the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, this article traces, describes and analyzes…
The Best of Enemies
The Politicization of Intelligence
Additional informationNotes on contributorsURI BAR-JOSEPHProfessor Uri Bar-Joseph teaches International Relations in the School of Political Science at Haifa University in Israel. Long involved in security matters, he is the author of The Angel: Ashraf Marwan, the Mossad and the War of Yom Kippur (in Hebrew, 2011, 450 pages) and The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (in English, Albany, NY: State University of New Y…
Forecasting a Hurricane
The surprising ‘Arab Spring’ raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977–79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate ac…
The “Special Means of Collection”
Israeli narratives of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War highlight the army’s lack of preparedness in the wake of a successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, despite assumptions of Israel’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Using recently declassified government documents, this article reveals a communication breakdown among Israel’s leadership over the operational status of a top secret means of surveillance. T…
Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century
This volumes discusses three principal issues: the Israeli army and the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA); Israel's present and future answers to the threays of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the impact of societal, political, and technological changes on Israel's future war objectives.
The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide
This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decisi…
Strategic Warning Intelligence
In 2018, as John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon were finishing their book, they estimated that U.S. strategic warning and counterdeception efforts were at one of their lowest points (p. 88). When we hear this sober assessment against the backdrop of President Donald Trump’s constant demand for intelligence to please, Dan Coats’s resignation as director of national intelligence (and the futile attempt to replace him with a typical Trump loyalist),…
Comparing National Approaches to the Study of Intelligence
This forum compares and contrasts national experiences in the development of intelligence studies from the perspective of seven countries: France, Japan, Israel, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The discussion is structured around a comparative framework that emphasizes five core dimensions that, we posit, are essential to the emergence of this subfield: access to relevant government information, institutionalization of …
Political science (19 obras) · History (14 obras) · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy (13 obras) · Law (13 obras) · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies (10 obras) · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts (9 obras) · Sociology (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · History (8 obras) · Law (7 obras)