Lauritz Aastrup Munch
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 296588 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Lauritz Aastrup Munch |
| NOMBRES | Lauritz Aastrup |
| APELLIDO | Munch |
| FIRMA | MUNCH L A |
| AFILIACIONES | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3510-5422 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2021 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
In Defense of Post Hoc Explanations in Medical AI
Since the early days of the explainable artificial intelligence movement, post hoc explanations have been praised for their potential to improve user understanding, promote trust, and reduce patient-safety risks in black box medical AI systems. Recently, however, critics have argued that the benefits of post hoc explanations are greatly exaggerated since they merely approximate, rather than replicate, the actual reasoning processes that black box…
How Relationships Mitigate Paternalistic Complaints (When They Do)
Many believe that relationships can make a constitutive difference to the moral status of paternalistic treatment. For example, it is often assumed that it’s easier to justify paternalizing a spouse than a stranger. But although this thought is widespread, there exists no detailed account of how relationships could mitigate paternalistic complaints. The aim of this paper is to develop an account of this phenomenon, drawing on the work of Margaret…
Can large language models help solve the cost problem for the right to explanation
By now a consensus has emerged that people, when subjected to high-stakes decisions through automated decision systems, have a moral right to have these decisions explained to them. However, furnishing such explanations can be costly. So the right to an explanation creates what we call the cost problem: providing subjects of automated decisions with appropriate explanations of the grounds of these decisions can be costly for the companies and org…
Wrongful discrimination as biased discrimination
People working on the ethics of discrimination have struggled with accounting for a kind of moral wrongdoing that is thought to be present in all instances of wrongful discrimination. So far, any moral wrong claimed to be characteristic of wrongful discrimination in this way has failed to generalize to all cases of wrongful discrimination, moving many to abandon the idea that wrongful discrimination is normatively distinct at all. Motivated by th…
Privacy
The concept of privacy is both significant and contested, with ongoing philosophical debate about whether it is best understood in terms of non-access or as involving some form of control. This paper advances the discussion by employing experimental philosophy to examine folk intuitions about privacy. Our findings show that these intuitions favor a control-based concept of privacy. Additionally, we show that the type of information at stake influ…
Consensual discrimination
What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect, and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account
Doxastic Affirmative Action
According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of th…
The privacy dependency thesis and self-defense
If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act may undermine other people’s ability to conceal information about them. Such dependencies are called privacy dependencies in the literature. Some say that privacy dependencies generate moral duties to avoid sharing information about oneself. If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing information to prevent them from doing so. In this …
What Relational Egalitarians Should (Not) Believe
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up 1
Algorithmic decision-making
The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a d…
Treating people as individuals and as members of groups
Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires treating people as agents in the appropriate capa…
Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent
It has recently been argued that to permissibly act on someone’s consent to sex, the agent must possess firsthand evidence of the consent directly from the consenter (Lackey 2021; Dougherty 2018). This view is motivated by a case where it seems impermissible to act on testimonial knowledge of someone’s consent to sex. Although we agree that it is impermissible to act as if there is consent in this case, we argue that the explanation in terms of a…
The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making
To Believe, or Not to Believe – That is Not the (Only) Question
What We Owe Past Selves
Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves
The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies
Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that …
Digital Self-Defence
Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence
How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties
Why ‘Negative Control’ is a Dead End
Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent
It has recently been argued that to permissibly act on someone’s consent to sex, the agent must possess firsthand evidence of the consent directly from the consenter (Lackey 2021; Dougherty 2018). This view is motivated by a case where it seems impermissible to act on testimonial knowledge of someone’s consent to sex. Although we agree that it is impermissible to act as if there is consent in this case, we argue that the explanation in terms of a…
Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence
How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties
Why ‘Negative Control’ is a Dead End
Digital Self-Defence
The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making
To Believe, or Not to Believe – That is Not the (Only) Question
What We Owe Past Selves
Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves
The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies
Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that …
Doxastic Affirmative Action
According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of th…
The privacy dependency thesis and self-defense
If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act may undermine other people’s ability to conceal information about them. Such dependencies are called privacy dependencies in the literature. Some say that privacy dependencies generate moral duties to avoid sharing information about oneself. If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing information to prevent them from doing so. In this …
What Relational Egalitarians Should (Not) Believe
Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up 1
Algorithmic decision-making
The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a d…
Treating people as individuals and as members of groups
Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires treating people as agents in the appropriate capa…
Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent
It has recently been argued that to permissibly act on someone’s consent to sex, the agent must possess firsthand evidence of the consent directly from the consenter (Lackey 2021; Dougherty 2018). This view is motivated by a case where it seems impermissible to act on testimonial knowledge of someone’s consent to sex. Although we agree that it is impermissible to act as if there is consent in this case, we argue that the explanation in terms of a…
Can large language models help solve the cost problem for the right to explanation
By now a consensus has emerged that people, when subjected to high-stakes decisions through automated decision systems, have a moral right to have these decisions explained to them. However, furnishing such explanations can be costly. So the right to an explanation creates what we call the cost problem: providing subjects of automated decisions with appropriate explanations of the grounds of these decisions can be costly for the companies and org…
Wrongful discrimination as biased discrimination
People working on the ethics of discrimination have struggled with accounting for a kind of moral wrongdoing that is thought to be present in all instances of wrongful discrimination. So far, any moral wrong claimed to be characteristic of wrongful discrimination in this way has failed to generalize to all cases of wrongful discrimination, moving many to abandon the idea that wrongful discrimination is normatively distinct at all. Motivated by th…
Privacy
The concept of privacy is both significant and contested, with ongoing philosophical debate about whether it is best understood in terms of non-access or as involving some form of control. This paper advances the discussion by employing experimental philosophy to examine folk intuitions about privacy. Our findings show that these intuitions favor a control-based concept of privacy. Additionally, we show that the type of information at stake influ…
Consensual discrimination
What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect, and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account
In Defense of Post Hoc Explanations in Medical AI
Since the early days of the explainable artificial intelligence movement, post hoc explanations have been praised for their potential to improve user understanding, promote trust, and reduce patient-safety risks in black box medical AI systems. Recently, however, critics have argued that the benefits of post hoc explanations are greatly exaggerated since they merely approximate, rather than replicate, the actual reasoning processes that black box…
How Relationships Mitigate Paternalistic Complaints (When They Do)
Many believe that relationships can make a constitutive difference to the moral status of paternalistic treatment. For example, it is often assumed that it’s easier to justify paternalizing a spouse than a stranger. But although this thought is widespread, there exists no detailed account of how relationships could mitigate paternalistic complaints. The aim of this paper is to develop an account of this phenomenon, drawing on the work of Margaret…
Computer Science (11 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Sociology (10 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Psychology (8 obras) · Internet privacy (7 obras) · Law and economics (7 obras) · Free Will and Agency (6 obras) · Law (6 obras)