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Morag Mcgrath

Datos Biográficos

ID298388
NOMBREMorag Mcgrath
NOMBRESMorag
APELLIDOMcgrath
FIRMAMCGRATH M
AFILIACIONESUniversity of Missouri
ORCID0000-0003-2055-6914
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS34
TOTAL DE CITAS228
TOTAL COMO AUTOR34
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN1974
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2025
ÍNDICE H6
  • Fraud in the buckeye state

    Open Access•Cooper A Maher, Timothy A Engle et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Criminal Justice•2025•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 5

  • Knowing What Things Look Like

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2024

    In ‘Knowing What Things Look Like,’ I argued against the immediacy of visual objectual knowledge, i.e. visual knowledge that a thing is F, for an object category F, such as avocado, tree, desk, etc. Joseph Shieber proposes a challenging dilemma in reply. Either knowing what Fs look like requires having concepts such as looks or it doesn’t. Either way my argument fails. If knowing what Fs look like doesn’t require having such concepts, then he cla…

  • Why We Doubt

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2024

    In Why We Doubt: A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical Inclinations, Ángel Pinillos makes a strong case for the importance of skeptical doubt, not merely to philosophy but to matters of great practical importance. Contrary to the views of Hume and Peirce, skeptical doubt can arise outside the study; it need not be “fictitious” or “paper” (viii). When it arises, it can have an impact on our willingness to act, individually and collectively. Sometim…

  • A limitation on agency in judgment

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Referencias: 24

  • Epistemic Norms for Waiting (and Suspension)

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophical Topics•2021

    Although belief formation is sometimes automatic, there are occasions in which we have the power to put it off, to wait on belief-formation. Waiting in this sense seems assessable by epistemic norms. This paper explores what form such norms might take: the nature and their content. A key question is how these norms relate to epistemic norms on belief-formation: could we have cases in which one ought to believe that p but also ought to wait on for…

  • Being neutral

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Noûs•2021

    Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one's epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This pap…

  • Sosa on epistemic value

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2020•Referencias: 10

  • Defeating pragmatic encroachment

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2018•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 10

    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of …

  • Judgment and Agency

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2017•Citada por: 1

    Virtue epistemology follows two traditions, as Ernest Sosa explains in this fine new book. One conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of the manifestation of virtuous intellectual character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. The other conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of competence in getting things right, exemplified in our reliable faculties of perception, memory, and introspection. Thus, we have character- …

  • Knowing What Things Look Like

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2017•Citada por: 4

    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such is the case. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This essay argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on …

  • Looks and Perceptual Justification

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2016•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 5

    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues fo…

  • Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 1

  • Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 3

  • Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 2

  • Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 2

  • Contextualism and Intellectualism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2010•Referencias: 5

    This is a preprint of an article published in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 24, Issue 1, pages 383-405, December 2010. The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00197.x

  • Knowledge in an Uncertain World

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•BOOK•Knowledge in an uncertain world•2009

    This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.

  • Memory and epistemic conservatism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2007•Citada por: 10•Referencias: 23

  • On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2007•Citada por: 49•Referencias: 1

    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citatio…

  • Temporal Parts

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2007•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 41

    This article discusses recent work in metaphysics on temporal parts. After a short introduction introducing the notion of a temporal part, we examine several well-known arguments for the view that ordinary material objects such as tables, trees, and persons have temporal parts: (1) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve puzzles of coincidence (e.g., the statue/lump puzzle); (2) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve the pr…

  • What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 1

    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non‐existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions

  • Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002•Citada por: 90•Referencias: 9

    Research Article| January 01 2002 Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Jeremy Fantl; Jeremy Fantl Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Matthew McGrath Matthew McGrath Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jeremy Fant…

  • Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002•Citada por: 28

  • Scott Soames

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

  • Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

Siguiente
  • Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002•Citada por: 90•Referencias: 9

    Research Article| January 01 2002 Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Jeremy Fantl; Jeremy Fantl Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Matthew McGrath Matthew McGrath Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jeremy Fant…

  • On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2007•Citada por: 49•Referencias: 1

    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citatio…

  • Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002•Citada por: 28

  • Memory and epistemic conservatism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2007•Citada por: 10•Referencias: 23

  • Stress and job satisfaction among social workers, community nurses and community psychiatric nurses

    Open Access•Beth Parry‐Jones, Beth Parry-Jones et al.•ARTICLE•Health & Social Care in the…•1998•Citada por: 10

    The introduction in April 1993 of new arrangements for assessment and care management following the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (Department of Health 1990a) heralded a period of major transition for front-line workers in the health and social services. Policy expectations for the development of the purchaser/provider split and the 'new managerialism' have posed unprecedented ideological, organizational and professional challenges. Two years a…

  • Looks and Perceptual Justification

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2016•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 5

    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues fo…

  • Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 2

  • Temporal Parts

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2007•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 41

    This article discusses recent work in metaphysics on temporal parts. After a short introduction introducing the notion of a temporal part, we examine several well-known arguments for the view that ordinary material objects such as tables, trees, and persons have temporal parts: (1) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve puzzles of coincidence (e.g., the statue/lump puzzle); (2) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve the pr…

  • What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 1

    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non‐existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions

  • Knowing What Things Look Like

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2017•Citada por: 4

    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such is the case. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This essay argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on …

  • Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 3

  • Defeating pragmatic encroachment

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2018•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 10

    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of …

  • Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 1

  • Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 2

  • Supporting 'Needs-Led' Services

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Gordon Grant•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•1992•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 11

    Many of the principles of the Community Care White Paper (DoH, 1989) bear a striking resemblance to the Welsh mental handicap strategy launched six years earlier (Welsh Office, 1983). This paper considers the lessons to be learnt from the Welsh strategy for the development of needs-led services as promulgated by the White Paper. Similarities and differences between the two policy initiatives are first identified before considering the conceptual …

  • Consumer Participation in Service Planning-the AWS Experience

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•1989•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 6

    This paper provides a case study of the involvement of carers in planning services for mentally handicapped people under the All Wales Strategy (AWS). After describing the structure for consumer participation in the AWS in Gwynedd, reasons for the low level of participation found are examined before considering what can be learnt from these early experiences. Major changes in the planning structure implemented after a review of the system are out…

  • Fraud in the buckeye state

    Open Access•Cooper A Maher, Timothy A Engle et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Criminal Justice•2025•Citada por: 1•Referencias: 5

  • Judgment and Agency

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2017•Citada por: 1

    Virtue epistemology follows two traditions, as Ernest Sosa explains in this fine new book. One conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of the manifestation of virtuous intellectual character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. The other conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of competence in getting things right, exemplified in our reliable faculties of perception, memory, and introspection. Thus, we have character- …

  • Inter‐agency Collaboration in the All‐Wales Strategy

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Social Policy and Administration•1988•Citada por: 1

    A key element in the All‐Wales Strategy (AWS) for Services for Mentally Handicapped People is the collaboration of statutory agencies involved in planning and managing mental handicap services. This paper discusses the experience over the first three years in one county. The inter‐agency county strategic planning group exhibited a high level of consensus reflecting its structure, group processes and the issues discussed. Controversial matters wer…

  • Research and community work with commonwealth immigrants

    Ray Lees, Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•New Community•1974•Referencias: 1

    (1974). Research and community work with commonwealth immigrants. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies: Vol. 3, No. 1-2, pp. 107-110

  • Social work and community relations (a review article)

    Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•New Community•1975

    Peter Baldock, Community Work and Social Work. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. £1.50. Bernard Davies, The Use of Groups in Social Work Practice. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. £4.25, Paper £1.95. Howard Jones (ed.), Towards a New Social Work. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. £1.95. Derek Jehu, Learning Theory and Social Work. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. £3.95, Paper £1.95. Eric Sainsbury, Social Work with Families. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1…

  • The Economic position of immigrants in Batley

    Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•New Community•1976

  • Inter‐agency Collaboration in the All‐Wales Strategy

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Social Policy and Administration•1988•Citada por: 1

    A key element in the All‐Wales Strategy (AWS) for Services for Mentally Handicapped People is the collaboration of statutory agencies involved in planning and managing mental handicap services. This paper discusses the experience over the first three years in one county. The inter‐agency county strategic planning group exhibited a high level of consensus reflecting its structure, group processes and the issues discussed. Controversial matters wer…

  • Lips, Teeth, and the Benefits of Lipreading

    Quentin Summerfield, A Macleod et al.•CHAPTER•Handbook of research on face…•1989

  • Consumer Participation in Service Planning-the AWS Experience

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•1989•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 6

    This paper provides a case study of the involvement of carers in planning services for mentally handicapped people under the All Wales Strategy (AWS). After describing the structure for consumer participation in the AWS in Gwynedd, reasons for the low level of participation found are examined before considering what can be learnt from these early experiences. Major changes in the planning structure implemented after a review of the system are out…

  • Supporting 'Needs-Led' Services

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Gordon Grant•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Policy•1992•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 11

    Many of the principles of the Community Care White Paper (DoH, 1989) bear a striking resemblance to the Welsh mental handicap strategy launched six years earlier (Welsh Office, 1983). This paper considers the lessons to be learnt from the Welsh strategy for the development of needs-led services as promulgated by the White Paper. Similarities and differences between the two policy initiatives are first identified before considering the conceptual …

  • The life cycle and support networks of families with a person with a learning difficulty

    Morag Mcgrath, Gordon Grant•ARTICLE•Disability Handicap & Society•1993

    This paper presents data from semi-structured interviews with 190 families enabling comparisons across the life cycle of problems faced by carers of children and adults with learning difficulties, the informal support received and support from the statutory services. The size of the kin support network described was inversely related to the number of marked behaviour problems. Age, social class and degree of handicap were all found to be associat…

  • Stress and job satisfaction among social workers, community nurses and community psychiatric nurses

    Open Access•Beth Parry‐Jones, Beth Parry-Jones et al.•ARTICLE•Health & Social Care in the…•1998•Citada por: 10

    The introduction in April 1993 of new arrangements for assessment and care management following the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (Department of Health 1990a) heralded a period of major transition for front-line workers in the health and social services. Policy expectations for the development of the purchaser/provider split and the 'new managerialism' have posed unprecedented ideological, organizational and professional challenges. Two years a…

  • Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•REVIEW•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001

  • Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002•Citada por: 90•Referencias: 9

    Research Article| January 01 2002 Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Jeremy Fantl; Jeremy Fantl Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Matthew McGrath Matthew McGrath Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 67–94. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jeremy Fant…

  • Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2002•Citada por: 28

  • Scott Soames

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2002

  • What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 1

    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non‐existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions

  • Memory and epistemic conservatism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Synthese•2007•Citada por: 10•Referencias: 23

  • On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2007•Citada por: 49•Referencias: 1

    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citatio…

  • Temporal Parts

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2007•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 41

    This article discusses recent work in metaphysics on temporal parts. After a short introduction introducing the notion of a temporal part, we examine several well-known arguments for the view that ordinary material objects such as tables, trees, and persons have temporal parts: (1) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve puzzles of coincidence (e.g., the statue/lump puzzle); (2) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve the pr…

  • Knowledge in an Uncertain World

    Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•BOOK•Knowledge in an uncertain world•2009

    This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.

  • Contextualism and Intellectualism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophical Perspectives•2010•Referencias: 5

    This is a preprint of an article published in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 24, Issue 1, pages 383-405, December 2010. The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00197.x

  • Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 2•Referencias: 1

  • Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 3

  • Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World

    Open Access•Jeremy Fantl, Morag Mcgrath et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 2

  • Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2012•Citada por: 5•Referencias: 2

  • Looks and Perceptual Justification

    Open Access•Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2016•Citada por: 6•Referencias: 5

    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues fo…

  • Judgment and Agency

    Morag Mcgrath, Matthew Mcgrath•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•2017•Citada por: 1

    Virtue epistemology follows two traditions, as Ernest Sosa explains in this fine new book. One conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of the manifestation of virtuous intellectual character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. The other conceives of epistemic normativity in terms of competence in getting things right, exemplified in our reliable faculties of perception, memory, and introspection. Thus, we have character- …

Philosophy (23 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (22 obras) · Epistemology (20 obras) · Psychology (15 obras) · Computer Science (14 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (14 obras) · Political science (12 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Linguistics (8 obras)

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