Fabrizio Panebianco

Datos Biográficos

ID3084830
NOMBREFabrizio Panebianco
NOMBRESFabrizio
APELLIDOPanebianco
FIRMAPANEBIANCO F
AFILIACIONESParis School of Economics
VERIFICADONo
TOTAL DE OBRAS10
TOTAL DE CITAS3
TOTAL COMO AUTOR9
TOTAL COMO EDITOR1
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2014
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2022
ÍNDICE H1

  • Education Transmission and Network Formation

    Open AccessVincent Boucher, Carlo Leone Del Bello et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2022

  • Education Transmission and Network Formation

    Vincent Boucher, Carlo Del Bello et al.ARTICLEJournal of Labor Economics2021

  • Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks

    Open AccessFabrizio Panebianco, Thierry VerdierARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2017

  • The dynamics of personal norms and the determinants of cultural homogeneity

    Open AccessVicente Calabuig, Gonzalo Olcina et al.ARTICLERationality and Society2017Referencias: 41

    This article studies the emergence of cultural homogeneity in personal norms when the behavior of heterogeneous individuals is driven both by economic incentives and by personal norms. Agents participate in a team production game by choosing their level of costly effort. Norms evolve along the life cycle of the individuals according to two psychological forces: cognitive dissonance or consistency and informational conformity. The model sheds ligh…

  • Understanding Cultural Traits

    Emanuele Serrelli, Fabrizio PanebiancoBOOKUnderstanding Cultural Traits2016

  • Cultural Traits in Economic Theory

    Open AccessFabrizio PanebiancoCHAPTERUnderstanding Cultural Traits2016

  • Cultural Traits and Multidisciplinary Dialogue

    Open AccessFabrizio Panebianco, E SerrelliCHAPTERUnderstanding Cultural Traits2016

  • The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance

    Vicente Calabuig, Gonzalo Olcina et al.ARTICLEApplied Economics Letters2016

    In this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choi…

  • Understanding Cultural Traits

    Open AccessFabrizio Panebianco, Emanuele SerrelliBOOKUnderstanding Cultural Traits2016

  • Beyond Carrots and Sticks

    Luigino Bruni, Fabrizio Panebianco et al.ARTICLEReview of Social Economy2014Citada por: 3Referencias: 25

    This paper is based on the intuition of Dragonetti, an old Neapolitan economist, which argues that a society experiences economic and civic development if agents promote values and virtues, more than solely rely on punishments stated by law. We thus study the evolution of cooperative behaviors using a mechanism of endogenous social rewards for cooperation (SRC). These additional (material) rewards depend on the recognition that the society—each a…