Jan Willem Honig
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 315479 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jan Willem Honig |
| NOMBRES | Jan Willem |
| APELLIDO | Honig |
| FIRMA | HONIG J W |
| AFILIACIONES | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8851-4457 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1992 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Ukraine’s Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War
This article argues that Ukraine offers a cautionary tale regarding the two main modern models of force generation. Neither the professional high-tech war model, favored by Western militaries, nor the whole-of-society war approach, said to have saved Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, proved successful formulas for Ukraine. Considering that Ukraine is fighting for survival, with Russian forces inside the country, the failure of both models in action has s…
An Exemplary Defeat
The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion-a sociopolitical and military embeddednes…
Great Battles
It may appear daring for a respected university press to start a new series recounting the stories and legacies of ‘great battles’—even when edited by a renowned military historian such as Sir Hew Strachan, until recently the Chichele Professor in the History of War at the University of Oxford. Few forms of history writing have encountered greater suspicion and reproach than ‘l’histoire-bataille’. The idea that ‘decisive battles’ form the fulcrum…
The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy
The formation of doctrine and strategy is usually regarded as the exclusive province of the major powers. Small states and their militaries have little choice but to conform. This article, however, argues that small, developed states possess an unprecedented opportunity independently to form doctrine and pursue strategy. The reasons are a worldwide trend of devolution in political power and a concomitant democratisation of violence and reduction …
Military, War, and Politics
The Ashgate Research Companion to War
Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy
Modern military historians struggle to explain medieval strategic behaviour. One key reason, the article argues, is their strong belief in the existence of timeless strategic standards. By analysing the example of the 1415 Agincourt campaign, the article proposes a new approach to understanding late medieval strategy. By reconstructing the normative framework that underpinned strategic practice, the critical importance emerges of an unusual set o…
Regaining Strategy
In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is mor…
Strategy and Genocide
Genocide is often seen as an extreme exhibition of senseless and purposeless violence and, as such, as particularly characteristic of modern war. The single most comprehensive examination of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, which was completed by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in 2002, is drawn to such an explanation. It judges the massacre to be an improvisation associated with the irrationality of war. By evaluati…
War without End(s)
This article argues that both anti- and pro-Clausewitzians have tended to base their views on an incomplete understanding of Clausewitz. We claim that the so-called ‘new wars’ do not require a new analytical paradigm, as is suggested by anti-Clausewitzians like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. But this does not mean that the prevailing pro-Clausewitzian discourse cannot be challenged. Clausewitz, as is well-known, employed a dialectical method…
Totalitarianism and realism
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields
Interpreting Clausewitz
The ‘Renationalization’ of Western European Defense
Earlier versions of this article were presented at a conference sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Defense and the Institute for East-West Security Studies in The Hague on 1 October 1991 and at the
Totalitarianism and realism
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields
An Exemplary Defeat
The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion-a sociopolitical and military embeddednes…
The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy
The formation of doctrine and strategy is usually regarded as the exclusive province of the major powers. Small states and their militaries have little choice but to conform. This article, however, argues that small, developed states possess an unprecedented opportunity independently to form doctrine and pursue strategy. The reasons are a worldwide trend of devolution in political power and a concomitant democratisation of violence and reduction …
Regaining Strategy
In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is mor…
Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy
Modern military historians struggle to explain medieval strategic behaviour. One key reason, the article argues, is their strong belief in the existence of timeless strategic standards. By analysing the example of the 1415 Agincourt campaign, the article proposes a new approach to understanding late medieval strategy. By reconstructing the normative framework that underpinned strategic practice, the critical importance emerges of an unusual set o…
Interpreting Clausewitz
The ‘Renationalization’ of Western European Defense
Earlier versions of this article were presented at a conference sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Defense and the Institute for East-West Security Studies in The Hague on 1 October 1991 and at the
The ‘Renationalization’ of Western European Defense
Earlier versions of this article were presented at a conference sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Defense and the Institute for East-West Security Studies in The Hague on 1 October 1991 and at the
Interpreting Clausewitz
Totalitarianism and realism
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields
Strategy and Genocide
Genocide is often seen as an extreme exhibition of senseless and purposeless violence and, as such, as particularly characteristic of modern war. The single most comprehensive examination of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, which was completed by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in 2002, is drawn to such an explanation. It judges the massacre to be an improvisation associated with the irrationality of war. By evaluati…
War without End(s)
This article argues that both anti- and pro-Clausewitzians have tended to base their views on an incomplete understanding of Clausewitz. We claim that the so-called ‘new wars’ do not require a new analytical paradigm, as is suggested by anti-Clausewitzians like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. But this does not mean that the prevailing pro-Clausewitzian discourse cannot be challenged. Clausewitz, as is well-known, employed a dialectical method…
Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy
Modern military historians struggle to explain medieval strategic behaviour. One key reason, the article argues, is their strong belief in the existence of timeless strategic standards. By analysing the example of the 1415 Agincourt campaign, the article proposes a new approach to understanding late medieval strategy. By reconstructing the normative framework that underpinned strategic practice, the critical importance emerges of an unusual set o…
Regaining Strategy
In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is mor…
The Ashgate Research Companion to War
Military, War, and Politics
Great Battles
It may appear daring for a respected university press to start a new series recounting the stories and legacies of ‘great battles’—even when edited by a renowned military historian such as Sir Hew Strachan, until recently the Chichele Professor in the History of War at the University of Oxford. Few forms of history writing have encountered greater suspicion and reproach than ‘l’histoire-bataille’. The idea that ‘decisive battles’ form the fulcrum…
The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy
The formation of doctrine and strategy is usually regarded as the exclusive province of the major powers. Small states and their militaries have little choice but to conform. This article, however, argues that small, developed states possess an unprecedented opportunity independently to form doctrine and pursue strategy. The reasons are a worldwide trend of devolution in political power and a concomitant democratisation of violence and reduction …
An Exemplary Defeat
The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion-a sociopolitical and military embeddednes…
Ukraine’s Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War
This article argues that Ukraine offers a cautionary tale regarding the two main modern models of force generation. Neither the professional high-tech war model, favored by Western militaries, nor the whole-of-society war approach, said to have saved Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, proved successful formulas for Ukraine. Considering that Ukraine is fighting for survival, with Russian forces inside the country, the failure of both models in action has s…
Political science (13 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Politics (7 obras) · Military History and Strategy (6 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Epistemology (4 obras) · History (4 obras) · Political economy (4 obras)