Filippa Lentzos
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 334105 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Filippa Lentzos |
| NOMBRES | Filippa |
| APELLIDO | Lentzos |
| FIRMA | LENTZOS F |
| AFILIACIONES | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6427-4025 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 21 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 132 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2006 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Pandemic risks
What does responsible science mean when it comes to genetic experiments? Are some experiments so risky they simply should not be done? Researchers, policy makers, and the public have been debating these issues for the past 50 years, ever since the first tools of genetic engineering enabled scientists to rewrite the genetic code and create organisms that had never before existed. While significant headway has been made into finding common ground a…
Our thanks to founding editor Professor Nikolas Rose
Introduction
Many people will remember Colin Powell’s historic speech to the UN Security Council describing Iraq’s mobile production facilities for making biological weapons. Many will also remember that shortl
Monitoring Iraq’s dual-use capabilities
In this interview, a former biological weapons chief inspector for UNSCOM describes the importance of biological monitoring in Iraq, its challenges, and its successes
UNSCOM’s work to uncover Iraq’s illicit biological weapons program
In this article, the authors offer a short primer that outlines UNSCOM’s historical context and the logistics of its work – central aspects contributing to the Special Commission’s successes in searching for Iraq’s hidden biological weapons program
Health Security Intelligence
This article introduces the Special Issue on Global Health Security. It provides an overview of the health security threat spectrum, tracing how perceptions of biological and health security threats have evolved in broad terms over the last century from deliberately introduced disease outbreaks to also incorporate natural disease outbreaks, unintended consequences of research, laboratory accidents, lack of awareness, negligence, and convergence o…
How to protect the world from ultra-targeted biological weapons
As genomic technologies develop and converge with AI, machine learning, automation, affective computing, and robotics, an ever more refined record of our biometrics, emotions, and behaviors (https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2018/02/28/589477976/biometric-data-and-the-rise-of-digital-dictatorship) will be captured and analyzed. These game-changing developments will deeply impact how we view health and treat disease, how long we live, and how we c…
Lockdown texts
Militarising the Mind
Advancements in behavioural neuroscience have revolutionised the treatment of mental illness by elucidating the mechanisms underpinning human behaviour and cognition. These advancements are not completely benevolent, but have dual-use potential which harkens back to a darker time when states sought to influence and control each other’s citizenry through psychological means. This article puts proposed behaviour-altering neuroscience weapons into t…
Biological Threats in the 21st Century
"Biological Threats in the 21st Century offers a fresh understanding of contemporary biological threats to national security. Readers are introduced to the politics, people, science and historical roots of contemporary biological threats through up-to-date, rigorous and accessible chapters written by leading academics and supplemented by expert point-of-view contributions and interviews.The book provides inspiration and resources for students and…
Biological Threats in the 21st Century
Biopreparedness
Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge
Institutions need to ignore some knowledge in order to function. This is “uncomfortable knowledge” because it undermines the ability of those institutions to pursue their goals (Rayner, 2012). We identify three bodies of knowledge that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology but are excluded from related policy discussions. We demonstrate how these “unknown knowns” constitute uncomfortable knowledge becaus…
The risk of bioweapons use
The Performativity of Constructed Uncertainty
Synthetic biology, security and governance
Synthetic Biology in the Social Context
Governing insecurity
How should we understand the politics of security today? This article addresses this question from one particular perspective, that of 'biosecurity'. It examines contemporary strategies for managing biorisks in three European states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We suggest that the framing of threat and response differs, even within Europe, and that one can identify three different configurations: contingency planning, protection and r…
Visions and Challenges in Redesigning Life
The American biodefense industry
Since 1998, and especially since the "Amerithrax" emergency of 2001, the United States has ambitiously funded biodefense projects, intending not only to enhance detection and management of any biological-weapons attack but also to establish a robust domestic biodefense industry. I asked if the United States had fulfilled this latter intention. Using the RAND Corporation's RaDiUS database, I examined federal biodefense grants and contracts awarded…
Rationality, Risk and Response
Governing insecurity
How should we understand the politics of security today? This article addresses this question from one particular perspective, that of 'biosecurity'. It examines contemporary strategies for managing biorisks in three European states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We suggest that the framing of threat and response differs, even within Europe, and that one can identify three different configurations: contingency planning, protection and r…
Rationality, Risk and Response
The American biodefense industry
Since 1998, and especially since the "Amerithrax" emergency of 2001, the United States has ambitiously funded biodefense projects, intending not only to enhance detection and management of any biological-weapons attack but also to establish a robust domestic biodefense industry. I asked if the United States had fulfilled this latter intention. Using the RAND Corporation's RaDiUS database, I examined federal biodefense grants and contracts awarded…
Visions and Challenges in Redesigning Life
Synthetic Biology in the Social Context
Governing insecurity
How should we understand the politics of security today? This article addresses this question from one particular perspective, that of 'biosecurity'. It examines contemporary strategies for managing biorisks in three European states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We suggest that the framing of threat and response differs, even within Europe, and that one can identify three different configurations: contingency planning, protection and r…
Synthetic biology, security and governance
Biopreparedness
Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge
Institutions need to ignore some knowledge in order to function. This is “uncomfortable knowledge” because it undermines the ability of those institutions to pursue their goals (Rayner, 2012). We identify three bodies of knowledge that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology but are excluded from related policy discussions. We demonstrate how these “unknown knowns” constitute uncomfortable knowledge becaus…
The risk of bioweapons use
The Performativity of Constructed Uncertainty
Biological Threats in the 21st Century
"Biological Threats in the 21st Century offers a fresh understanding of contemporary biological threats to national security. Readers are introduced to the politics, people, science and historical roots of contemporary biological threats through up-to-date, rigorous and accessible chapters written by leading academics and supplemented by expert point-of-view contributions and interviews.The book provides inspiration and resources for students and…
Biological Threats in the 21st Century
Militarising the Mind
Advancements in behavioural neuroscience have revolutionised the treatment of mental illness by elucidating the mechanisms underpinning human behaviour and cognition. These advancements are not completely benevolent, but have dual-use potential which harkens back to a darker time when states sought to influence and control each other’s citizenry through psychological means. This article puts proposed behaviour-altering neuroscience weapons into t…
Health Security Intelligence
This article introduces the Special Issue on Global Health Security. It provides an overview of the health security threat spectrum, tracing how perceptions of biological and health security threats have evolved in broad terms over the last century from deliberately introduced disease outbreaks to also incorporate natural disease outbreaks, unintended consequences of research, laboratory accidents, lack of awareness, negligence, and convergence o…
How to protect the world from ultra-targeted biological weapons
As genomic technologies develop and converge with AI, machine learning, automation, affective computing, and robotics, an ever more refined record of our biometrics, emotions, and behaviors (https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2018/02/28/589477976/biometric-data-and-the-rise-of-digital-dictatorship) will be captured and analyzed. These game-changing developments will deeply impact how we view health and treat disease, how long we live, and how we c…
Lockdown texts
Introduction
Many people will remember Colin Powell’s historic speech to the UN Security Council describing Iraq’s mobile production facilities for making biological weapons. Many will also remember that shortl
Monitoring Iraq’s dual-use capabilities
In this interview, a former biological weapons chief inspector for UNSCOM describes the importance of biological monitoring in Iraq, its challenges, and its successes
UNSCOM’s work to uncover Iraq’s illicit biological weapons program
In this article, the authors offer a short primer that outlines UNSCOM’s historical context and the logistics of its work – central aspects contributing to the Special Commission’s successes in searching for Iraq’s hidden biological weapons program
Pandemic risks
What does responsible science mean when it comes to genetic experiments? Are some experiments so risky they simply should not be done? Researchers, policy makers, and the public have been debating these issues for the past 50 years, ever since the first tools of genetic engineering enabled scientists to rewrite the genetic code and create organisms that had never before existed. While significant headway has been made into finding common ground a…
Our thanks to founding editor Professor Nikolas Rose
Political science (17 obras) · Law (14 obras) · Bacillus and Francisella bacterial research (10 obras) · Psychology (8 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Diathesis–stress model (7 obras) · Dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia (7 obras) · Medical tourism (7 obras) · Politics (7 obras) · Engineering (6 obras)