Nuno Garoupa
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 340127 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Nuno Garoupa |
| NOMBRES | Nuno |
| APELLIDO | Garoupa |
| FIRMA | GAROUPA N |
| AFILIACIONES | George Mason University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6792-0918 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 50 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 96 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 50 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1998 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 6 |
Compensating Non-Convicted Pretrial Detainees
This paper presents a formal model explaining how different legal rules governing compensation for non-convicted pretrial detainees impact the decisions of enforcers and courts when detaining and convicting individuals suspected of having committed a crime. The model shows that compensating every non-convicted pretrial detainee leads to too many convictions by increasing the cost of acquittals. It could also induce enforcers to apply pretrial det…
Is there a European law and economics? A reflection on identity, method, and national traditions
Constitutional monarchy and long-run economic growth
This article examines the long-run relationship between constitutional monarchy and economic growth using a panel of 37 countries from 1870 to 2018. Exploiting the staggered timing of regime transitions as a source of quasi-experimental variation, we reassess whether monarchies promote prosperity or merely survive because of it. The results suggest that pre-existing economic development, rather than monarchical institutions themselves, explains t…
Populist constitutional backsliding and judicial independence
Foreign Judges and Foreign Case Citations
We study the value of foreign judges and foreign case citations for emerging courts in postcolonial democracies, with a specific focus on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeals (HKCFA). The HKCFA, Hong Kong’s highest appellate court since the transfer of its sovereignty to China, features foreign judges as full members of the court. Using a novel dataset of all publicly available HKCFA decisions from 1997 to 2020, we show that there is a significan…
Judicial transformation
Judicial transformation may result either from shifts in institutional context (prompting behavioral adjustment among incumbent judges) or changes in the composition of the bench (particularly through court-packing strategies that introduce new appointees). This article examines the case of the Polish Constitutional Court to evaluate which of these mechanisms better accounts for the controversial transformation of the court since late 2015. Drawi…
Fifty years after
Revolutions as structural breaks
This paper examines whether major political institutional disruptions produce temporary shocks or structural breaks in long-term development. Using the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a natural experiment, we apply the synthetic control method to estimate its causal effect on economic growth and institutional quality. Drawing on a panel of 66 countries from 1950 to 2015, we construct counterfactual trajectories for Iran in the absence of revolutionary…
Out‐party, out of luck
This study examines how public support for due process in corruption investigations is affected by partisan biases. Using a survey experiment conducted with a representative sample of Portuguese voters, it finds that voters' support for legally enshrined due process rights is conditional on their partisan alignment with the corruption suspects. Specifically, respondents exhibit greater support for due process protections for in‐party than for out…
The Law of Restitution for Mistaken Payments
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment has emerged as an important and independent branch of private law globally but has attracted relatively little economic analysis. This article develops a model of the core example of restitution—mistaken payments—in a parsimonious setting with two pairs of buyers and sellers and low (high) transaction costs within (across) pairs. The framework is based on the idea that mistaken payments to strangers im…
Purging Disloyal Courts in Democratic Transitions and Judicial Preferences
∞ In this article, I examine court-purging in democratic transitions through the lens of judicial preferences. Specifically, I address the debate on how court-purging during a democratic transition affects the likelihood of future court-purging. I argue that the prevailing assumption is one of static, sincere judicial preferences. In contrast, I explicitly recognize the role of dynamic judicial preferences and incentives. This recognition suggest…
Measuring Political Institutions in the Long Run
In this article, latent variable analysis is used to construct hybrid measure of political development based on the plausible common variation between objective and subjective indicators of political institutions. For a sample of 167 countries for the period 1810–2018, we chart long-term paths of political development. Our empirical strategy attempts to overcome the existing potential bias in the measures of democracy in the long run by extractin…
Populist governments, judicial independence, and public trust in the courts
Can governments make courts politically compliant without undermining public confidence in the judicial system? Many studies show a positive relationship between judicial independence and citizens’ trust in courts. However, most of them have shown static cross-sectional correlations rather than actual effects of court curbing on trust. Factors such as citizens’ level of education and political preferences may also play a role in moderating reacti…
Regulating Parties by Constitutional Rules in Liberal Democracies
When establishing constitutional rules that regulate political parties, liberal democracies struggle between civil liberties—thus tolerating anti-democratic parties—and potential threats of democratic breakdown, which can be reduced by prosecuting and prohibiting anti-democratic parties. We suggest that liberal democracies must balance false positives and false negatives by combining ex ante and ex post regulatory mechanisms. By making use of a u…
Punishing terrorists in the Spanish Supreme Court
Ideology and Career Judges
Conventional literature presents civil-law judiciaries as insulated from political preferences. We investigate labor law appeals in the Spanish Supreme Court for the period 2010-2020. Our findings show that ideology (proxied by conservative/progressive affiliation) is a good predictor of a pro-employee/pro-employer outcome. Specifically, the results detect a pattern of behavior by justice rapporteurs: conservative rapporteurs are more likely to b…
Disagreeing in private or dissenting in public
The Exclusionary Rule Revisited
We revisit the economic theory of exclusionary rules. First, we show that more exclusion may induce enforcers to conduct more searches, contrary to the standard notion that more exclusion leads to fewer searches. Second, we identify and investigate the complexities that arise when enforcers may harass suspects (imposing significant costs without legal proceedings) instead of conducting legal searches. If one attempts to choose the optimal exclusi…
Are you Injurer or Victim? Liability for Accidents under Role-Type Uncertainty
We show that when parties are uncertain about their nature (injurer or victim) in accidents, conventional results in the bilateral accident model need to be reassessed. Legal policy implications are derived. Specifically, the efficient liability rule inevitably begs for a form of negligence that internalizes uncertainty concerning the parties (injurer or victim) and their subjective perceptions.
Measuring Procedural and Substantial Amendment Rules
Constitutional amendment difficulty or rigidity has generated extensive literature in recent times, both conceptually and empirically. Although constitutional scholars seem divided about the importance and significance of amendment limits, there has been a proliferation of indicators and statistical analysis. In this Article, while recognizing the normative debate, we provide an empirical exploration for thirty-seven countries based on factor ana…
Loyalty to the party or loyalty to the party leader
A Theory of Defiant Courts in Nondemocratic Regimes
Regimes that exhibit authoritarian features while still retaining some traditional democratic institutions are on the rise. Even though such regimes have eliminated important constraints on executive power, some still feature an occasionally defiant judiciary. We provide a novel explanation for this phenomenon by focusing on the judiciary’s role as a potential source of valuable information to the government about divisions among the regime’s eli…
Comparative Law and Economics
The fields of comparative law and law and economics have not had a happy or productive relationship. There are recent notable exceptions, such as comparative corporate governance, comparative constitutional law, and comparative competition law, but we are surprised by that limited cross-fertilization, given that so many other areas of law have found concepts from law and economics helpful and, in some instances, transformative. To try to understa…
Spurred by legal tradition or contextual politics? Lessons about judicial dissent from Slovenia and Croatia
Exploring dissent in the Supreme Court of Argentina
Choosing between the government and the regions
In this article the extent to which political variables can explain the behaviour of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions is explored. Two competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis argues that one should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. The other hypothesi…
Public trust in the European legal systems
Two findings stand out in the literature on public attitudes vis-à-vis courts. The first is that judicial independence increases public trust. The second is that ‘to know courts is to love them’. In this study, these stylised facts are used as a starting point to ask three questions. First, is there also a role for judicial accountability in fostering public trust, above and beyond that played by independence? Second, could it be that only the mo…
An Economic Theory of Church Strictness
Journal Article An Economic Theory of Church Strictness Get access Pedro Pita Barros, Pedro Pita Barros Universidade Nova de Lisboa and Centre for Economic Policy Research Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Nuno Garoupa Nuno Garoupa Universidade Nova de Lisboa and Centre for Economic Policy Research Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issu…
Guarding the Guardians
This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have created judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they di…
Measuring Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies
This paper extends the empirical analysis on the determinants of judicial behaviour by measuring the ideal points for the Justices of the Philippine Supreme Court for 1986−2010. The Philippines is an interesting case given the US influence in designing the Supreme Court while the political and social context differs significantly. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find stro…
Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection
It has been argued that, under certain conditions, judges are motivated to engage in strategic defection against their appointer once they perceive the latter to be losing effective power. This behaviour should generate a clustering of decisions unfavourable to the incumbent administration at the end of their term, when they are perceived to be weak. In this article we investigate empirically the application of the strategic defection model on th…
Judicial Performance and Trust in Legal Systems
Objective Determining the existence of a relationship between judicial performance and citizens’ trust in the legal system. Method Cross‐classified multilevel models, using data from more than 20 European countries, 80 surveys, and 100,000 respondents, over a decade. Results The longer the time that lower courts take, on average, to dispose of pending cases, the lower is the public's trust in their legal system. Conclusion Judicial performance, o…
An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Transformation in Turkey
Constitutional amendments in September 2010 restructured the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) by imposing term limits, adding six additional seats to the Court, and bolstering the role of the political branches in the appointments process. Numerous commentators have argued that the structural reforms amounted to court packing, influenced court decisions in substantive ways, and undermined the TCC’s ability to serve as an effective check on the …
An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014
Populist governments, judicial independence, and public trust in the courts
Can governments make courts politically compliant without undermining public confidence in the judicial system? Many studies show a positive relationship between judicial independence and citizens’ trust in courts. However, most of them have shown static cross-sectional correlations rather than actual effects of court curbing on trust. Factors such as citizens’ level of education and political preferences may also play a role in moderating reacti…
On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology
Cet article propose une analyse économique du choix de la technologie de mise en œuvre du droit et des droits à la protection de la vie privée. Il propose une explication de la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme en termes d’efficacité. Le modèle suggère qu’une technologie de mise en œuvre du droit avec protection de la vie privée peut engendrer plus de violations du droit et peut détériorer la qualité des décisions des tribunaux, mais qu…
Revolutions as structural breaks
This paper examines whether major political institutional disruptions produce temporary shocks or structural breaks in long-term development. Using the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a natural experiment, we apply the synthetic control method to estimate its causal effect on economic growth and institutional quality. Drawing on a panel of 66 countries from 1950 to 2015, we construct counterfactual trajectories for Iran in the absence of revolutionary…
Judicial Behavior under Austerity
The austerity policies pursued in several countries during the Eurozone crisis began to call attention to the role played by courts as relevant actors in the context of budgetary and financial stress. The case of the Portuguese Constitutional Court has often been singled out in national and international forums as one characterized by particularly intense activism in this respect. Allegedly, political conflict around austerity policies and the de…
Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference
This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law regimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to agencies, agencies’ exercise of discretion, and judicial practices of deference to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we show how cross-national differences in institutions’ capacities and the environments they face encourage the ad…
Choosing Judges in Brazil
This Paper compares the Brazilian with the United States general procedures of judicial selection at the state and federal levels. The most significant difference between the two approaches is that in Brazil the selection at the lower level is entirely administered by the judiciary, while in the United States, judges are either approved by the executive or elected by popular vote. At the Supreme Court level, however, the Brazilian Constitution us…
The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions
This paper considers why some harm‐generating activities are controlled by criminal law and criminal sanctions while others are subject to some other mechanism such as civil law, administrative law, regulation or the tax system. It looks at the question from the perspective of the law and economics approach. We seek to identify the comparative benefits of using the criminal law relative to other enforcement mechanisms and – more broadly – why cer…
Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals
There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non‐optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals
Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals
There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non‐optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals
An Economic Theory of Church Strictness
Journal Article An Economic Theory of Church Strictness Get access Pedro Pita Barros, Pedro Pita Barros Universidade Nova de Lisboa and Centre for Economic Policy Research Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Nuno Garoupa Nuno Garoupa Universidade Nova de Lisboa and Centre for Economic Policy Research Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issu…
Efficient Deterrence does not Require that the Wealthy should be Able to Buy Justice
It has been argued that it is inefficient to restrict the ability of the rich to buy better legal defense than the poor because such restrictions lead to overdeterrence of the wealthy, who have a higher opportunity cost of imprisonment. We show that the ability of the rich to buy a lower conviction probability can never lead to the expected sanction for a crime being the same at all income levels. Thus whilst a restriction on legal defense expend…
Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid
The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this paper we show that legal aid can be a part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error both guilty and innocent individuals are better off, because the marginal cost of defence expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guil…
A law and economics perspective on terrorism
On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology
Cet article propose une analyse économique du choix de la technologie de mise en œuvre du droit et des droits à la protection de la vie privée. Il propose une explication de la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme en termes d’efficacité. Le modèle suggère qu’une technologie de mise en œuvre du droit avec protection de la vie privée peut engendrer plus de violations du droit et peut détériorer la qualité des décisions des tribunaux, mais qu…
The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions
This paper considers why some harm‐generating activities are controlled by criminal law and criminal sanctions while others are subject to some other mechanism such as civil law, administrative law, regulation or the tax system. It looks at the question from the perspective of the law and economics approach. We seek to identify the comparative benefits of using the criminal law relative to other enforcement mechanisms and – more broadly – why cer…
Costs and Cautionary Tales
Criminal Law and Economics
Criminal Law and Economics applies economic theory to explain crime, law enforcement, criminal law and criminal procedure. This pathbreaking book draws together sixteen chapters by leading scholars in the field, summarizing theoretical and empirical work researched to date on criminal law and economics. The topics range from private and public enforcement of the law, criminal procedure and regulation to terrorism, cyber crime and tax evasion. The…
Assessing the Argument for Specialized Courts
Specialized courts have become a key component of the legal reform packages implemented in civil law countries, particularly, in the area of family law. One argument for this policy is that they are able to reach a decision faster than the regular courts, which are normally congested. We use data from a survey of Spanish family courts in the region of Madrid to test this claim. After controlling for other relevant variables, the econometric resul…
Guarding the Guardians
This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have created judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they di…
Regulation of Professions
This unique Handbook offers the most up-to-date and comprehensive, state-of-the-art reviews of the politics of regulation. It presents and discusses the core theories and concepts of regulation in response to the rise of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism, and in the context of the ‘golden age of regulation’. Its eleven sections include forty-eight chapters covering issues as diverse and varied as: theories of regulation; historical p…
Choosing Judges in Brazil
This Paper compares the Brazilian with the United States general procedures of judicial selection at the state and federal levels. The most significant difference between the two approaches is that in Brazil the selection at the lower level is entirely administered by the judiciary, while in the United States, judges are either approved by the executive or elected by popular vote. At the Supreme Court level, however, the Brazilian Constitution us…
Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence
The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of law is that wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence. This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence, because they influence equally the innocent and the guilty. Therefore deterrence does not change. We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence. We prove that wrongful conv…
Choosing between the government and the regions
In this article the extent to which political variables can explain the behaviour of constitutional judges in Italy when dealing with conflicts between the central government and regions is explored. Two competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis argues that one should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the judges and the success of the central government primarily due to the appointment mechanism. The other hypothesi…
Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection
It has been argued that, under certain conditions, judges are motivated to engage in strategic defection against their appointer once they perceive the latter to be losing effective power. This behaviour should generate a clustering of decisions unfavourable to the incumbent administration at the end of their term, when they are perceived to be weak. In this article we investigate empirically the application of the strategic defection model on th…
Stare decisis e certiorari chegam ao Brasil
Duas grandes reformas nos processos judiciais foram implementadas no Brasil recentemente: a súmula vinculante (todos os tribunais tem que seguir as decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em casos similares) e o requisito da repercussão geral (a Suprema Corte apenas aprecia os casos que são de relevância geral). Essas duas novas regras respondem a um longo debate na comunidade jurídica brasileira em como resolver a congestionamentos dos tribunais, o…
Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference
This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law regimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to agencies, agencies’ exercise of discretion, and judicial practices of deference to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we show how cross-national differences in institutions’ capacities and the environments they face encourage the ad…
Measuring Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies
This paper extends the empirical analysis on the determinants of judicial behaviour by measuring the ideal points for the Justices of the Philippine Supreme Court for 1986−2010. The Philippines is an interesting case given the US influence in designing the Supreme Court while the political and social context differs significantly. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find stro…
An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014
Stare decisis e certiorari chegam ao Brasil
Duas grandes reformas nos processos judiciais foram implementadas no Brasil recentemente: a smula vinculante (todos os tribunais tem que seguir as decises do Supremo Tribunal Federal em casos similares) e o requisito da repercusso geral (a Suprema Corte apenas aprecia os casos que so de relevncia geral). Essas duas novas regras respondem a um longo debate na comunidade jurdica brasileira em como resolver a congestionamentos dos tribunais, o grand…
Judicial Behavior under Austerity
The austerity policies pursued in several countries during the Eurozone crisis began to call attention to the role played by courts as relevant actors in the context of budgetary and financial stress. The case of the Portuguese Constitutional Court has often been singled out in national and international forums as one characterized by particularly intense activism in this respect. Allegedly, political conflict around austerity policies and the de…
An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Transformation in Turkey
Constitutional amendments in September 2010 restructured the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) by imposing term limits, adding six additional seats to the Court, and bolstering the role of the political branches in the appointments process. Numerous commentators have argued that the structural reforms amounted to court packing, influenced court decisions in substantive ways, and undermined the TCC’s ability to serve as an effective check on the …
Spurred by legal tradition or contextual politics? Lessons about judicial dissent from Slovenia and Croatia
Exploring dissent in the Supreme Court of Argentina
Political science (41 obras) · Law (35 obras) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (30 obras) · Economics (24 obras) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (24 obras) · Law and economics (19 obras) · Politics (18 obras) · Law (17 obras) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (17 obras) · Sociology (14 obras)