Jeroen Hopster
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3426604 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jeroen Hopster |
| NOMBRES | Jeroen |
| APELLIDO | Hopster |
| FIRMA | HOPSTER J |
| AFILIACIONES | Utrecht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9239-3048 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 30 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2017 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Conceptual Mediation in Technomoral Change
Philosophers of technology have identified various mechanisms through which technology can change moral norms, values, beliefs and practices. Danaher and Sætra (2023) offer a useful systematization of these mechanisms, with no claim to being exhaustive. We contribute to their work by analyzing how the mediating role of moral concepts fits into this scheme. First, we point out that concepts mediate the moral effects of technological changes, a pro…
Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose
Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the exa…
Anticipatory gaps challenge the public governance of heritable human genome editing
Considering public moral attitudes is a hallmark of the anticipatory governance of emerging biotechnologies, such as heritable human genome editing. However, such anticipatory governance often overlooks that future morality is open to change and that future generations may perform different moral assessments on the very biotechnologies we are trying to govern in the present. In this article, we identify an ‘anticipatory gap’ that has not been suf…
Pistols, pills, pork and ploughs
The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role …
Vertical Technologies and Relational Values
Critical reflection on the material, environmental, and social conditions underlying technology remains peripheral to the field of technology ethics. In this commentary, I underwrite the diagnosis by Vandemeulebroucke et al. (2025) that the field suffers from an “extractivist blindspot”, but propose a somewhat different cure. First, rather than focusing on the material ontogenesis of technical artefacts, a more radical turn away from artefacts is…
The Weight of Legitimate Expectations in a Just Climate Transition
The ambition to decarbonize societies calls for a normative theory of just transitions. An important aspect of such a theory is to scrutinize the moral entitlements of stakeholders whose status quo expectations get frustrated in the course of sustainability transitions. The concept of legitimate expectations (LE) has been advanced as a core constituent of such a theory but has also been criticized for the conceptual confusion it attracts. In this…
Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice
Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful f…
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, an…
Who owns Nature? Conceptual appropriation in discourses on climate and biotechnologies
Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a…
Climate Uncertainty, Real Possibilities and the Precautionary Principle
A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionar…
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology
Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation . We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, adva…
Ethics of socially disruptive technologies
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
Future value change
The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of ‘axiological futurism’. However, this investigation faces a challenge: ‘axiological possibility space’ is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculati…
The normative significance of future moral revolutions
Since moral revolutions have occurred in the past, it seems plausible to suppose that they will occur again in the future. What significance, if any, does this prospect have for our present normative outlook? This paper identifies eight ways in which this question may be answered, drawing on recent arguments in the philosophical literature. Our aim is not to vindicate any of these purported normative responses as correct. Instead, our aim is taxo…
Mutual affordances
In a recent contribution to this journal Paolo Gerbaudo has argued that an ‘elective affinity’ exists between social media and populism. The present article expands on Gerbaudo’s argument and examines various dimensions of this affinity in further detail. It argues that it is helpful to conceptually reframe the proposed affinity in terms of affordances. Four affordances are identified which make the social media ecology relatively favourable to b…
What are socially disruptive technologies
Scholarly discourse on “disruptive technologies” has been strongly influenced by disruptive innovation theory. This theory is tailored for analyzing disruptions in markets and business. It is of limited use, however, in analyzing the broader social, moral and existential dynamics of technosocial disruption. Yet these broader dynamics should be of great scholarly concern, both in coming to terms with technological disruptions of the past and those…
Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology
What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse’s evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse’s argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that people generally experience morality as objective. We demonstrate how recent experimental findings challenge this widely-shared armchair presumption and…
Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity
What are socially disruptive technologies
Scholarly discourse on “disruptive technologies” has been strongly influenced by disruptive innovation theory. This theory is tailored for analyzing disruptions in markets and business. It is of limited use, however, in analyzing the broader social, moral and existential dynamics of technosocial disruption. Yet these broader dynamics should be of great scholarly concern, both in coming to terms with technological disruptions of the past and those…
Mutual affordances
In a recent contribution to this journal Paolo Gerbaudo has argued that an ‘elective affinity’ exists between social media and populism. The present article expands on Gerbaudo’s argument and examines various dimensions of this affinity in further detail. It argues that it is helpful to conceptually reframe the proposed affinity in terms of affordances. Four affordances are identified which make the social media ecology relatively favourable to b…
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
The Weight of Legitimate Expectations in a Just Climate Transition
The ambition to decarbonize societies calls for a normative theory of just transitions. An important aspect of such a theory is to scrutinize the moral entitlements of stakeholders whose status quo expectations get frustrated in the course of sustainability transitions. The concept of legitimate expectations (LE) has been advanced as a core constituent of such a theory but has also been criticized for the conceptual confusion it attracts. In this…
Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity
Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity
Why Metaethics Needs Empirical Moral Psychology
What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse’s evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse’s argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that people generally experience morality as objective. We demonstrate how recent experimental findings challenge this widely-shared armchair presumption and…
Mutual affordances
In a recent contribution to this journal Paolo Gerbaudo has argued that an ‘elective affinity’ exists between social media and populism. The present article expands on Gerbaudo’s argument and examines various dimensions of this affinity in further detail. It argues that it is helpful to conceptually reframe the proposed affinity in terms of affordances. Four affordances are identified which make the social media ecology relatively favourable to b…
What are socially disruptive technologies
Scholarly discourse on “disruptive technologies” has been strongly influenced by disruptive innovation theory. This theory is tailored for analyzing disruptions in markets and business. It is of limited use, however, in analyzing the broader social, moral and existential dynamics of technosocial disruption. Yet these broader dynamics should be of great scholarly concern, both in coming to terms with technological disruptions of the past and those…
Future value change
The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of ‘axiological futurism’. However, this investigation faces a challenge: ‘axiological possibility space’ is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculati…
The normative significance of future moral revolutions
Since moral revolutions have occurred in the past, it seems plausible to suppose that they will occur again in the future. What significance, if any, does this prospect have for our present normative outlook? This paper identifies eight ways in which this question may be answered, drawing on recent arguments in the philosophical literature. Our aim is not to vindicate any of these purported normative responses as correct. Instead, our aim is taxo…
Climate Uncertainty, Real Possibilities and the Precautionary Principle
A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionar…
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology
Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation . We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, adva…
Ethics of socially disruptive technologies
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice
Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful f…
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, an…
Who owns Nature? Conceptual appropriation in discourses on climate and biotechnologies
Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a…
Anticipatory gaps challenge the public governance of heritable human genome editing
Considering public moral attitudes is a hallmark of the anticipatory governance of emerging biotechnologies, such as heritable human genome editing. However, such anticipatory governance often overlooks that future morality is open to change and that future generations may perform different moral assessments on the very biotechnologies we are trying to govern in the present. In this article, we identify an ‘anticipatory gap’ that has not been suf…
Pistols, pills, pork and ploughs
The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role …
Vertical Technologies and Relational Values
Critical reflection on the material, environmental, and social conditions underlying technology remains peripheral to the field of technology ethics. In this commentary, I underwrite the diagnosis by Vandemeulebroucke et al. (2025) that the field suffers from an “extractivist blindspot”, but propose a somewhat different cure. First, rather than focusing on the material ontogenesis of technical artefacts, a more radical turn away from artefacts is…
The Weight of Legitimate Expectations in a Just Climate Transition
The ambition to decarbonize societies calls for a normative theory of just transitions. An important aspect of such a theory is to scrutinize the moral entitlements of stakeholders whose status quo expectations get frustrated in the course of sustainability transitions. The concept of legitimate expectations (LE) has been advanced as a core constituent of such a theory but has also been criticized for the conceptual confusion it attracts. In this…
Conceptual Mediation in Technomoral Change
Philosophers of technology have identified various mechanisms through which technology can change moral norms, values, beliefs and practices. Danaher and Sætra (2023) offer a useful systematization of these mechanisms, with no claim to being exhaustive. We contribute to their work by analyzing how the mediating role of moral concepts fits into this scheme. First, we point out that concepts mediate the moral effects of technological changes, a pro…
Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose
Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the exa…
Epistemology (13 obras) · Sociology (13 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (8 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (7 obras) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (6 obras) · Psychology (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras)